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Abstract 
 
This thesis claims that attempts to eliminate everyday objects from ontology on 
the basis of a priori reasoning about the composition relation fail. The thesis 
focuses on the positions of ‗Organicist‘ philosophers; philosophers who argue 
that  all  that  exists  are  organisms  and  microscopic  (or  smaller)  mereological 
simples.  
 
Organicist  positions  have  two  key  foundations:  1)  arguments  from 
compositional  failure,  which  conclude  that  there  are  no  everyday  objects 
because (it is argued) there are no non-living composite entities. 2) A rhetorical 
move, the ‗O-arranging manoeuvre‘, whereby it is claimed that the elimination 
of  everyday  objects  from  our  ontology  would  make  ‗no-difference‘  because 
object-wise arrangements of mereological simples take their place. 
 
The  thesis  maintains  that  arguments  from  compositional  failure  should  be 
reinterpreted as arguments to the conclusion that the notion of ‗composition‘ 
being employed by Organicists is inadequate for the purposes of metaphysics. A 
minimal alternative account of everyday objects is posited. It is shown that by 
deploying  the  O-arranging  manoeuvre  Organicists  (and  other  Eliminativists) 
commit themselves to all that is required on the presented account to entail the 
conclusion that everyday objects exist.  
 
The thesis concludes that there are everyday objects. It suggests that we should 
reject the idea that composition is what matters in ontology, but if one does not 
then the thesis gives reasons for rejecting compositional ontologies that entail 
the non-existence of everyday objects.  
   4 
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Introduction 
 
‗Organicists‘ are committed to the claim that although there are people, strictly 
speaking none of them are wearing clothes. For Organicists claim that the only 
things bigger than an atom that exist are living things. Organisms exist, they 
claim, but clothes, cups, mountains, pebbles and lakes do not.  Trees exist, but 
firewood does not. Apples cease to exist once plucked from the tree. People 
exist, but corpses do not1, and so on.  
 
It is important to be clear: this is not a sceptical claim. It is not the claim that we 
do not have sufficient reason to believe in everyday objects or the claim that we 
cannot know that there are everyday objects. It is the stronger claim that there 
are no non-living objects. Simply put, the claim is that they do not (and in fact, 
could not) exist. Here the claim that there are no non-living everyday objects 
will be termed the ‗negative ontological claim‘ (we can contrast this with the 
Organicists‘ positive ontological claim, which is that there are living things). 
 
The notion of an ‗everyday object‘ is a mundane one. Everyday objects are just 
those things that make up the world, or, not to beg any questions against the 
Organicists, those objects which we normally (pre-philosophically) take to make 
up  the  world.  They  are  things  such  as  tables,  chairs,  pebbles,  tomatoes, 
mountains, planets, seas, haberdashery, soft-drinks, and galaxies. They are the 
particular things with which we interact in the ordinary course of living our 
lives2. 
 
The negative ontological claim seems self evidently false. It seems self evident 
that there is a computer that I am typing this upon, that I travel places on trains, 
                                              
1 This example is due, I am told, to Katherine Hawley. 
2 For the purposes of this thesis, I will often restrict application of the term ‘everyday object’ 
to just those non-living objects that Organicists deny the existence of. It should be clear 
from the context where I do this.    8 
that  I  am  drinking  a  mug  of  tea  and  so  on.  We  might  ask:  if  there  are  no 
everyday objects how are we to account for the way that the world seems and 
for our interactions with it? How do we account for the causal activities of 
everyday objects? 
 
Organicists  respond  to  these  sorts  of  challenges,  and  attempt  to  make  the 
negative ontological claim plausible, through a dialectical trick that will here be 
termed  the  ‗O-arranging  manoeuvre‘.  The  O-arranging  manoeuvre  works  by 
replacing objects with mereological simples or atoms (i.e. things without parts—
we shall see shortly that this notion is more problematic than the Organicists 
suppose) arranged ‗object-wise‘. So according to the Organicists, although my 
computer does not exist, there are simples arranged computer-wise which have 
cooperated to do all the things that I would normally take a computer to do; 
there is no chair to support my weight, but there are simples arranged chair-wise 
to support me. The O-arranging manoeuvre enables Organicists to argue that a 
world without non-living everyday objects would seem to us just as the world 
actually does. It enables them to treat the question ‗what objects are there?‘ as a 
metaphysical rather than a physical question. 
 
Despite the incredulous stares which a bald statement of the position can give 
rise to, Organicism is a popular position in contemporary metaphysics. While it 
is difficult to say how many adherents it has, it has, for the most part, been 
accepted as one of the viable positions with respect to the ontology of everyday 
objects. It is also influential: Organicists are among the main proponents of an 
approach  to  the  metaphysics  of  everyday  objects  that  we  could  call 
‗compositional ontology‘. The idea of the approach is that we can discover what 
things  there  are  in  the  world  through  a  priori  reasoning  about  composition. 
Organicism‘s  two  main  proponents  are  Peter  van  Inwagen3  and  Trenton 
Merricks. 
                                              
3  Van  Inwagen’s  1990  Material  Beings  has  366  citings  listed  on  Google  scholar,  and 
Merricks’ 2001 Objects and Persons has 127 citations (search date: 21 May 2009).    9 
 
The  notion  of  compositional  ontology  will  be  discussed  in  some  detail  in 
Chapter One. According to a compositional ontology the best way to answer 
the question ‗what everyday objects are there?‘ is to first answer the question 
‗what composite objects are there?‘. Because any macroscopic objects must be 
composite,  the  thinking  goes,  answering  this  question  will  tell  us  what 
macroscopic objects there are.  
 
The idea that there are no non-living everyday objects is strengthened by appeal 
to traditional puzzles about everyday objects such as the Ship of Theseus puzzle, 
the  sorites  paradox,  and  the  ‗problem  of  the  many‘4.  These  puzzles  can  be 
construed as puzzles about composition.  
 
The problem of the many5, for example, is premised upon the possibility that 
for a given object it may be unclear precisely which atoms compose it. Consider 
a particularly crumbly cookie for instance. Maybe we could imagine a cookie so 
crumbly that it was in fact entirely composed of crumbs. If we take some crumb 
on the edge of the cookie, it might not be entirely clear whether or not that 
crumb is ‗part‘ of the cookie. There may be a number of crumbs like this. When 
we  refer  to  the  cookie  then,  which  particular  collection  of  crumbs  are  we 
referring to? Is it the collection of crumbs which includes that one on the edge 
or not? It seems that we have two candidate cookies that we could be referring 
to.  We  could  be  referring  to  the  cookie  composed  of  all  the  other  crumbs 
except the one on the edge, or we could be referring to the cookie composed of 
all those crumbs and the one on the edge. What is more, it seems that for any of 
those crumbs on the edge we can ask a similar question. Are there indefinitely 
                                              
4 The Ship of Theseus puzzle and the sorites paradox are discussed in Chapter Seven, 
where the use that Merricks and van Inwagen make of them are discussed. The sorites 
paradox is also appealed to by Unger and Wheeler in their denial of everyday objects (see 
(Unger  1979),  (Unger  1979)  and  (Wheeler  1979)  for  uses  of  the  sorites  to  deny  the 
existence of everyday objects). 
5 See (Unger 1980) and (Lewis 1993).   10 
many cookies that we could be referring to? The Organicist answer is simple—
there are no cookies, and so there is no cookie that we are referring to. 
 
The debate about the existence of everyday objects then, is located at the nexus 
of a number of different issues. Issues about composition, about the right way 
to  do  metaphysics,  issues  arising  from  the  traditional  problems  concerning 
objects, the question of what it is (if anything) we pick out when we talk about 
objects and whether it is really plausible to suppose that the world would be the 
same regardless of whether or not it contains everyday objects. Showing how 
the Organicist thesis can be challenged will provide us with a more secure basis 
for investigating these issues. 
 
This  thesis  offers  a  number  of  challenges  to  Organicism.  In  Chapter  One 
compositional  ontologies  are  examined  in  some  detail.  It  is  noted  that 
Organicists do not offer us any sort of analysis of composition; in fact, van 
Inwagen suggests that there is no such analysis to be found. It is argued here 
however,  that  this  is  a  weakness  in  a  compositional  ontology.  It  leads  to  a 
problem in making sense of the notion of a mereological simple. If we are going 
to determine what things there are in the world by determining the occasions 
when mereological simples compose other things, then we had better be able to 
specify  what  it  is  for  something  to  be  a  mereological  simple.  Standardly,  a 
mereological simple is taken to be a thing without parts. But in the mereological 
systems  which  form  the  background  to  compositional  ontology  the  ‗part‘ 
relation is a basic notion. Such systems do not offer any way to determine it. 
Given this, we can raise a legitimate question about what things are supposed to 
be simple. What is more, once the impoverished notion of composition that the 
Organicists  are  appealing  to  becomes  clear  we  can  present  them  with  the 
following  challenge:  Why  should  we  suppose  that  everyday  objects  are 
composite  rather  than  simple?  It  is  argued  that  while  the  conclusion  that 
everyday objects are simple is not an obvious one, it is at least as plausible as, 
and is preferable to, the conclusion that there are no macroscopic objects.  
   11 
In Chapter Two a property bundle theory of everyday objects is developed, as is 
the basis for a theory of object concepts. It is argued that our object concepts 
are  both  generated  in  response  to,  and  satisfied  by,  regularities  in  our 
environment that can be thought of in metaphysical terms as bundles of (sparse) 
properties. The challenge is then presented to the Organicist to say what more is 
necessary for there to be objects than our object concepts being satisfied by the 
environment that we live in. 
 
Chapter Three builds on the previous chapter by showing how the theory of 
objects presented in that chapter is consonant with traditional empiricism. In 
particular it is noted that the theory developed there fits nicely with the way that 
J. L. Mackie reconstructs Locke‘s view of everyday objects. It is suggested then 
that there is nothing especially radical about the theory presented in Chapter 
Two, and that it merely locates and brings to bear resources for responding to 
the Organicist which were already available to empiricists. 
 
In  Chapter  Four  the  O-arranging  manoeuvre  is  discussed  in  detail.  The 
manoeuvre is shown to be an essential part of the Organicist position and to 
entail a number of commitments on the part of Organicists which will make it 
difficult  for  them  to  respond  to  the  theory  of  objects  presented  here.  In 
particular, it is argued that the O-arranging manoeuvre commits the Organicist 
to the existence of sparse properties that are coordinated in the way that we 
require them to be for us to conclude that there are objects. Given this sort of 
coordination, it is argued in Chapter Five, that it is difficult for Organicists to 
give a principled objection to the claim that what satisfy our object concepts are 
complexes  of  properties  that  are  themselves  the  causal  consequence  of 
arrangements of simples.  
 
Chapter Six responds to arguments from over-determination that are presented 
by Trenton Merricks and Cian Dorr. Dorr and Merricks argue that we should 
eliminate everyday objects from our ontology because we can account for all of 
their causal activities in terms of the activities of their parts and they are hence   12 
epiphenomenal.  In  response  it  is  noted  that  in  order  to  be  both  valid  and 
plausible, such an argument must rely on a hidden premise to the effect that 
objects  are  causally  independent  of  their  parts.  Since  it  is  clearly  false  that 
objects and their parts are causally independent it is concluded that Dorr‘s and 
Merricks‘ arguments are unsound. 
 
Finally, in Chapter Seven two of the puzzles concerning everyday objects are 
discussed.  Both  Merricks  and  van  Inwagen  claim  that  a  strength  of  their 
position is its ability to deal with the puzzles about everyday objects. The basis 
of this is simple: if there are no everyday objects, then there can be no problems 
concerning  their  composition.  It  is  argued  in  Chapter  Seven  that  while  the 
details  of  the  Organicists‘  positive  ontological  claims  may  benefit  them  in 
dealing with the puzzles, they do not enjoy a significant advantage over other 
positions by virtue of their negative ontological claim. In particular, problems 
that  arise  for  other  positions  with  respect  to  everyday  objects  still  arise  for 
Organicists with respect to living things. What is more, problems that arise at a 
level of metaphysics for theories that take everyday objects to exist, re-occur as 
issues in semantics for Organicists. To the extent that there is a problem about 
whether some object persists, for example, there is a problem for Organicists in 
making sense of our linguistic practice in referring to the same thing at different 
times.  
 
This thesis, then, presents two complimentary challenges to Organicism. The 
first challenge is to the notion that we can determine what there is by a priori 
reasoning about composition. The challenge is: Given the very thin notion of 
composition  that  Organicists  are  appealing  to,  why  should  we  suppose  that 
everyday objects must be composite? Why could they not be (in the sense of 
composition being used) simple? 
 
In the second half of this thesis it is argued that our object concepts are, as a 
matter  of  fact,  satisfied  and  that  by  utilising  the  O-arranging  manoeuvre 
Organicists make it difficult for themselves to coherently deny this. The second   13 
challenge then is this: If our object concepts are satisfied by our environment, 
what more is needed for us to conclude that there are everyday objects? The 
Organicists‘ standard answer is that in order for collections of simples to give 
rise to objects they must compose something. But here I argue that is false, 
given the notion of composition utilised by Organicists. 
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Recent metaphysical literature on everyday objects has spawned theses about 
what there is that are very much at odds with what, pre-philosophically, most 
people seem to believe. Thus, we have ‗Universalists‘ claiming that for any n 
number  of  objects  there  is  an  n+1th  object  which  they  compose  and 
‗Eliminativists‘ arguing that there are no everyday objects at all. The main target 
of  this  thesis  is  Organicism;  the  thesis  that  the  only  things  that  exist  are 
mereological simples (i.e. things that do not themselves have parts) and living 
things. The arguments advanced in favour of Organicism, however, exemplify a 
certain approach to ontology, which can be termed ‗compositional ontology‘, 
and this too will be criticised.  
 
This  chapter  introduces  compositional  ontology  and  Organicism  and  will 
suggest that they are not conceptually well founded. In particular, we will see 
that Organicists lack an account of what composition is. It will be suggested that 
given this they are also unable to give an account of what ‗simples‘ are, or to 
give a principled objection to the idea that everyday objects are in fact functional 
simples.    15 
 
Section 1.1 introduces compositional ontology as a metaphysical approach and 
uncovers some of the commitments that are associated with it. In 1.2 some of 
the theoretical background to the Organicist position is laid out and in section 
1.3 we show that there are a number of ways to think about parts and wholes in 
addition to that which seems to be appealed to by the compositional ontologists 
who are the target of this chapter. It is suggested that whenever we talk about 
‗parthood‘ in the context of metaphysical theories we are, to a certain extent, 
using the expressions ‗part‘ and ‗composition‘ in a technical way.  
 
One of the most influential aspects of van Inwagen‘s treatment is the way that 
he frames the questions. His claim is that the important question to answer is 
the one that he terms ‗the Special Composition Question‘; the question, that is 
‗when do some things compose another thing?‘. This question is central to the 
approach to metaphysics that is here termed ‗compositional ontology‘6. Section 
1.4  shows  how  focusing  on  the  Special  Compositional  Question,  to  the 
exclusion  of  other  questions  about  composition,  skews  the  discussion  of 
everyday objects. Section 1.5 examines what we can learn from answers to the 
Special Compositional Question, and it is argued that the Organicists‘ purpose 
in examining the question is to find support for their negative ontological claim, 
rather than to make discoveries about the nature of those composite objects 
that they do think exist. 
 
Having laid out the bones of the Organicist position in sections 1.1 to 1.5, the 
last  three  sections  of  the  chapter  make  the  case  that  the  conception  of 
composition  that  the  Organicist  appeals  to  is  weak  in  two  significant  ways. 
Firstly,  it  faces  a  difficulty  in  giving  an  account  of  what  ‗simples‘  are,  and 
secondly, in resisting the claim that everyday objects are in fact simple. I argue 
                                              
6 As Hawley puts it (Hawley 2006) van Inwagen’s Material Beings  is ‘agenda setting’. The 
reason for this is at least in part the way that he frames the questions.   16 
that the claim that everyday objects are simple, while not ideal, is a more natural 
conclusion to draw then the conclusion that there are no everyday objects.  
 
1.1   Compositional ontology 
It has become common to present discussion about the ontology of everyday 
objects  as  turning  upon  which  of  a  number  of  competing  theses  about 
composition is correct7. Three possible theses are exhaustive of the possibilities 
with respect to composition, and those philosophers who will here be termed 
‗compositional  ontologists‘  hold  correlative  ontological  theses.  The  available 
options concerning composition are:  
 
  Unrestricted Composition  
  Restricted Composition 
  No Composition 
 
(Terminological note: these names will be used to pick out the theses about 
composition,  which  can  be  considered  independently  of  their  ontological 
correlates).  
 
Unrestricted Composition claims that there is no limit on composition: any two 
things automatically compose a third thing. The usual examples given of this are 
odd combinations of physical objects (with socks and the Eiffel Tower being 
popular  choices).  Thus,  we  might,  in  order  to  highlight  the  supposed 
implausibility  of  this  position  note  that  it  entails  that  there  is  an  object 
composed  of  my  phone  and  the  Pope‘s  left  hand.  In  fact,  these  sorts  of 
consequences only follow if you think that objects such as the Pope‘s left hand 
                                              
7 Although there is a well established meta-ontological literature questioning the basis of 
metaphysical debates in general and this debate in particular. See for instance, (Carnap 
1950), (Quine 1951a), (Yablo 1998), (Dorr 2005), (Azzouni 2007), and the recent collection, 
(Chalmers, Manley and Wasserman 2009). While meta-ontological questions will not be 
discussed explicitly in this thesis (though they are touched on at the end of Chapter Six), it 
should become clear that there is a meta-ontological position which informs the position 
taken here.   17 
and my phone just are their parts; if you think that there is more to my phone 
than its matter, then the story would need to be more complicated. A more 
careful formulation might not mention the Pope‘s hand and my phone directly. 
People  who  accept  Unrestricted  Composition  are  not  committed  to  talking 
about phones or hands at all. What they are committed to is that the things 
(presumably matter) that compose the Pope‘s hand (however picked out) and 
the  things  (again,  presumably  material)  that  compose  my  phone  (however 
picked out), also (together) compose a third thing.   
 
‗Universalism‘ is the ontological correlate of Unrestricted Composition8. If any 
two objects compose a third object, and we can take the objects over which the 
existential quantifier ranges to be either composite objects or simples, then it 
would seem to follow trivially that whenever there are two objects, there is a 
third object which is the composite of both of them. 
 
‗No Composition‘, as might be expected, is the claim that no composition takes 
place. This can be taken to entail ‗Eliminativism‘; the thesis that there are no 
composite objects. Recent defenders of this view are Cian Dorr (Dorr 2002) and 
Keith Hossack (Hossack 2000), and Peter Unger has held a closely related view 
(Unger 1979)9.  
 
Finally, Restricted Composition is the thesis that composition only happens 
sometimes10. Some things taken together compose other things, the thought 
goes, and some things taken together do not compose anything. This might be 
supposed to be the pre-philosophical starting point of most people with respect 
to composition. In order to get from restricted composition to a generalizable 
                                              
8 Two recent philosophers who take Universalist positions are David  Lewis (see  (Lewis 
1991)) and Theodor Sider (see (Sider 2001)).  
9 Unger held that while there are no everyday objects such as tables and chairs, there may 
still be material things. In more recent work (e.g.  (Unger 2006)) Unger has moved away 
from his nihilist position with respect to everyday objects. 
10 Merricks and van Inwagen hold the Organicist version of the posi tion. Responses closer 
to  a  ‘naïve’  view  have  been  defended  by  Markosian  (Markosian  1998a)  and  Sanford 
(Sanford 1993).    18 
ontological thesis, however, one needs an account  of under what conditions 
composition takes place.  
 
Organicists hold a controversial version of Restricted Composition: they hold 
that  those  bits  of  matter  that  make  up  living  things  succeed  in  composing 
something, but that other bits of matter do not11. Because there are no non -
living composite objects, according to the O rganicist we should conclude that 
there  are  no non -living everyday  objects.  They infer  the  non -existence  of 
everyday objects from the failure of other matter to compose anything . (They 
have other reasons for rejecting everyday objects as well, these are addressed in 
Chapters Six and Seven).  
 
We  can  see  then  that  both  Elimina tivism  about  everyday  objects  and 
Organicism derive part of the reason for their negative ontological claims from 
theses about composition. They  infer from their conclusion that there are no 
composite objects (or there are no non-living composite objects) the conclusion 
that there are no everyday objects (or there are no non-living everyday objects). 
Another  reason they c an give to support their negative ontological claims  
derives from traditional problems about everyday objects, such as the Problem 
of the Many, the Ship of Theseus and the  sorites paradox. These arguments, 
while being concerned with the endurance of everyd ay objects, can also be 
understood  as concerning  the composition of objects. The Organicist and 
Eliminativist theses are supposed to help with these puzzles by obviating the 
need for them: the  Eliminativist about everyday objects need not say which 
collection of crumbs is identical to the cookie, because they do not think there 
are any cookies. (Though Chapter Seven of this thesis challenges the claim that 
                                              
11  Van  Inwagen  holds  that  simples  that  constitute  a  life  compose  something.  Merricks’ 
thesis is slightly different, though here I will ignore these differences where they do not 
affect  the  main  line  of  argument  presented.  Merricks  holds  that  simples  compose 
something just in case there is an emergent property of an object constituted by the simples 
that cannot be attributed to the joint action of the simples. He argues that consciousness is 
such a property. Merricks’ position is slightly mysterious: if the simples are not responsible 
for the emergent property, why should we think they have anything to do with it or that they 
are parts of the object exhibiting it?   19 
Organicism  does  better  than  other  theories  with  respect  to  the  traditional 
problems concerning objects). 
 
We can term the style of thinking that takes one from theses about composition 
to theses about what there is ‗compositional ontology‘. Compositional ontology 
is an approach to ontology rather than a thesis. However, one can identify a 
number of assumptions held in common that we can treat, for the purpose of 
argument,  as  a  doctrine  to  be  examined.  Merricks  (Merricks  2001)  and  van 
Inwagen (van Inwagen 1990) both participate in this approach, arguing for an 
Organicist ontology on the basis of claims about composition.  
 
The attractive idea behind compositional ontology is that one can establish what 
there is by establishing firstly what, if any, things are mereologically simple, and 
secondly, when it is the case that some things compose other things. The idea is 
attractive, not least, because it gives philosophy an important role in finding out 
what  entities  there  are  in  the  universe  and  reinstates  metaphysics  as  an 
important sub-discipline in philosophy.  More importantly, the idea is attractive 
because it  suggests  that a certain level of theoretical economy is possible in 
ontology: if we could find a priori rules determining when some things compose 
other things, then we would have a way of determining a priori what there is. 
Arguably, the theses about composition that were listed above enshrine the sorts 
of  rules  necessary  for  this  project.  Unrestricted  composition  and  No-
composition  allow  for  ontological  conclusions  with  relatively  few  additional 
premises, as does restricted composition when supplemented with a principle 
such as the Organicists‘ saying when it is that composition takes place. The 
methodology  of  compositional  ontology  then,  is  to  argue  in  favour  of  a 
preference for one rule or collection of rules about composition rather than 
another on the basis of its utility in dealing with philosophical problems. 
 
In order for compositional ontologists to make good on their claim that they 
can underwrite ontological theorising with theorising about composition, they 
must accept two major commitments.    20 
 
Firstly, compositional ontologists are committed to there being state-able rules 
for composition (such as restricted composition and unrestricted composition). 
That is, they are committed to the possibility of rules saying when it is the case 
that some things compose other things. These rules must be comprehensive: 
they must give a uniform account of every case where some xs compose an 
object. If there are no such rules then the compositional ontology approach has 
no hope of success. What is more, given the way that compositional ontologists 
actually  go  about  trying  to  find  these  rules,  it  seems  that  they  must  be 
discoverable a priori. Compositional ontology  is a metaphysical rather than a 
physical science approach to finding out what things there are.  
 
When put in these terms it seems questionable whether there really are such 
rules. Even supposing that there are, one might think that they would have to be 
found through empirical research. Why would one think that the best way to 
find rules of composition is to think about it, rather than to empirically examine 
the physical structure of those things that we take to be composite and discover 
whether or not they have something in common? Such an approach may not be 
philosophical, but philosophical analysis of the concept of composition would 
certainly be required as a part of it. Such an approach would almost inevitably 
result in far more complicated (and messy) theories than those put forward by 
compositional ontologists. What is more, such an approach might discover that 
there are no such rules. Markosian (Markosian 1998a) argues convincingly that 
composition  is  ‗brute‘,  which  is  to  say,  that  there  are  no  state-able  rules 
governing when it occurs. The basis of his argument is that the theories arising 
out of a compositional ontological approach are each, in their way, problematic. 
While this line of attack will not be pursued here, it is worth asking why it is that 
it has seemed even initially plausible that there are such rules of composition12. 
                                              
12 Or why we should think that one rule applies to all physical things, (Simons 2006) argues 
that there are different rules or principles for different sorts of thing. 
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The second of the commitments of compositional ontology is that there must 
be  some  way  of  getting  from  rules  about  composition,  to  facts  about  what 
objects there are. This may be plausible, even trivial, in an ontology where the 
only acceptable objects of quantification are mereological simples and sums. It is 
not nearly so trivial with respect to everyday objects. One of the claims argued 
for in this thesis is that there is no straightforward way to infer facts about the 
existence (or not) of everyday objects from rules about composition.  
 
Compositional  ontology  could  be  considered  the  dominant  contemporary 
approach  to  the  metaphysics  of  everyday  objects.  An  important  part  of  the 
background theory for the approach is a collection of theories about parthood 
that can, following Simons (Simons 1987), be termed ‗extensional mereologies‘. 
Simons uses the term ‗extensional mereology‘ to pick out systems of mereology 
that are either similar to, or variations of, those of either Leśniewski or Leonard 
and Goodman. He uses the terminology for formal and historical reasons: the 
authors‘ intention was that the systems be similar to the Boolean algebra and 
their form displays a tendency towards an extensionalist approach to logic. In 
particular, they take it to be the case that things with the same parts are identical. 
Simons also notes a ‗pun‘ ((Simons 1987) p. 7) on the word ‗extend‘, which 
motivates the term‘s use here. As he says:  
 
‗The  most  appropriate  interpretation  for  extensional 
mereologies, one which renders all their axioms plausible, is 
one  in  which  the  singular  terms  of  the  theory  stand  for 
spatial, temporal, or spatio-temporal extents or for extended 
matter‘.  (Simons 1987) p. 7 
 
Though Leonard and Goodman are quite clear that they intend their Calculus of 
Individuals to apply to anything that could plausibly be considered an individual   22 
(including times, places, objects, and properties) it is the pun which motivates 
the use of the term in this thesis13. 
 
1.2   Organicism and Extensional Mereology 
In this section we will see that Organicists share some background assumptions 
about the parthood relation with extensional mereologists. Organicists hold that 
composition is restricted, and therefore reject the claim that any two objects will 
compose  a  third.  However,  both  Merricks  and  van  Inwagen  accept 
‗extensionality‘,  the  claim  that  any  objects  with  exactly  the  same  parts  are 
identical, and they accept the transitivity of the parthood relation. Moreover, as 
we shall see, the definition that van Inwagen gives of ‗composition‘ is very much 
in  line  with  extensional  mereology.  We  shall  see  in  Sections  1.4  and  1.5, 
however, that there is little to the Organicists‘ notion of part beyond the formal 
constraints of mereology and the idea of what van Inwagen terms ‗principles of 
composition‘. 
 
Leonard  and  Goodman‘s  Calculus  of  Individuals  is  intended  by  them  to  be 
formally  equivalent  to  Leśniewski‘s  mereology14  but  is  formulated  in  the 
supposedly  more  intelligible  language  of  Russell  and  Whitehead‘s  Principea 
Mathematica. Leonard and Goodman argue that their version of the Calculus of 
Individuals  offers  a  useful  way  to  give  an  account  of  so  called  ‗multigrade‘ 
relations; that is, relations that, rather than having a fixed number of arguments 
(such as a ‗is married to‘ which is a two place relation), can be used to relate 
different numbers of things15. Arguably composition is one such relation,  so 
                                              
13 What is at stake in Organicist discussions of the ontology of everyday objects is a notion 
of composition which is applied to physical entities or extents. 
14  See  (Leonard  and  Goodman  1940)   p.  46,  they  in  fact  take  it  to  be  ‘formally 
indistinguishable’  from  Leśniewksi’s  ‘theory  of  manifolds’.    Though  as  noted  in  (Simons 
1987)  the  logical  underpinnings  of  Leśniewski’s  mereology  are  quite  different  from  the 
Calculus of Individuals. Simons gives a detailed discussion of the similarities and difference 
between these accounts, as well as some others. 
15 Since, the logic of plural reference has been developed, and  is arguably a better tool for 
dealing with multigrade relations without incurring ontological commitment see  (Hossack 
2000).    23 
Leonard and Goodman can be seen as utilising the formal account of the part 
whole relation that Leśniewski had developed in order to approach technical 
problems  concerning  other  relations.  Leonard  and  Goodman,  at  least  in 
(Leonard  and  Goodman  1940),  treat  the  notion  of  composition  involved  as 
ontologically innocent.  
 
When Leśniewski himself developed the formal theory of mereology, however, 
he  was  engaged  in  a  much  more  ambitious  undertaking16. His aim was to 
develop a formal system that could act as the foundation for mathematics, but 
which did not require us to posit class es, which he regarded as the cause of 
Russell‘s paradox17 and of being unacceptably abstract. Thus, Leśniewski wanted 
wholes to do for him what Russell required sets and classes to do; to collect 
individuals. While Leśniewski‘s system can be construed as an analysis of the 
‗part-whole‘  relation,  its  intended  use  means  that  the  part-whole  relation 
articulated was required to have certain formal properties18.  
 
For  instance,  formal  mereological  systems  treat  the  part -whole  relation  as 
transitive. That is, if some thing A is a part of B, and B is a part of C, then it is 
taken to follow that A is a part of C. A more fundamental point (and a point 
with which Organicists agree19) is that mereology is ‗extensional‘20, that is, that 
                                              
16 See in particular, Leśniewski’s ‘Foundations of a General Theory of Sets’ and ‘On the 
Foundations of Mathematics’ reprinted in (Surma, Srzednicki, Barnett and Rickey 1992). 
For  a  comprehensive  account  of  the  development  and  conceptual  underpinnings  of 
extensional mereology, as well as a detailed discussion of how Leśniewski’s Mereology 
differs from Leonard and Goodman’s Calculus of Individuals, see (Simons 1987). 
17  Rusell’s  paradox,  first  communicated  in  a  letter  to  Frege  in  1902,  is  the  question  of 
whether there can be a set of sets which are not members of themselves. See Leśniewski 
‘A Class of Classes not Subordinated to Themselves’ in (Surma, Srzednicki, Barnett and 
Rickey 1992) for Leśniewski’s early response.  
18  It is at least arguable that these formal requirements lead to a tension between our 
intuitive conception of the part -whole relation, and that expressed by mereology. See 
(Simons 1987).  
19 Van Inwagen states this explicitly (van Inwagen 1990) p. 30. Merricks does not explicitly 
commit himself to an extensional way of thinking about parthood, but his rejection of ‘co-
location’ (see (Merricks 2001) Chapter 2, section III and the end of Chapter 3) is a rejection 
of the notion that two distinct entities could have the same parts.  
20 This is noted in (Simons 2006) p. 1.    24 
objects with the same parts are identical; and conversely, that if two things have 
different parts then they are distinct. 
 
Three inter-definable notions form the basis of formal mereological systems. 
These are the notions of ‗part‘, ‗overlapping‘ and ‗disjointness‘. We can follow 
(Simons 1987), in taking the following notation as saying x is a part of y21:  
 
  x < y 
 
And the following as saying that x is a proper part of y (the difference being that 
things can be parts of themselves but cannot be proper parts of themselves): 
 
  x << y 
 
We can then say that two things overlap if they have a part in common:  
 
x o y    z ( z < x & z <y) 
 
A thing is disjoint from another if they have no parts in common:  
 
  x l y   ¬ x o y 
 
The fundamental notion, however, is that of a mereological ‗sum‘ (or fusion). 
The intuitive idea of a mereological sum is of an individual which collects some 
group of individuals into a whole. To represent this notion formally, we would 
need to articulate a way of referring to multiple objects. Van Inwagen prefers 
the use of plural reference to do this. We will follow him and take ‗the xs‘ to 
refer to some particular individuals. We can then define the notion of a fusion 
or sum in the same way as van Inwagen, as follows:  
 
                                              
21 The rest of the notation here has been borrowed from Simons too.   25 
 
‗y is a sum of the xs = df 
 
The xs are all parts of y and every part of y overlaps at least 
one of the xs‘ (van Inwagen 1990) p. 29. 
 
This is essentially the definition of the notion of a sum that Goodman gives in 
his presentation of the Calculus of Individuals in his (Goodman 1951) (though 
Goodman‘s  presentation  of  it  is  somewhat  more  formal).  Leśniewski,  and 
contemporary Universalists, take it to be the case that for any given collection of 
objects there will be a sum or fusion of them.  
 
This sort of formalisation of the part-whole relation forms an important part of 
the background to Organicism. This can be seen, in particular, in the way that 
van Inwagen introduces the notion of composition, as follows: 
 
‗We shall use the expression 
   
  The xs compose y 
 
as an abbreviation for 
 
the xs are all parts of y and no two of the xs overlap and 
every part of y overlaps at least one of the xs.‘ 
       (van Inwagen 1990) p. 2922. 
 
Van Inwagen is explicit that the notion of overlapping that he is using is the 
same as that introduced ab ove: two things overlap when they have parts in 
common.  As  he  notes,  this  notion  of  composition  is  the  notion  of  a 
mereological sum with the addition of a requirement that none of the parts of y 
overlap each other.  
 
 
                                              
22 In (van Inwagen 1987) van Inwagen attributes this account of composition to Carnap, 
though he does not give a reference.    26 
We can see then that the notion of composition that forms the background to 
the  Organicist  position  is  very  much  influenced  by  formalised  systems  of 
mereology. Extensional ontologies such as Leonard and Goodman‘s Calculus of 
Individuals  (Leonard  and  Goodman  1940)  lend  themselves  to  Universalism, 
because  it  seems  that  they  allow  us  to  treat  any  collection  of  individuals  as 
composing another individual. However, if we have (as the Organicists think 
they have) a principled restriction of composition to some entities (so that only 
some things together compose another thing), then we could still take the rules 
of composition given by a fully developed extensional mereology to give an 
account of how parts and wholes are related to each other.  It is just that there 
are fewer wholes then the Universalist acknowledges. 
 
Organicists share some of the main assumptions of mereology (for instance that 
parthood is extensional and transitive see (van Inwagen 1990) pp. 54-55), but 
(unlike Leonard and  Goodman) they restrict their consideration to ‗physical‘ 
simples and also think that only some of those simples compose other things. 
Thus,  what  they  are  talking  about  when  they  discuss  composition  is  how 
physical simples or atoms fit together to make bigger things. It will be argued 
below that this notion of a physical ‗simple‘ is much more problematic than has 
been supposed.  
 
That  van  Inwagen  is  thinking  about  composition  in  this  way  is  further 
demonstrated by the sorts of principles that van Inwagen thinks we can give to 
say how parts and wholes are related. One of the ways he thinks that we find 
out  about  the  properties  of  composite  things  is  through  ‗principles  of 
composition‘. These are supposed to be ‗self evident‘ ((van Inwagen 1990), p. 
54) common sense principles that are independent of what account we give of 
what composites there are, or what ‗composition‘ comes to. Thus, he suggests 
the following: 
 
 
   27 
‗If each of the xs has a surface and the xs compose y, then y 
has a surface and the surface area of y is less than or equal to 
the sum of the surface areas of the xs. 
 
If each of the xs has a mass and the xs compose y, then y has 
a mass and the mass of y is the sum of the masses of the xs. 
 
If  each  of  the  xs  occupies  a  region  of  space  and  the  xs 
compose y, then y occupies the sum of the regions occupied 
by the xs.‘ 
         (van Inwagen 1990) p. 44.  
 
These principles  make perfect  sense if you are thinking  of parts as physical 
atoms  pushed  together  to  make  an  object—but  less  sense  under  some 
alternative conceptions of parts (see Section 1.3 below).  
 
The compositional ontologists with whom we are here concerned are thinking 
about composition as something that, if it happens, is done by bits of matter, as 
distinct from being  done by ‗sparse‘  properties, tropes, form and  matter, or 
some combination of these with a bare particular. The bits of matter are related 
in a way which could be articulated in terms of a restriction to the physical of 
formal mereological systems such as that of Leśniewski23, or the Calculus of 
Individuals of Leonard and Goodman. One interesting feature of Leonard and 
Goodman‘s Calculus of Individuals is that they are explicit that it could apply to 
any individuals whatsoever, including property instances, and in fact they think 
that is part of its utility. An ‗individual‘ in Leonard and Goodman‘s system is 
just something of the ‗lowest‘ logical type.  
 
Organicists  then,  share  with  Universalists  an  understanding  of  what  sort  of 
relation composition is. In addition, they share a particular notion of the domain 
of things that they are dealing with— the domain of physical things.  
 
                                              
23 See Leśniewski – ‘On the Foundations of Mathematics’ in (Surma, Srzednicki, Barnett 
and Rickey 1992),   28 
In the next section a number of other notions of part will be distinguished. It 
will be noted that some of these sorts of conceptions of part could also be 
thought of as ‗compositional‘ ontologies, but that these are not under discussion 
in this thesis.  
 
1.3   Other  notions  of  part  and  other  sorts  of  ‘compositional’ 
ontology. 
We  can  see  that  Organicists  and  Universalists  share  some  background 
assumptions about composition and about what sorts of things are eligible to be 
parts. In this section we note that there are ways of thinking about parts other 
than that of the Organicists and Universalists. Some of these ways of thinking of 
parts could also be thought of as compositional ontologies, in the sense that 
they try and give an account of what there is by determining a basic sort of 
entity  and  then  determining  when  these  basic  entities  combine  in  order  to 
compose other entities.  None the less, these accounts are not the target of this 
thesis, and will here be set aside.  
 
It should be clear that while philosophers such as Armstrong (see for instance 
the  theory  of  universals  presented  in  (Armstrong  1978b)  and  in  a  more 
accessible form in  (Armstrong 1989)) and Bacon  (see  (Bacon 1995)) can  be 
construed  as  treating  everyday  objects  as  being  ‗composed‘  of  sparse 
properties24, and Simons (e.g. (Simons 1998)) asserts that objects are composed 
of tropes. These philosophers are not compositional ontologists in the sense 
being targeted by this thesis.  
 
One charge that could perhaps be levelled at Universalists is that they take there 
to be only one concept of ‗part‘ and ‗whole‘, where in fact what we are dealing 
                                              
24  There  are  also  examples  in  the  history  of  philosophy  of  ontologies  which  could  be 
construed  as  ‘compositional’  but  in  ways  different  to  the  extensional  conception  of  the 
Organicists. Arlig (Arlig 2008), for instance offers a useful survey of the central place that 
the notion of division and various notions of part and whole had in medieval philosophy.   29 
with is a cluster of related notions25. This would not in itself be much of an 
objection to any compositional ontology so long as the notion of part that that 
compositional ontology used could be shown to be coherent and applicable to 
those entities that they are concerned with (though Univers alists, for instance, 
will be inclined to hold that their notion of parthood is superior to others) 26.  It 
will be useful in what follows, however, to be cle ar that there are a number of 
different ways of thinking about parts available; that the formal way of thinking 
about parts adopted by compositional ontologists is one amongst a range of 
different ways to think about them. 
 
Below we will see a number of  different notions of ‗parthood‘; some of these 
will be referred to later in the thesis. The point of mentioning them here is to 
establish some background for the next section where we examine the range of 
questions that can be asked about composition and about simples, and suggest 
that  one  of  the  issues  with  Organicism  is  the  particular  conception  of 
composition that they have and the questions that they want to ask about it. 
 
Spatial Parts 
Since matter exists in space and time, things made of matter occupy some space-
time region. This makes it tempting to think of the parts of a thing as those 
items of matter that exist in the same space-time region as it. One could then 
define a notion of composition in terms of spatial overlap (as distinct from the 
mereological  notion  of  overlap  discussed  above).  This  will  be  particularly 
tempting for metaphysicians who wish to individuate objects according to their 
spatial location. One motivation for doing this is as a solution to the problem of 
difference. The problem of difference arises for sparse universals theorists, who 
are  realist  about  physical  properties  and  hold  that  each  property  is  wholly 
wherever it is instantiated. The problem is how to differentiate between two 
                                              
25 See (Fine 2008) for a pluralist theory of part. 
26 A similar point is made in (Simons 1987).   30 
objects with exactly the same sparse properties; they have the same properties, 
and in each case the properties they have are wholly located in the object. Why 
are they not the same object? Clearly, if objects are individuated by their spatial 
location, that would distinguish them (though another way would be to posit a 
‗bare  particular‘  to  do  this  job27).  For  philosophers  without  this  sort  of 
theoretical commitment, however, spatial parts will seem unattractive.   
 
One reason for thinking that we should not equate parts of something with the 
matter in the space-time region that they occupy is that one can imagine there 
being  two  different  objects  in  one  place  at  the  same  time.  Leaving  aside 
contentious  examples  such  as  lumps  of  marble  and  statues,  cases  like  the 
following rather gruesome example suggest the possibility of co-location: 
 
Suppose that a person is shot with a gun. The bullet pierces his cotton 
jacket and then enters his body. As it enters it drags a piece of cloth with 
it. Later, an inexperienced surgeon removes the bullet but overlooks the 
piece of cloth. The wound is sown up and the piece of cloth remains in 
the body.  
 
It seems plausible that the cloth has not become part of the body, and 
that bodily fluids pass through the cloth and continue their functions 
within the body. We might suppose that the cloth occupies a region of 
space also occupied by (at least part of) the body, but is not itself a part 
of the body.  
 
Van  Inwagen  also  offers  an  argument  for  the  possibility  (though  not  the 
actuality)  of  some  sort  of  non-controversial  collocation  (see  (van  Inwagen 
1990). p. 50).  
                                              
27 see Chapter Three below.   31 
Arbitrary Parts 
Take an object. You could (in theory, if not in practice) cut it up any way that 
you wanted. Any sort of arbitrary bit of it could be cut off; each of these bits 
could be considered a part of the object28.  
Functional Part 
We can distinguish Arbitrary Parts from Functional Parts29. For many things, to 
be what they are requires that they have parts that fulfil certain functions. 
Paradigm cases of this are artefacts created for a specific purpose, such as cars 
and airplanes; one could cut these things up into arbitrary parts, but it is hard to 
deny that they are also made up of parts which, due to  their own nature are 
essential to the functioning of the whole. Thus we find that engines do not 
function well without carburettors or pistons. We can term these parts of an 
object its ‗functional parts‘. Things other than artefacts have functional parts; all 
the people I have spoken to recently had bodies that would not function very 
well without various functional parts, such as intestines, lungs, hearts and livers.  
 
More controversially, we might think of various kinds of organic and inorganic 
substance as requiring functional parts in order to be what they are. Water, to 
take a school science example, requires parts of both Hydrogen and Oxygen in 
order for it to have the physical properties that it does.  
 
                                              
28  Krecz (Krecz 1986) argues for a distinction between what he terms ‘pieces’ and ‘parts’ 
which  matches  well  with  the  distinction  being  drawn  here  between  arbitrary  parts  and 
functional  parts.  Markosion  (Markosian  1998a)  distinguishes  ‘metaphysical’  from 
‘conceptual’ parts, where conceptual parts are roughly equivalent to what are here called 
‘arbitrary parts’. Metaphysical parts, in Markosian’s terminology are objects in  their own 
right (though he does not say much about what this comes to).  
29 We can also think of things having parts in order to be what they are, without those parts 
having the sort of functional status suggested here. See for instance Kit Fine  (Fine 2003) 
fn17 p. 206, where he notes that a statue may have an ‘arm’ that the matter constituting it 
does not.    32 
Physical Part 
One might think that Organicists, focusing as they do on composition relations 
between physical individuals, are themselves delineating a particular kind of part 
relation. The relation between physical individuals and the things they compose. 
We can term this the notion of ‗physical parts‘, despite the questions that will be 
raised in the next section about whether the ‗individuals‘ that they start with are 
really suitable for the job. It should be noted however that the formalised notion 
of  parthood  found  in  the  Calculus  of  Individuals  forms  the  basis  of  the 
Organicists‘ approach to physical parts. As such we could view their approach 
(and  in  fact  the  approach  of  Universalists)  as  applying  the  Calculus  of 
Individuals to a restricted domain consisting of just physical individuals (for 
Universalists)  or  just  physical  individuals  that  constitute  organisms  or  are 
simples (in the case of the Organicist).  
 
“Alphabetical” Parts 
As  was  noted  previously,  there  are  other  sorts  of  ontology  that  might  be 
considered  ‗compositional‘.  Amongst  these,  we  might  find  alternative 
conceptions of parthood. Certain trope theorists30, for instance, think of objects 
as literally composed of their properties (the term ‗Alphabetical Part‘ is taken 
from the title of (Bacon 1995)). Trope theorists argue for a brand of nominalism 
about properties; they are property realists, but reject the notion that there are 
such things as ―universals‖ which objects with ―the same‖ properties have in 
common.  Rather,  they  believe  that  objects  are  composed  of  ―tropes‖  or 
property instances that resemble each other precisely.  
 
Clearly the sense in which the mass of an object (to pick a physical property 
fairly arbitrarily) could be considered a ‗part‘ of that object is quite different 
from the way that an arbitrary section of a table, or the engine of a car are parts 
of their respective wholes. For one thing, it is not necessary to think of the 
                                              
30 See for instance (Williams 1953), or more recently (Simons 1994).   33 
property as only applying to one region of the object; properties such as mass 
and  density  can  apply  to  the  whole  object  where  ―whole‖  is  thought  of  in 
conventional terms. For another, such ‗self-evident‘ properties of proper parts 
as having a smaller surface area than the whole seem to have no relevance to 
this sort of part. 
 
The  idea  of  property-as-part  derives  from  the  way  that  properties  are 
conceptualised by trope theorists. One can think of an object as a whole and 
then imagine separating out each of its individual properties. One starts with the 
whole object and from that separates out the ways that the object is; each way or 
property is a trope. Without these properties the object would not exist. 
 
One could be a trope theorist and also a mereologist. The key claim of the trope 
theorist is that properties are real but not repeatable; it is only one sort of trope 
theory that conceives of properties as ‗parts‘ of objects. On the other hand, the 
view  of  the  universe  as  constructed  from  properties  is  in  some  ways  an 
attractive one.  
 
There are two ways that an ontologist could combine extensional mereology 
with a trope ontology. One way is simply to apply the Calculus of Individuals to 
property instances, taking property instances as individuals. This will of course 
mean that any arbitrary collection of property instances will compose an object, 
but some of these arbitrary collections will no doubt coincide with things that 
we do in fact think are objects. The other way would be to distinguish two 
senses of part: alphabetical parts that coordinate to produce physical individuals, 
and a physical parthood relation to say how individuals fit together to produce 
bigger wholes. This seems perfectly reasonable.  
 
*  *  * 
 
The  existence  of  different  metaphysical  notions  of  part  does  not  entail  the 
falseness of the Organicist position. But we should be aware that Organicists in   34 
particular, and compositional ontologists generally, are bringing to the debate 
about ontology a specific conception of what parts are and can be and a specific 
conception of what sorts of entities are the right sort to be parts of things. 
 
Even if one were inclined to take composition as fundamental in one‘s ontology, 
one might think that one would be better off taking Alphabetical Parts as one‘s 
basic starting point, rather than the seemingly arbitrary physical individuals that 
seem to be presupposed by the compositional ontologists that are here being 
criticised.  Van  Inwagen  correctly  concludes  that  a  proper  account  of 
composition, where that is an account of physical parthood, will be very difficult 
to provide. One conclusion one could draw from this is that such would be the 
wrong sort of mereological sum to build your ontology from. One reason that 
Alphabetical Parts might be preferable to mereological parts is that there is a 
clear  notion  and  a  well  established  tradition  of  treating  properties  as  basic 
constituents in metaphysical systems (see for instance Plato‘s Republic, Chapters 
9 and 10 of (Russell 1912),  (Bergman 1967), (Armstrong 1978b)) 
 
We have seen then that there are a variety of more or less intuitive notions that 
could be appealed to as notions of ‗parthood‘, and we have seen that some of 
these can be built into metaphysical systems. There are two points.  
 
The first point is that which entities you take the composition relation to apply 
to is not a theoretically neutral matter. It is very much a part of the notion of 
composition  that  is  being  adopted.  Alphabetical  parts  are  posited  as  the 
fundamental level of a systematic metaphysics, and it is at least arguable that 
they are best conceived of as parts of the things they instantiate. Spatial Parts are 
most likely to be posited in response to metaphysical problems such as those 
outlined above.  
 
The  second  point  is  that  while  we  clearly  do  have  intuitive  conceptions  of 
parthood and composition, that to a large extent when we appeal to these in the 
context of metaphysical theories they become subject to the requirements of the   35 
theory that we are working with. There is an important sense in which when we 
are dealing with composition in relation to metaphysics we are dealing with a 
technical  notion  and  not  necessarily  with  the  naïve  notion  appealed  to  in 
everyday speech. This is particularly true in the case of the Organicists‘ notion 
of part, relying as it does on a background conception that is derived from a 
restriction of formal mereology. In what follows it will be argued that this leads 
to two related problems for the Organicist. It will be argued that the notion of 
composition that Organicists are playing with is insufficient to enable them to 
identify simples; that there is a problem for them in identifying what things are 
supposed to be the relata of the composition relation. Secondly, it is argued that 
the concept of part that they are using is so anaemic that they cannot appeal to 
it in resisting a claim that everyday objects are simple.  
 
Considering the importance of the notion of ‗composition‘ to compositional 
ontologists, it is not at all clear what ‗composition‘ is to amount to for them. 
They seem to have something like the following in mind when they are writing: 
Mereological atoms, though defined in terms of parthood, are just bits of matter 
(presumably the smallest bits that we can find). If composition were to take 
place, then some collection of bits of matter would be aggregated in order to 
‗create‘ the composite object. The relations between parts and these composite 
objects  would  conform  to  extensional  mereology.  These  features  of  the 
Organicists‘ position, however, are largely unargued for presuppositions. 
 
1.4  Questions about composition  
Van Inwagen distinguishes two questions that one might ask about composition 
(see (van Inwagen 1990) he articulates the ‗Special Composition Question‘ in 
section 2, and the ‗General Composition Question‘ in section 4). In this section 
the special and general questions will be unpacked and what they show about 
the  presuppositions  of  the  Organicist  position  will  be  uncovered.  It  will  be 
argued  that  while  the  Special  and  General  compositional  questions  are 
important,  there  are  other  interesting  questions  that  one  might  ask  about   36 
composition and the fact that van Inwagen (and Merricks) do not ask them is 
revealing.  
 
The  General  Compositional  Question  is  fairly  paradigmatic  of  a  platonic 
question  of  the  form  ‗what  is  X?‘.  In  this  case  the  question  is,  ‗What  is 
composition?‘ (see (van Inwagen 1990) p. 39). The answer that van Inwagen 
asks for is one that takes the form:  
 
  The xs compose y iff … 
 
Where ‗the xs‘ is a plural referring expression, and … is an answer that does not 
itself contain any mereological terms.  
 
The Special Compositional Question on the other hand, is the question, ‗when 
does composition happen?‘. In van Inwagen‘s formal presentation, the question 
is, when is it the case that:  
 
  y the xs compose y 
 
With ‗the xs‘ again being treated as a plural referring expression. An answer to 
the Special Compositional Question, it should be noted, would take the form of 
the sort of rule of composition that compositional ontologists need in order to 
fulfil their project. The three theses about composition mentioned above, with a 
proviso, would constitute answers to the Special Compositional Question.  
 
The  Special  Compositional  Question  is  cast  by  van  Inwagen  in  explicitly 
ontological terms: composition occurs when there is something composed. It is 
this feature which enables him to put his proposed answer to the question to the 
ontological use that he would like to.  
 
This  gives  rise  to  the  proviso.  Restricted  Composition,  Unrestricted 
Composition and No Composition have been introduced as theses about when   37 
composition takes place. Restricted and Unrestricted composition, however give 
rise to answers to the Special Compositional Question only if it is legitimate to 
infer  from  them  their  ontological  correlates.  That  is,  only  if  unrestricted 
composition really does entail Universalism does it constitute an answer to the 
Special  Compositional  Question,  because  only  then  will  it  say  when  there  is 
something composed of the things under discussion. Similarly, where the form 
of restricted composition gives rise to Organicism, it only constitutes an answer 
to  the  Special  Compositional  Question  as  posed  by  van  Inwagen  because  it 
makes an ontological claim. As will be argued in Section 1.7 (below), the move 
from theses about composition to theses about existence is problematic.  
 
It  is  tempting  to  treat  the  distinction  between  the  Special  and  General 
compositional questions as issuing from a special case of the familiar distinction 
between a concept and its extension, with the Special Compositional Question 
asking  for  the  extension  of  the  concept,  and  the  General  Compositional 
Question asking for an account of its sense. This would not be a mistake, but 
van Inwagen takes a good deal of care over the formulation of the questions, 
and it is worth just noting a number of elements of van Inwagen‘s treatment.  
 
Van Inwagen explicates the General Compositional Question in two ways which 
we may suppose are intended to be equivalent. On pages 38-39 of (van Inwagen 
1990) he distinguishes the questions as follows: 
 
‗To  say  what  composition  was  would  be  to  say  what 
multigrade  relation  was  expressed  by  the  sentence  ―the  xs 
compose  y‖,  and  an  answer  to  the  Special  Composition 
Question tells us only what multigrade relation is expressed 
by the (singular) existential generalisation of this sentence‘ 
 
Later on the same page, he introduces the General Compositional Question: 
 
‗As the Special Composition Question may be identified with 
the question Under what conditions does composition occur?   38 
So the General Composition Question may be identified with 
the question, What is composition?‘ 
 
To  answer  the  General  Compositional  Question  then  (according  to  van 
Inwagen, and it is after all his question), one would need to be able to say what 
multigrade relation composition is identical to, but fill it out in non-mereological 
terms. The answer that van Inwagen requires for the General Compositional 
Question  then  will  take  one  of  two  forms.  The  informal  form  will  be 
‗Composition is …‘. The more formal form will take the form:  
 
  The xs compose y iff … 
 
Where  the  right  hand  side  of  the  bi-conditional  must  not  contain  any 
mereological  expressions.  The  challenge  then,  appears  to  be  similar  to  that 
posed by someone who responds to the claim that there are moral facts by 
asking for a naturalistically acceptable property that can be said to constitute 
those facts, and in fact van Inwagen‘s argument in response is similar in form to 
Moore‘s open question argument31.  
 
Towards the end of Section 4 of Material Beings, van Inwagen expresses his view 
that  it  is  unlikely  that  an  adequate  answer  to  the  General  Compositional 
Question  will  be  found  (see  p.  51).  Van  Inwagen  first  notes  that  given  the 
expected logical form that responses to the Special and General compositional 
questions  must  take,  there  is  no  formal  way  of  inferring  an  answer  to  the 
General Compositional Question from an answer to the Special Compositional 
Question taken by itself. He then notes that the only way that he could think of 
for answering the General Compositional Question would be to propose some 
function that could be applied to ‗the xs‘ such that it related ‗the xs‘ to the 
object ‗y‘ being composed and satisfaction of that function was necessary and 
sufficient  for  those  xs  to  compose  the  thing  y  in  question.  That  is,  as  van 
                                              
31 See §13 of (Moore 1903)   39 
Inwagen puts it, the answer would have to have the following logical form (van 
Inwagen 1990) p. 44:  
 
  The xs compose y iff y has f(the xs) 
 
Van Inwagen says that he suspects that any attempt to provide an account of 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for composition, or to find a multigrade 
relation  that  can  be  identified  with  composition,  will  be  subject  to 
counterexamples. In effect, he thinks that for any function on y and ‗the xs‘ that 
one  could  put  forward,  it  will  still  be  possible  to  find  cases  where  you  can 
plausibly claim that it is an open question whether ‗the xs‘ compose y.  
 
The history of other attempts at finding necessary and sufficient conditions for 
the application of concepts suggests that van Inwagen might be correct to be 
pessimistic. Van Inwagen, in fact concludes: 
 
‗I am inclined to think that there is no way of answering the 
General Composition Question.  I am inclined to think that 
the concepts ―part‖, ―sum‖ and ―compose‖ form what (by 
analogy to ―the modal circle‖ or ―the moral circle‖) one might 
call the  ―mereological  circle‖, a closed family of concepts.‘ 
P.51 
 
Given van Inwagen‘s pessimism about the prospects for answering the General 
Compositional  Question,  his  pursuit  of  the  Special  Compositional  Question 
might seem unsurprising. But one might wonder what would be wrong with at 
least sketching out how the mereological circle would look32. Why would  this 
not be a worthwhile project to pursue, if composition is interesting at all? Why 
should we not just accept mereological terms as basic? If they are foundational 
                                              
32 Katherine Hawley has argued that there could be answers to the General Compositional 
Question, and that these would take the form of ‘principles of composition’ analogous to 
principles of identity in that you would need different principles for different sorts of object. 
She notes that van Inwagen’s requirements of an answer to the General Compositional 
Question  are  more  stringent  then  his  requirements  of  an  answer  to  the  Special 
Compositional Question, requiring the answer to be both non-trivial and also apparently a 
conceptual truth. See (Hawley 2006).   40 
in ontology, it should not be surprising that they are resistant to analysis, but 
then why should we not think the mereological circle a virtuous one? 
 
One thing to notice is that there are a lot of questions that one can ask about 
composition  other  than  the  Special  and  General  compositional  questions. 
Composition (at least when taken as a relation between physical individuals) 
appears prima facie to be a non-symmetric relation (or collection of relations) 
between one thing (the composite) and many things (the compositors33 or parts) 
which compose it. In so far as the thing composed is a composit e, it is 
ontologically dependent upon the composition relation.  
 
There are then a number of different relations and sets of relations that we may 
be interested in when considering composition, and we may ask questions 
relating to any of them. Take first the relationship between an object and those 
parts that compose it.  
 
Suppose an object O to be composed of n parts p 1, p2,…pn. Then one sort of 
relation that we might be interested in is that between each of the parts and the 
object. That is, we could be interested in the relation between p1 and O by 
virtue of which p1 is a part of O, the relation between p2 and O by virtue of 
which p2 is a part of O, and so on.  
 
We might also be interested in the relationship that holds between p1…pn taken 
as a group and  the object they compose. I.e. we might be interested in the 
relation between O and {p1, p2,…pn}. 
 
The  other  sort  of  relation  one  might  be  interested  in  is  between  the 
compositors.  It  is  this  latter  sort  of  relation  that  an  answer  to  the  Special 
Compositional  Question might hope to offer some insight into. That is, we 
                                              
33 Use of the term ‘compositor’ here should be fairly self explanatory, but it is here used for 
things that are candidates for being parts.    41 
might be interested in the relation between p1 … pn, by virtue of which p1...pn 
compose something. We might also be interested in the relationship between 
them such that the thing that they compose is O. 
 
There are, then, a number of relations that should be examined if we are to 
investigate composition properly, and a number of compositional questions that 
might be asked.  
 
Van Inwagen asks three compositional questions: 
 
General Compositional Question:  When  is  it  the  case  that  the  xs 
compose a y 
 
Special Compositional Question:   When is it the case that there is 
something composed by the xs 
 
An answer to the Special Compositional Question can also be understood as an 
existential generalisation of an answer to the General Compositional Question 
in that whenever it is the case that ‗the xs compose a y‘ is true, it will also be the 
case that ‗there is something composed by the xs‘. Of course, in that situation 
there will also be something ‗the xs‘ compose, so (as van Inwagen notes (van 
Inwagen 1990) p. 48) we can also ask the: 
 
Inverse Special Compositional Question:  When is it the case that 
there is a y that has the 
xs as parts 
 
Given the discussion above, to these questions we may add the following more 
specific compositional questions:  
   
  What relations (if any) must there be between compositors in order for 
them to compose something?   42 
  What relation must there be between an individual compositor and an 
object in order for the compositor to be a part of that object? 
  What relation must there be between a group of compositors and an 
object in order for them to (jointly) compose that object? 
  What  is  the  relation  between  the  properties  of  compositors  and  the 
properties of the composite? 
  What relation is there between the compositors and the composite‘s being 
the thing that it is?  
 
Some  of  these  questions  might  be  answered  by  what  van  Inwagen  terms 
‗principles of composition‘, but do not get further development than that (see 
Section  1.2  for  discussion  of  the  use  van  Inwagen  makes  of  principles  of 
composition).  
 
Of course, that there are other questions to ask does not invalidate the Special 
Compositional Question. Nor does it tell against any particular answer to that 
question, certainly not the Organicist answer. The point is that once one has, as 
Organicists have, rejected Unrestricted Composition and No Composition, one 
is  compelled  to  think  of  composition  as  a  much  more  complicated 
phenomenon, as I will now explain. 
 
The  first  four  of  these  other  questions  emerge  once  one  has  rejected 
Unrestricted Composition and No Composition. If Restricted Composition is 
correct, then it is likely that composition is not a single relation; if it happens at 
all it is extremely complicated and involves a number of relations in different 
directions between different things. It is very likely not just a multigrade relation 
in the sense of being a relation which takes an indefinite number of individuals 
as arguments and applies equally to all of them. It is very likely also multifaceted; 
it is likely to be something which happens when a number of different relations 
are satisfied by a number of different relata, some of which will be composites 
and some compositors. Ideally, compositional ontologies would speak to these   43 
complexities. Given that any account of composition would have to answer 
these questions, and in addition explain how the answers related to each other, it 
is not surprising that Organicists do not offer an account of composition. What 
is slightly surprising is the suggestion that the Special Compositional Question is 
answerable  while  the  others  are  not.  Taken  independently  of  the  answers 
proposed by Merricks and van Inwagen and the aspirations of compositional 
ontology to say what there is, there seems little reason to prefer the Special 
Compositional Question over others. Van Inwagen‘s choice of which question 
to  answer  is  motivated  by  his  metaphysical  goals,  rather  than  an  interest  in 
composition. 
 
In fact, one might think that focusing on the Special Composition Question in 
this way is like trying to put a car in gear before depressing the clutch: one might 
think that the right way to find out about composition is to find out what things 
there are, and then try and find out which of those things are composite. What 
we have seen so far is that there are a number of different notions of parthood 
that we could discuss and a number of questions about composition that we 
could ask. Van Inwagen poses two very specific questions about composition, 
but,  as  we  have  seen,  he  does  so  having  already  made  some  non-trivial 
assumptions  about  what  sorts  of  entities  can  be  compositors  and  what  the 
formal properties of the composition relation must be.  
 
1.5  What  we  can  learn  from  answers  to  questions  about 
composition 
We have seen then, that out of the available questions that van Inwagen could 
have  asked  about  composition,  the  one  that  he  decided  to  answer  was  the 
Special Compositional Question. Van Inwagen thinks that his answer to the 
Special Compositional Question provides the best account both of what there is 
and of objects. It is worth being clear then, just what sorts of things can be 
taken to follow from an answer to the Special Compositional Question, and 
from the Organicist answer to it in particular.    44 
 
The answer to the Special Compositional Question that van Inwagen offers is as 
follows: 
     
  y the xs compose y iff the activities of the xs constitute a life. 
 
What can we infer from this answer? In the last section we noted that van 
Inwagen argues that there is no good analysis of composition; that there is no 
satisfactory  answer  to  the  General  Compositional  Question.    Van  Inwagen 
claims that an answer to the Special Compositional Question does not help us 
with the General Compositional Question. What then can we infer from an 
answer to the Special Compositional Question? 
 
One might think, for a start, that No Composition gives us a pretty good grip 
on what composite objects are: To wit, non-existent. Van Inwagen in fact allows 
(see (van Inwagen 1990) p. 73) that non-composition provides an answer to the 
General and the Special compositional questions, but holds that his own answer 
to the Special Compositional question and the Universalist answer fails to give 
similar insight into the nature of composite objects34.  
 
Arguably, however, a Universalist answer to the Special Compositional Question 
would tell us some things about composite objects. One might think that  the 
objects that are generated by Leonard and Goodman‘s calculus of individuals 
are determined by the nature of the calculus; they are arbitrary collections, no 
more no less. It may be that some of these collections constitute those objects 
we find around us (tables and trees and such like), and the fact that the matter 
constituting my desk composes a mereological sum does not entail anything 
                                              
34 In fact he argues that universalism does not even  answer the Special Compositional 
Question because not all mereological sums are composite objects (see the discussion of 
van Inwagen’s definition of composition on p. 25 above and also see (van Inwagen 1990) p. 
79);  only  non-overlapping  sums  are.  But  since  overlapping  is  a  mereological  term,  this 
answer  fails  to  satisfy  his  requirements  for  an  answer  to  the  General  Compositional 
Question.    45 
about my desk. But mereological sums, if they exist, are a type of object. They 
are a type of object which is a posit of a certain sort of metaphysical theory. The 
metaphysical theory determines, for instance what the persistence conditions of 
a mereological sum is: a mereological sum exist just as long as its parts do. Thus, 
while Universalism may not by itself tell us much about tables and chairs and 
such like35 it does tell us about the objects to which it gives rise. 
 
It seems then that if an answer to the Special Compositional Question is going 
to be powerful enough to play the basic role in a compositional ontology, then it 
is also going to tell us some things about the things that there are. Surely, one 
might think, at the very least it is going to have to give us some information 
about when those things survive or are destroyed, if only because when a 
composite object is destroyed composition will have failed. 
 
We might be  tempted to think  that van Inwagen‘s answer does entail some 
things about the thing composed. One thing it might be thought to entail is that 
the thing composed is alive. Van Inwagen identifies the thing composed as an 
‗organism‘. But it is important to note that while we do in fact have a prior 
conception of what would constitute something‘s being an organism, this is not 
what is being appealed to  by van  Inwagen.  He introduces  the  notion of an 
organism as follows: 
 
‗Suppose that something is such that certain objects compose it in virtue 
of their activity‘s constituting a life. Let us call such a composite object 
an organism.‘ P.90 
 
                                              
35  In  fact,  accepting  Universalism  does  also  put  fairly  heavy  constraints  on  a  theory  of 
everyday objects, in particular it creates a challenge in accounting for continuity of everyday 
objects, and tends to lead one to a perdurantist theory of temporal continuity for objects 
such as that advanced in (Sider 2001). That is, one is led to hold that at any given time all 
that one is able to interact with is a 3 dimensional part of a 4 dimensional object.    46 
At the start of the next paragraph he asks ‗What is an organism like?‘. The 
sources of data for his answer are principles of composition36: those things that 
we know (independently of either of the compositional questions) about how 
the parts  of  a  composite object  relate to the whole.  (Van Inwagen gives 
examples of such principles on page 44 of (van Inwagen 1990), they include, for 
example, the principle that the surface area of a whole is less than or equal to 
the surface area of its parts). 
 
The term ‗organism‘ then, is functionally defined by van Inwagen. An organism 
is that thing whatever it is that is composed of the things that constitute a life. To 
find out the nature of such things you need to engage in further reasoning based 
on  what  you  know  about  composition  and  about  the  parts  of  the  thing 
composed.  
   
So  far  little  has  been  said  about  Trenton  Merricks‘  contribution  to  the 
Organicist literature.  This will be remedied  (see particularly Chapter Six and 
Chapter Seven), but for now it is worth noting that he does not offer an analysis 
of composition either. He is explicit in taking composition to have ontological 
import. That is, he, like van Inwagen, takes the existence of composites to be 
necessary for there to be everyday objects, and the existence of macroscopic 
objects as sufficient for the existence of composite objects. 
 
The case in favour of Organicism will be discussed at length in the final three 
chapters of this thesis, but it is worth noting in advance of this, that the reasons 
given by Merricks and van Inwagen for positing the existence of living things 
are not primarily reasons relating to composition. Van Inwagen in fact argues 
that  answers  to  the  Inverse  and  General  Composition  questions  will  not 
necessarily entail the best answer to the Special Compositional Question.  
 
                                              
36 We met van Inwagen’s proposed principles of composition above on p. 27.   47 
Given this, we might wonder whether Organicists really need to develop their 
position in terms of composition at all. In the next section it will be argued that 
an explicit argument is required to get one from a thesis about composition to a 
thesis about the existence of everyday objects. The Organicist answer to the 
Special Compositional Question could just as well be tabled as an answer to an 
alternative question that makes no reference to composition at all. That is:  
 
When does the causal interaction of n pieces of our environment require 
us to posit a further n+1 entity.  
 
The Organicist answer would, presumably, be as follows:  
 
The causal interaction of n pieces of our environment require us to posit 
a further n+1 entity iff  the causal interactions constitute a life.  
 
To be properly fair to van Inwagen, we might try putting the question in the 
same form as his ‗official‘ version of the Special Compositional Question. When 
is it the case that: 
 
  y y emerges from the causal interaction of the xs  
 
And the Organicist answer: 
 
y  y  emerges  from  the  causal  interaction  of  the  xs  iff  the  causal 
interactions of the xs constitute a life 
 
One could just as well conclude that the Organicists‘ positive ontological claim 
is true  without ever discussing composition (and few would question it). One 
might think that the Organicists‘ positive ontological claims really have nothing 
very much to do with composition. Their arguments in favour of these claims 
would seem to bear this thought out. Two main lines of thought underlie them.   48 
The first of these is the Cartesian notion that we, as thinkers, know that any 
ontology which excludes thinkers must be false37. Since we are both thinkers 
and composite objects, it follows that there are some composite objects. The 
second basis for inferring the existence of organisms stems from the claim that 
organisms  such  as  ourselves  have  ‗emergent‘  properties  which  cannot  be 
attributed to the joint action of our parts in a way that is not the case for other 
macroscopic  objects38.  The  second  of  these  lines  of  thought  does   make 
reference to parts, but such reference could again be replaced by discussion of 
causal interactions. 
 
The Organicists, however, introduce discussion of composition when discussing 
their more controversial negative ontological thesis: the thesis that  there are no 
non-living  macroscopic  physical  objects.  They  think  that  the  reasons  that 
Eliminativists have for rejecting the existence of everyday objects hold weight.  
The Eliminativist of course rejects everyday objects in part because of worries 
about composition.  
 
On the face of it then, the Organicists‘ discussion of composition is primarily 
required to support their negative ontological thesis; otherwise there is no real 
need for them to discuss composition at all.  
 
But  having  rejected  No  Composition,  Organicists  find  themselves  with 
argumentative burdens that the Eliminativist does not have. They must account 
for those cases where composition does happen. Organicists‘ failure to offer any 
analysis  of  composition  (beyond  that  adopted  from  formal  mereology  and 
discussed  above)  puts  them  in  an  awkward  rhetorical  position.    While 
Organicists are adopting a compositional approach to ontology, they have no 
real account to give of what composition ‗itself‘ is. It is not, of course, unusual 
for us to find ourselves in the position of being able to determine the extension 
                                              
37 See (van Inwagen 1990) Section 12.  
38 See (Merricks 2001) Chapter 3 and 4, and also see Chapter 6 in this thesis where the 
argument from overdetermination is discussed in some detail.    49 
of a concept without being able to define it (like the judge who acknowledged 
his inability to properly define ‗pornography‘ but alleged that he knew it when 
he saw it). In this case, however, the position is invidious. As will be argued 
below, it is invidious because the failure to give an account of the concept of 
composition  leaves  open  the  possibility  of  introducing  other  notions  of 
composition  than  the  extensional  notion  that  forms  the  background  to  the 
Organicist position. This means that it is difficult to see what the content of a 
claim that people or everyday objects are mereologically simple is, and why we 
should reject it. The fact that Organicists claim composition happens but fail to 
give an account of it will, it will emerge, leave them with two problems. Firstly, 
it makes it difficult for them to offer a convincing account of what it would be 
for something to be ‗simple‘. Secondly, and leading on from that, it leaves them 
with a problem dealing with the challenge that everyday objects might best be 
considered as ‗simples‘. Or so I argue below. 
 
1.6   Simples 
We have seen how the notion of composition that Organicism rests upon relies 
on  unargued  presuppositions  about  what  sort  of  relations  are  involved  in 
composition, and we have seen how the Special Compositional Question seems 
most sensible in the context of a response to a Universalist and Eliminativist 
approach  to  metaphysics.  However,  I  have  suggested  that  having  accepted 
Restricted  Composition  one  is  left  having  to  make  sense  of  composition  in 
terms of a much more complicated group of relations than Organicists really 
acknowledge.  What  is  more,  I  have  argued  that  there  are  a  wider  range  of 
questions  to  ask  about  them  than  is  suggested  by  the  Special,  Inverse  and 
General compositional questions. We have also noted that Organicism makes 
use of two notions of part. In the background is the notion of parthood that is 
formalised in Goodman and Leonard‘s Calculus of Individuals, which is then 
combined with or restricted to a notion of physical parthood.  
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In this section the notion of a mereological simple will be unpacked a little. This 
will be important in two respects. Firstly, in the next section it will be argued 
that the notion of composition presupposed by Organicists does not rule out 
the  possibility  that  everyday  objects  are  simples.  Secondly,  the  O-arranging 
manoeuvre, which is discussed in detail in Chapter Four, makes extensive use of 
the notion of a mereological simple or atom. Essentially the idea of the O-
arranging manoeuvre is to mitigate the seemingly self-evident falsity of the claim 
that  there  are  no  everyday  objects,  by  replacing  them  with  object-wise 
arrangements  of  simples.  If  the  Organicist  is  unable  to  give  an  account  of 
simples, however, then he will need to reformulate the O-arranging Manoeuvre.  
 
In the context of an extensional mereology a simple is just supposed to be a 
thing without any proper parts. Working within the framework of Goodman 
and Leonard, for instance, a simple is just an individual that is disjoint from all 
other individuals. However, once we limit the range of possible individuals to 
physical  objects  (as  Organicists  do),  we  find  ourselves  dealing  either  with 
Democratian atoms or with the atoms of physics. Democratian atoms are what 
you are left with if you take a physical object and keep dividing until it is no 
longer possible to divide it anymore. Such things would presumably be very 
small, and presumably microscopic. The atoms of physics on the other hand are 
now well known to be composites, made up of electrons, neutrons and protons; 
and with the nucleus now being supposed to be made of even smaller particles, 
leptons, quarks and the like. One or other of these approaches seems to be what 
Organicists have in mind. 
 
We can, however, raise an issue for Organicists about the very nature of the 
simples  that  they  discuss.  The  issue  is  this.  In  the  last  three  sections  it  has 
emerged that Organicists do not offer an account of what ‗composition‘ is. We 
might ask then, on what basis they can say whether some thing or other is a 
simple. It is far from clear that they can just appeal to the notions of parthood 
inherent in extensional mereology. While extensional mereologies are able to 
define what would count as a mereological simple in terms of related concepts   51 
such as ‗disjointness‘, what things to actually count as such are argued to be (at 
least by Goodman and Leonard) primarily a methodological decision39. More 
problematic though is that Organicists dis agree strongly with the extensional 
mereologists concerning what things are parts and what things are not. This 
leads  one  to  suppose  that  whatever  the  mereologist  means  by  ‗part  of‘  or 
‗disjoint from‘ (the two notions are inter-definable) that cannot be what the 
Organicist means by it.  
 
This difficulty with saying what composition is would, for instance make it very 
difficult for the Organicist to make sense of a Democratian notion of simple. 
How are we to make sense of ‗division‘? We can make sense of their dividing up 
organic  wholes—for  they  are  supposed  by  the  Organicist  to  be  composite 
objects. But once we have chopped a bit off a living thing we may suppose there 
is  a  good  chance  that  it  will  stop  living.  It  will  then,  by  the  Organicists‘ 
ontological standards, have stopped existing. How are we to divide a thing that 
does not exist? To be sure, on their account we can divide up an object-wise 
arrangement of simples (e.g. a torso wise arrangement of simples), but properly 
conceived by the Organicists‘ lights this is just moving simples around—the 
notion of simples is prior.  
 
On the face of it, this presents Organicists with a problem. Organicists deny 
that things have functional parts. You do not, according to van Inwagen, strictly 
speaking have a liver. Your parts are simples. But now we must ask, what are 
these?  How  on  earth  would  we  determine  what  the  candidate  things  to  be 
simples are40? 
 
                                              
39  As  presented  in  (Leonard  and  Goodman  1940)  part  of  the  utility  of  the  Calculus  of 
Individuals  is  that  it  applies  whatever  entities  you  take  to  be  logically  basic.  Thus,  the 
conclusion of the paper (p. 55) is: ‘The dispute between nominalist and realist as to what 
actual  entities  are  individuals  and  what  are  classes  is  recognized  as  devolving  upon 
matters of interpretative convenience rather than upon metaphysical necessity’. 
40 The question of what simples are is also raised in (Markosian 1998b).    52 
One way to step around this issue, would be to defer to modern physics. The 
strategy there would just be to define simples as those things, whatever they may 
be, which are the smallest physical units of matter. This is, in fact, very close to 
the approach that Merricks and van Inwagen do actually adopt.  
 
Van Inwagen adopts a functionalist definition along these lines. The notion of a 
simple is first introduced by van Inwagen, as follows:  
 
‗A simple or mereological atom is an object without proper 
parts, and a physical simple is a simple that unlike mathematical 
objects  or  God  or  Cartesian  egos,  belongs  to  the  subject 
matter of physics‘ p. 72.  
 
Later,  while  responding  to  a  question  about  the  persistence  of  simples,  he 
explicitly  notes  that  the  definition  of  simple  is  functional  in  nature  (before 
arguing that he is not committed to the existence of simples in any case): 
 
‗The notion of a simple is a functional, not a structural or 
ontological notion. The term ‗simple‘ was introduced into our 
discourse as a name for objects that play a certain role in the 
economy of the physical universe.‘ (van Inwagen 1990) p.158.  
 
In fairness, the existence or not of simples is listed in chapter 5 of (van Inwagen 
1990), as one of the things that van Inwagen will not presuppose (c.f. p. 52). On 
the other hand, in the preface, van Inwagen lists ten assumptions that he makes 
that leads him to the metaphysical position that he occupies. The fifth of these 
is that ‗matter is ultimately particulate‘ (p.5). He writes: 
 
‗I assume that every material thing is composed of things that 
have no proper parts: ―elementary particles‖, or ―mereological 
atoms‖ or ―metaphysical simples‖.‘ (van Inwagen 1990) p. 5.  
 
Merricks similarly makes reference to physics, and claims that he does not really 
need atoms in his ontology:   
‗In  much  of  what  follows,  I‘ll  make  claims  about  atoms 
arranged statuewise. I have in mind here the atoms of physics,   53 
not Democritus. For there is no need to build a commitment 
to  (or,  for  that  matter,  against)  simples  into 
Eliminativism….Then again, there is no need to build in a 
commitment to the atoms of physics either. So consider my 
claims  about  the  atoms  of  physics  to  be  useful  but 
expendable.  Such  claims  are  really  placeholders  for  claims 
about whatever microscopic entities are actually down there‘ 
((Merricks 2001) p.3) 
 
It is probably just as well that van Inwagen and Merricks think that they can get 
along without simples, because it is not clear that there is really any such thing, 
at least if by ‗thing‘ one means individuatable persisting entities, as we shall now 
see. 
   
In (Simons 1998)41, Simons quotes Schrodinger:  
―…the elementary particle is not an individual; it cannot be 
identified,  it  lacks  ‗sameness‘.  The  fact  is  known  to  every 
physicist… In technical language it is covered by saying the 
particles ‗obey‘ new-fangled statistics, either Einstein-Bose or 
Fermi-Dirac statistics. The implication, far from obvious, is 
that  the  unsuspected  epithet  ‗this‘  is  not  quite  properly 
applicable  to,  say,  an  electron,  except  with  caution,  in  a 
restricted sense and sometimes not at all‖ (Schrodinger 1950) 
p.109 
 
If, at the most fundamental level, matter is not particulate but a sort of quantum 
froth42,  then  talk  of  ‗whatever  microscopic  entities  are  actually  down  there‘ 
somewhat misses the point. Van Inwagen, in an admirably straightforward way, 
acknowledges that he is unable to give any sort of criterion for the persistence 
of simples. He even gives an example:  
                                              
41  See  also  (Lowe  1994),  who  references  (van  Fraasen  1991).  A  different  reason  for 
worrying about the existence (or at least the nature) of fundamental particles is provided by 
'ontic structuralists' in the philosophy of physics, who claim that there are relations but not 
relata involved in fundamental physics (where the relata would be fundamental particles). 
See discussion in, (Chakravartty 2003), (French and Ladyman 2003), and (French 2006). 
 
42 This Phrase seems to be fairly common, see for instance the New Scientist: 
http://www.newscientist.com/channel/fundamentals/mg18925394.600-sights-set-on-
quantum-froth.html, accessed March 2009.   54 
‗An electron disappears from a certain orbit and an electron 
appears  in  a  lower  orbit,  the  difference  in  energy  being 
accounted  for  by  the  emission  of  a  quantum  of 
electromagnetic radiation. Is the ―new‖ electron in the lower 
orbit the one that was in the higher orbit? Physics as far as I 
can tell, has nothing to say about this‘ ((van Inwagen 1990) 
pp.158-159) 
 
Merricks and van Inwagen, however, seem unduly sanguine about the apparent 
difficulty of pinning down any particulars that could be identified as simples. 
They argue that their main claims about composition, though they would need 
reformulating if simples did not exist, do not require simples to exist in order to 
be true. Their main claim is that the only composite things are organisms, and 
they suggest that this claim could be true even without there being any simples.  
One is left a little puzzled by this suggestion however, for the following reason.  
   
On  the  suggestion  that  there  are  physical  simples  we  can  develop  an 
understanding of how an organism can be a composite object (on the Organicist 
account). Simples become involved in a homeostatic system, get together to take 
part in the activities of organs and such like and all together these activities 
constitute a life. Of course, for van Inwagen organs are not really objects—they 
are merely ‗virtual‘ objects, but we can get the idea. The question is, if there are 
no  simples,  and  the  higher  level  composites  within  a  body  such  as  lungs, 
tongues and viscera are merely ‗virtual‘ objects, what is it that organisms are 
supposed to be composed of? 
 
Perhaps  the  idea  is  that  there  would  exist  some  smallest  non-frothy  unit  of 
matter,  and  this  could  take  the  place  of  simples  as  the  basic  ontological 
constituent. This may be physically possible (though the point that Schrodinger 
appears to have been making in the quote above is that even if this is the case, 
those non-frothy units of matter still fail to qualify as individuals). Assuming this 
to be the case, then the term ‗simple‘ would be a placeholder for ‗smallest non-
frothy bit of matter‘. We need not allow Organicists the assumption that such a 
thing makes sense, but allowing that it does, we might then ask the question, are   55 
the smallest non-frothy bits of matter composite? Clearly they cannot be—as 
they are not living. But if they are simples, then they are a funny sort of simple 
that seems to ontologically rely on the activities of the subatomic ‗froth‘, in a 
way similar to the way we might suppose a whole to rely on its parts. Once we 
have introduced this funny sort of entity into the mix, we have lost something 
of the  conceptual purity to which compositional ontologies aspire. We have 
‗simples‘ and composites, but the simples are now a funny sort of entity that is 
not fundamental—and it seems arbitrary to say that these things exist but not 
the virtual objects (such as lamb‘s kidneys) that those of us who have not fallen 
for the Organicists‘ svengali charms think are probably made up out of them. 
 
Whether  or  not  it  is  correct  to  say  that  the  Organicist  thesis  could  be  true 
without there being any simples, it still seems that a lack of simples will cause 
the account as a whole some problems. To see this, assume that Schrödinger is 
correct  and  that  there  are  no  actual  individuals  that  could  be  identified  as 
‗simples‘. The Organicist is now in a position where he has no account of what 
composition is, no way of differentiating some thing as simple or not, and no 
individuals that  he or  she can point to (even metaphorically) and  say ‗those 
things  are  simples‘.  Given  this,  there  seems  no  real  reason  to  suppose  that 
anything is composite in their sense. Those everyday objects which exist may as 
well be simple. The issue is not so much, ‗are there simples?‘ as, ‗what would it 
be for something to be simple on an Organicist account?‘, and, further, ‗what 
would it take for something to fail to be simple?‘. 
 
It will be worth saying something in passing about the possibility of ‗gunk‘. The 
gunk hypothesis is that there are no simples, that matter is infinitely divisible; 
that it is gunk43. Since van Inwagen and Merricks argue that simples and living 
things exist and are all that exist, the truth of the gunk hypothesis would mean 
                                              
43  (Zimmerman  1996)  argues  for  a  gunk  theory  (though  his  argument  is  premised  on 
simples being points). (Sider 1993) has argued that since van Inwagen holds it to be a 
necessary truth that there are simples and gunk worlds are possible, that van Inwagen’s 
position is false.    56 
that their position is strictly speaking false. How problematic this would be for 
them is not altogether clear; could they, for instance, accept a gunk hypothesis 
yet keep their positive ontological claim that the only composite things there are, 
are organisms? The main problem with their doing so, will be answering the 
question ‗What are composite objects composed of?‘.  
 
If the world is, as van Inwagen supposes, ultimately particulate, then this is an 
easy question to answer: composite objects are composed of simples. If the 
world is a gunk world, however, then there are no simples to do the composing. 
Those  with  a  more  generous  account  of  composition  will  not  face  any 
analogous problem. A Universalist, for instance can make sense of any given 
object being infinitely divisible, but an Organicist cannot.  
 
In fact, if the gunk hypothesis is true it is difficult to see how an Organicist can 
make sense of everyday objects being divisible at all. If they retain the view that 
the only composite objects are Organisms, they would have to hold that there 
are  no other objects. This is because gunk that did not compose something 
could  not  exist;  in  order  for  there  to  be  gunk  there  has  to  be  something 
divisible, and for something to be divisible it has to have parts. If a thing has 
parts it is composite. Once we allow things made of gunk we have allowed 
things made of composite matter, and this would deprive Organicists of the 
compositional rational for their ontology. The only existing things then, would 
be living things. But as was noted earlier, organisms do not respond very well to 
splitting. Most of them would die if split into two equal parts. What then, could 
they be composed of? 
 
Supposing once more that there are simples, Organicists might be in a better 
position to account for them if they had an account of what composition is. 
That is, if they had an answer to the General Compositional Question. A simple, 
remember, is just a thing without any parts. Parts are the things that are held 
together by the composition relation to compose a whole. If we had an account 
saying what it is for some thing to be a part of another, or saying what it is for   57 
some things to compose another thing we might be able to supply a principled 
account of why some things do not have parts, or others do44.  If, for instance, 
we could say what it is for  something to be a part of something else, then we 
might be able to say when something had no parts. If we had an account of 
composition that meets van Inwagen‘s high standards, a function for instance 
that relates parts to wholes, then we might be able to say what things do not 
stand in those sorts of relata. However, van Inwagen suspects no such account 
is to be found, and Merricks does not even mention the possibility of one.  
 
One might suggest that the notion of ‗part‘ being appealed to by the Organicist 
is the everyday notion. The thought would go as follows: The mereological view 
of parts that lies behind the Organicist position is in fact just a formalisation of 
our normal, everyday intuitions about parts (with the odd change to make the 
formalism come out right). There is just one (apparently unanalysable) notion of 
part that the Universalist, the Eliminativist and the Organicist have in common. 
Where they differ, goes the thought, is not on what composition is, but on when it 
happens. Given this, the thought might go, we do have an intuitive notion of 
what a simple would be, based on our everyday notion of part.  
 
This suggestion, however, is not quite sufficient to rescue the Organicist. Even 
assuming that the notion of part being appealed to is our ordinary everyday 
notion, what is at stake is when one thing is a part of another. A mereological 
simple has to be thought of in terms of its failing to itself have any parts. But all 
of  the  suggested  theses  about  composition  (Organicism,  Unrestricted 
Composition, No Composition) suggest that our everyday beliefs about when 
composition takes place are radically mistaken. How then is an appeal to our 
everyday conception  of part  supposed  to  tell  us what  things are simples?  It 
cannot, and neither can anything else in the Organicists‘ position.  
 
                                              
44 A noteworthy attempt to give an account of when something is a simple can be found in 
(Markosian 1998b).    58 
If Organicists had a robust notion of parthood, then they might be able to 
appeal  to  it  in  order  to  give  an  account  of  simples.  If  they  could  say  what 
parthood is, that is, they might then be able to give a principled  reason for 
saying that some bit of matter does or does not have any parts.  
 
Assuming that Organicists take the smallest non-frothy bit of matter conception 
of what a simple is, we might still wonder why we should accept that conception 
of what a simple is. As was noted above, given their commitments and their 
inability to say what composition is, it seems strange to attribute to that sort of 
object the ontological work that the Organicists do.  We may suggest instead 
that composition, taking physical objects as the individuals to be composed and 
do  the  composing  (as  distinct  for  instance,  from  taking  properties  as 
compositors), is not the soundest base for a philosophical ontology.  
 
1.7   Could everyday objects be mereologically simple? 
So  far  we  have  sought  to  put  a  little  pressure  on  the  notion  of  ‗simple‘  as 
deployed by Organicists. In this section, we suggest that the  Eliminativist is 
unable  to  give  good  reasons  for  rejecting  the  idea  that  everyday  objects  are 
simples, or rather, that the obvious reasons that they might be tempted to give 
are undercut by their own position.  If, as the Organicist supposes, we are in a 
dialectical position so extreme that it might require us to give up the existence of 
such  things  as  tables  and  mountains,  we  might  be  better  off  seeing  what 
alternatives  we  can  come  by.  One  thing  we  might  revisit  is  the  notion  of 
‗simple‘, and has already been noted, the Organicists, while having something in 
mind that they mean by the term ‗simple‘ do not really have a principled reason 
to suppose that there are such things. 
 
Two claims are made in this section. Firstly it is argued that being composite is 
not a necessary property for everyday objects. Secondly, it is argued that it is no 
more outlandish to suppose that everyday objects are in fact simple, then it is to 
suggest that in fact there are none. It will be suggested that this gives us reason to   59 
suspect that whether or not there are everyday objects does not really boil down 
to the question, ‗are there macroscopic composite objects‘? 
 
Merricks and van Inwagen both give the notion that everyday objects could be 
non-composite short shrift. Merricks for instance says the following:  
 
‗The claim that atoms arranged baseballwise fail to compose a 
baseball  might  be  hard  to  swallow.  But  it  goes  down  like 
draught Guinness compared to the claim that baseballs are 
simples.‘ (Merricks 2001) p. 63 
 
Van Inwagen, too, takes a dim view of simple everyday objects, and at places 
seems to suppose that everyday objects must necessarily be composite material 
objects:  
 
‗There are certain properties that a thing would have to have 
to be properly called a ―table‖ in anyone‘s understanding of 
the word, and nothing has all these properties. If anything did 
have them, it would be real, a true object, actually a thing, a 
substance,  a  unified  whole,  and  something  more  than  a 
collection of particles. But nothing does. If there were tables, 
they  would  be  composite  material  objects,  and  every 
composite material object is real, a true object, actually a thing, 
a  substance,  a  unified  whole  and  something  more  than  a 
collection of particles.‘ (van Inwagen 1990) pp.99-100  
 
However, the Organicists‘ failure to give us an account of what composition is 
means that by their own lights they are not really in a position to deny that 
everyday objects are simples. If, of course, it were the case that everyday objects 
are necessarily composite material objects than that would give them a reason to 
reject the thesis that everyday objects are simples.  
 
However,  it  is  not  the  case  that  everyday  objects  are  necessarily  composite 
material objects. Consider the following two possibilities, though they may be 
physically  impossible  (and  therefore  under  some  assumptions  about   60 
metaphysical impossibility, metaphysically impossible) they don‘t seem in any 
way to contradict our normal conception of ‗chair-ness‘: 
   
Sci-Fi world 
New technology has been used to manipulate gravity and other forces so 
as to be able to produce ‗force fields‘. (This is something of a staple in 
far-future  science  fiction  writing).  Someone  decides  to  invent  a  chair 
using  force  fields.  These  prove  astonishingly  successful  inventions 
(presumably because they can be turned off in order to be stored). Every 
house has a few. These chairs are used in just the same way that we use 
chairs. The difference is they are not composed of matter at all. What 
one is sitting upon is just cleverly arranged force fields.  
 
  Extended Simples World 
Extended simples world is composed entirely of simples and organisms. 
There are (as the Organicists in our world suppose) no composite non-
organic objects. However, simples in extended simples world have the 
useful  property  of  being  extendable.  Rather  than  being  microscopic 
particles,  they can  (through  the application of heat)  be stretched into 
extended areas of space and into useful shapes. Some of these simples 
are extended into chair-shapes. These chair-shaped simples are used in 
just the same way that we use chairs.  
 
Force chairs in Sci-Fi World are not composed of anything—they are not even 
material objects. If you are disposed to think that they are still chairs then you 
should accept that being a composite object is not necessary for there being a 
chair. 
 
Extended Simples World is, by stipulation, consistent with the Organicist thesis 
about  composition.  If  you  think  it  is  comprehensible  and  that  chair-shape 
objects in Extended Simples World are chairs, then you should conclude that 
being a composite object is not an essential part of being a chair .   61 
 
It is, of course, quite a step from arguing that there are possible worlds where 
there  are  non-composite  everyday  objects,  or  possible  objects  that  are  non-
composite, to arguing that there are in actuality non-composite everyday objects.  
 
In the sequel it will be argued that objects are best conceived of as functionally 
defined entities. This need not entail that objects are ‗simple‘; but one way of 
developing the emerging account will be that objects are functionally defined 
simples.  The  point  made  in  the  preceding  sections  is  that  the  Organicists‘ 
account of composition is not robust enough to rule out such a position. The 
claim below will be that whether or not there are such things as chairs or tables 
does not depend upon composition. Rather, the way to find out whether or not 
there are chairs or tables is to see whether our ‗chair‘ concept or our ‗table‘ 
concept is satisfied. To put the point simply; there are chairs if all the chair 
things get done. 
 
The Organicists‘ claim that objects do not exist does not involve the simple 
disappearance  of  the  matter  that  does  what  objects  do.  Merricks  and  van 
Inwagen‘s position is not self-evidently false because, while it is their view that 
objects do not exist, they also hold that the matter which most people think 
comprises objects still does all the things that people normally suppose objects 
to do. Thus, someone holding the position advocated in the next chapter and an 
Organicist  can  disagree  about  whether  objects  exist,  but  agree  that  object 
functions are, in fact, fulfilled.  
 
1.8  From composition to ontology? 
In  this  chapter  Organicism  has  been  treated  as  a  form  of  compositional 
ontology: It has been treated as an ontological thesis that is premised on a thesis 
about composition.  It has been argued that because of Organicism‘s failure to 
give an account of what composition is, it runs into problems when faced with 
the claim that everyday objects are not composite.    62 
 
We  might  agree  that  where  composition  happens  amongst  material  objects, 
there is an additional ‗whole‘ created from ‗parts‘, and that this ‗whole‘ must 
exist for some relation to count as ‗composition‘. Granting this, we might still 
question the idea that questions about the existence of everyday objects depend 
in  important  ways  on  questions  about  the  frequency  and  distribution  of 
incidences of composition. 
 
Van Inwagen, at one point, appears to offer us an argument taking us from the 
claim that there are no composite objects to the claim that there are no everyday 
objects. The argument runs as follows and can be termed ‗the simple argument‘: 
 
1.  Anything that exists is either a simple or a living thing. 
2.  Chairs are non-living 
3.  Chairs are non-simple objects 
4.  Therefore chairs do not exist. 
 
This argument is clearly valid, but even so it is a poor argument. To see why, 
consider an analogous argument for the conclusion that there are no chairs:  
 
1.  Anything that exists is non-coloured or a living thing 
2.  Chairs are non-living 
3.  Chairs are coloured 
4.  Therefore, chairs do not exist  
 
Or,  the  following  argument  which  is  not  formally  analogous  but  makes  the 
point clearly: 
 
1.  Anything that exists is non-coloured  
2.  All chairs are coloured 
3.  Therefore, chairs do not exist  
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The thesis that no everyday objects are coloured is a philosophically live thesis45. 
But even if we accepted it we would be unlikely to conclude on that basis that 
there are no chairs. Rather, we would conclude that chairs are not coloured. If 
we accept the arguments provided for the unlikely conclusion that chairs and 
such like are not composite objects, our conclusion should, similarly, be that 
chairs are non-composite. That being composite is not a necessary property of 
chairs is demonstrated by the scenarios presented in the previous section.  
 
The simple argument is so simple, that one might wonder whether it is really 
van Inwagen‘s argument at all. He certainly writes as if it is. The argument is 
found in the text quoted above, but to repeat it:  
 
‗There are certain properties that a thing would have to have 
to be properly called a ―table‖ in anyone‘s understanding of 
the word, and nothing has all these properties. If anything did 
have them, it would be real, a true object, actually a thing, a 
substance,  a  unified  whole,  and  something  more  than  a 
collection of particles. But nothing does. If there were tables, 
they  would  be  composite  material  objects,  and  every 
composite material object is real, a true object, actually a thing, 
a  substance,  a  unified  whole  and  something  more  than  a 
collection of particles.‘ (van Inwagen 1990) pp.99-100 
 
This  section  of  text  occurs  in  the  context  of  van  Inwagen‘s  rejection  of  a 
number of ways of characterising his view. He wants to be clear that he is not 
arguing that tables are ‗unreal‘ or somehow second class citizens, he wants to say 
that there are no tables.  
 
The simple argument is not van Inwagen‘s only reason for adopting his position 
but it does seem to be a presupposition of compositional ontologists that one 
can  make  an  easy  inference  from  non-composition  to  non-existence.  If  this 
simple inference is supposed to be along the lines of the simple argument then it 
is unsound.  
                                              
45 See for instance (Jackson 1977), (Boghossian and Velleman 1989).   64 
 
Organicists  and  other  compositional  ontologists  think  that  given  a  full 
description of the distribution of properties across a world, determining what 
entities that world contains is a matter of determining what simples there are in 
that world and when they compose other things. Thus far, so good. The point 
being made here is as follows: this method does not enable one to determine 
whether or not there are everyday objects such as tables and mountains unless 
one assumes that such things must be composite. But in this chapter we have 
seen that there are different ways that we could think about composition, and 
we have seen that which things we take to be eligible for parthood is likely to 
depend on other metaphysical commitments. We have also seen that there is no 
obvious reason to suppose that macroscopic objects must be composite. The 
notion of composition that Organicists are using is not such that they have an 
obvious reason to offer for why we should not treat objects as for their purposes 
simple. If it makes no qualitative difference what composite objects there are 
and it is possible to coherently disagree about what things are composite to the 
extent that Universalists, Nihilists and Organicists do, then it is reasonable to 
suppose that what things are composite in the sense that they are picking out is 
slightly arbitrary.  
 
We are supposed to think that the decision about what entities there are will 
come  down  to  which  ontology  provides  the  best  account  of  objects.  But 
Nihilism and Organicism are, from the outset, insulated from accounting for 
our experience of everyday objects by the O-arranging manoeuvre.  To see how 
odd the notion of composition being used by Organicists is, consider that even 
those composite objects they do suppose to exist do not have the parts that we 
would (pre-philosophically)  take them to. They hold that I exist, for instance, 
but that I have no kidneys (merely kidney-wise arrangements of simples). What 
is more, according to their position, it is impossible for me to have a kidney; 
kidneys are not (of themselves) organisms or (on the Organicists‘ view) simples. 
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My claim then is that for all Organicists have to say about composition, we 
could consider everyday objects to be simple. In itself the claim that everyday 
objects are simple is not very attractive; this is because it seems clear that they 
do have parts. But, whatever notion of ‗part‘ we apply to objects to conclude 
that they have parts is not the notion of part that Organicists have in mind, for 
normally  we  suppose  everyday  objects  to  have  more  parts  than  just  their 
fundamental atoms and Organicists do not. Similarly, we might worry that on 
the account offered everyday objects could not be cut in half. But that does not 
follow. A chair could be cut in half. It would be destroyed and two new objects 
created (or perhaps merely de-concatenated). What must be denied (if taking 
this line) is that the two new objects were ever themselves parts of the original 
chair. In fact, this is not a new position. In Metaphysics Z, Aristotle argues that no 
substance can have other actual substances as parts; his reasoning being that 
when things are parts of a substance they are only potential substances and not 
actual substances (Aristotle, Metaphysics Z13, 1039a in (Aristotle 1984)). 
 
Someone  might  object  to  the  notion  that  everyday  objects  are  simple  by 
pointing out that this seems to commit us to claiming that, for instance, there 
are cars but that no car has an engine (or people none of whom have kidneys). 
Strictly speaking though, all the position requires is that the engines that are 
located within cars are not thereby ‗parts‘ of the cars, in the controversial sense 
of the word ‗part‘ that has become the focus of recent metaphysical debate. We 
can still say that there are engines (though these must in themselves be simples), 
and we need not deny any other relationship that an engine has with its car. 
Thus, we need not deny the role of the engine in moving the car around or its 
location within the body of the car. 
 
In any case I am not here arguing that everyday objects actually are simple. 
Rather, the point is that there is a lacuna in the Organicist position. All they 
have to say about composition is that it obeys certain formal rules, and that the 
only composite objects are organisms. But if this is all that you have to say 
about what composition is, then there seems to be no good reason to think that   66 
everyday objects must be composite. It is preferable to suppose that objects 
exist but (in this weak sense of simple) are simple, rather than to suppose that 
there are no everyday objects. 
 
The  aim  of  this  section  has  not  been  to  address  the  main  arguments  for 
Organicism,  merely  to  introduce  the  position  and  show  that  construed  as  a 
compositional ontology (as its protagonists do so construe it) Organicism faces 
a number of challenges that are not normally acknowledged. The positive case 
in favour of Organicism will be addressed in the last three chapters of the thesis. 
The next chapter sketches an approach to everyday objects that does not take 
what there is to be a matter of when composition occurs.  
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A glossary of terms introduced in Chapter 2 
 
Arrangement: a collection of ‗simples‘ 
 
Form:  a  collection  of  properties,  initially,  a  collection  of  ‗macroscopic‘ 
properties 
 
Arrangement  formation:    the  simples  in  an  arrangement  and  the  relations 
between them. 
 
Arrangement structure: the relations between simples in an arrangement 
 
Efficacious  sub-structure  of  an  arrangement:  the  subset  of  relations 
involved  in  an  arrangement  structure  that  are  causally  responsible  for  the 
arrangement form. 
 
Arrangement-form: the collection of macroscopic properties generated by an 
arrangement formation. 
 
Object-form: the collection of properties possessed by an object (assuming that 
there are such things). 
 
Formal-role: pattern of possible causal interactions involving a form. 
 
Object concepts: concepts that regiment the regularities in the world around us 
into objects.  
 
Applications  conditions:  conditions  under  which  it  is  correct  to  apply  an 
object  concept  (that  is,  the  conditions  where,  excluding  error  about  what 
conditions are actually instantiated, it is true to say that there is an object of the 
that type there).    69 
 
Co-application conditions: conditions under which it is correct to re-apply an 
object  concept  (that  is,  the  conditions  where,  excluding  error  about  what 
conditions are actually instantiated, it is true to say that something is the same 
object (as some other object)).  
 
*  *  * 
 
In  the  last  chapter  we  saw  that  the  notion  of  composition  appealed  to  by 
Organicists is not as secure as might have been thought and that consequently 
there  are  difficulties  for  Organicists  with  articulating  what  it  would  be  for 
something to be a mereological simple and with resisting the claim that everyday 
objects are simple.  
 
In this chapter we develop the basis of what might be termed a functional-
bundle account of everyday objects. It will be argued here that there are reasons 
why such an account is attractive independently of the case being built here 
against  Organicism.  We  will  soon  see  though,  that  the  functional-bundle 
approach adopted here is very different to that of the compositional ontologists 
in the way that it approaches issues of metaphysics.  
 
The theory of objects sketched in this chapter is based on the idea that there are 
regularities in our environment which satisfy our object concepts. The challenge 
to Organicists is to say what is needed in order for there to be objects beyond 
the satisfaction of our object concepts by regularities in our environment. The 
theory takes seriously the notion of an arrangement of simples which underlies 
the Organicists‘ O-arranging manoeuvre (which is discussed in Chapter Four). 
What  Organicists  do  not  really  discuss  in  connection  with  the  O-arranging 
manoeuvre, is the role that the arrangement of simples plays in generating the 
properties that the O-arranging manoeuvre is invoked to explain. The theory 
presented in this chapter takes seriously the notion that the properties of objects 
arise  from  the  relations  that  hold  between  collections  of  simples  in  our   70 
environment. It is argued that objects are complexes of properties that satisfy 
our object concepts and further, that particular complexes of properties can be 
identified with the properties generated by particular arrangements of simples.  
 
I will argue that what differentiates random collections of properties from those 
that constitute objects is their suitability to satisfy our object concepts. It might 
initially seem as though there is something slightly miraculous about this, but 
one  needs  to  remember  that  our  object  concepts  were  not  developed  in  a 
vacuum. They were developed as a response to the world in which we find 
ourselves and to the important causal interactions that enable us to get around 
in that world. The idea is that our object concepts are suited to identify objects 
in  our  environment  because  that  is  their  purpose,  and  that  objects  in  our 
environment are such as to be so identified because our object concepts were 
developed in response to them. 
 
The chapter has three main parts. The first of these introduces a good deal of 
terminology, which is used to describe the way that objects, simples and the 
organisation  of  simples  are  related  to  each  other.  In  the  second  section  the 
notion of an object concept is introduced and explored. In the final section of 
the chapter the theory of objects is stated, a potential objection is addressed and 
some general features of the account are discussed. In particular, the account is 
fitted into a wider story about how we are able to be effective in the world and it 
is shown to be based upon a plausible intuition concerning what needs to be the 
case for objects to exist. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the 
consequences  of  this  intuition  for  the  methodology  we  should  adopt  when 
establishing what things exist. 
 
In the next chapter we will see that the account of objects developed in this 
chapter fits comfortably with the British empiricist tradition.  
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2.1  Everyday objects 
The term ‗everyday object‘ is used here to pick out the mundane things that 
surround us in everyday life. Examples would be tables, chairs, mountains, trees, 
roads, beaches, planets and the like.   
 
Assuming,  just  for  a  moment,  that  there  are  such  things,  our  primary 
interactions with them are causal. We ourselves are embodied creatures in the 
world, and in order to survive in that world we need to interact with it. What is 
more, our survival as a species has hinged largely on our ability to purposefully 
affect  and  manipulate  the  environment  around  us.  Living  things,  we  may 
suppose, tend to survive better, the better they are at recognising the salient 
parts of their environment.  
 
We do, as a matter of fact, tend to recognise objects in the world around us. 
Looking around me as I write  I find, amongst other  things, a blue cup, an 
aspidistra and a lamp. Let us take the cup as an example. The properties of the 
cup that we experience tend to coordinate in a fairly predictable way. The cup 
tends to keep its shape as we move it around; despite variances in the surface 
shades  we  actually  experience,  we  tend  to  think  that  the  colour  of  the  cup 
remains  constant;  in  the  normal  course  of  things  its  mass  does  not  change 
appreciably.  What  is  more,  I  am  in  a  position  to  make  a  number  of 
counterfactual  predictions  concerning  the  cup.  I  can  predict  (amongst  other 
things) that it will be an adequate receptacle for hot and cold drinks; that it will 
break if I drop it onto a hard surface; and that, ceteris paribus, it will fall if I drop 
it. Because I am in the position to make these sorts of predictions about the cup 
and many other the things in my environment, I am in a position to find the cup 
useful. Yet even if I did not find the cup useful, it would still have a place in my 
mental economy. 
 
More  fundamentally,  all  my  experiences  of  the  cup  are  derived  from  causal 
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to  find  out  its  hardness  I  must  touch  it  (or  communicate  with  someone  or 
something that has), and by flicking it I can find out about its tonal properties 
when struck in a certain way (which may be understood in terms of the way that 
it transmits energy as sound waves).   
 
The  cup  then,  can  be  thought  of  as  a  collection  or  bundle  of  coordinated 
properties. It is because we are able to understand the way that the properties 
work together and coordinate that we are able to use the cup as a cup.  
 
Our interactions with everyday objects then, depend on the regularities amongst 
properties that we find in our environment. Even those who claim that everyday 
objects do not exist will accept that there are some simples arranged in a way 
that is causally responsible for the properties that I associate with the cup. These 
properties are what below will be termed a ‗form‘. It will be argued in what 
follows that, with some qualifications, the existence of object forms is sufficient 
for the existence of objects. 
2.1.1  Some preliminaries 
In order to show how functional-bundlism about everyday objects is supposed 
to work, some preliminary terminology will be introduced (this is summarised in 
the glossary at the start of this chapter). The point of this is largely to fill in the 
way that the arrangement of matter is relevant to claims about the existence of 
everyday objects. In what follows there will be discussion of simples, but this is 
in no way essential. What is important in what follows is that the matter that 
constitutes  objects  in  our  immediate  environment  is  structured,  rather  than 
unstructured.  These  structures  could  just  as  well  be  thought  of  in  terms  of 
relations between distributions of properties as in terms of relations between 
individual particulars. Discussion of the structure of ‗object-wise arrangements‘, 
or  objects  for  that  matter,  is  notably  absent  from  the  Organicist  and 
compositional ontologist literature. 
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The idea of the O-arranging manoeuvre, which will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter Four, is that  all of the  things which we normally  think  are true of 
objects can be accounted for in terms of cooperating collections of simples. 
Much of the Eliminativist case depends on our being able to make sense of 
activities of simples without there being anything which those simples compose. 
It is because we can attribute the macroscopic properties of objects to the action 
of  cooperative  collections  of  simples  that  we  are  supposed  to  be  able  to 
eliminate everyday objects from our ontology. In what follows we will allow that 
the  idea  of  simples  can  be  made  sense  of,  despite  the  misgivings  expressed 
earlier (doing so will, later on, enable us to engage with Organicists over issues 
that we otherwise could not).  
 
Supposing that some object in fact exists because there is some matter arranged 
in a certain way (i.e. that we are not talking about force-chairs or some such 
object), we can call the particular matter that constitutes or realises the object, 
arranged as it in fact is, an ‗object arrangement‘. An object arrangement in this 
sense will be equivalent to an object-wise arrangement of simples, and we can 
allow  that  we  can  discuss  the  arrangement  of  matter  without  positing  some 
object that is constituted or composed by that arrangement. 
 
It will be easiest to introduce the terminology of this section by means of an 
example. Let us take as our example the chair upon which the auto-icon of 
Jeremy Bentham sits in the South Cloister at University College London.  
 
Eliminativists hold that there is no such chair. Rather, they say, the auto-icon is 
supported  by  a  chair-wise  arrangement  of  simples46,  which,  though  not 
composing anything, do cooperate in order to support the auto-icon‘s weight.  
 
                                              
46 Strictly, they would say that the auto-icon wise arrangement of simples is supported by 
the chair-wise arrangement of simples.   74 
We can then talk of the chair-wise arrangement. Though, as will be emphasised 
when  we  discuss  the  O-arranging  manoeuvre  in  Chapter  Four,  we  cannot 
without argument hypostatize arrangements: an ‗arrangement‘ for Eliminativists 
is not an object. In any case, there are a number of things that we can say about 
Jeremy‘s chair that do not beg the question against the Eliminativist.  
 
One thing that we can note is that the chair has a number of properties that 
could be termed ‗macroscopic‘. That is, it is about 3 feet tall at the back, 2 feet 
tall  at  the  seat.  It  weighs  a  certain  amount  at  sea  level  and  so  on.  These 
properties are explained by Eliminativists by reference to the cooperation of 
simples, but the properties themselves are not questioned. These macroscopic 
properties taken together constitute what will here be termed the ‗form‘ of the 
chair. The notion of a ‗form‘ is discussed in more detail in sections 2.1.2 and 
2.1.3 below. Eliminativists will of course deny that there is a chair for there to 
be a form of, but they will, presumably, accept that the macroscopic properties 
that we would (on the hypothesis that there are chairs) associate with the chair 
are in fact manifest. 
 
Some simples are, or so we shall assume for the moment, responsible for the 
macroscopic properties of the chair47. This matter is organised in a certain way: 
the simples are related in the ways required to  causally produce the form of the 
chair. These simples, and the relations that hold between them, we may term the 
arrangement formation. There is no need to assume that the arrangement 
formation itself is an object; we can treat the term ‗arrangement formation‘ as a 
multiple referring term.  
 
                                              
47 An advantage for the position being developed is that it allows that just which simples are 
responsible for some object's form could be entirely vague, while also allowing that the form 
in fact exists could be entirely non-vague see Chapter 7 (p. 214)  for a brief discussion of 
how someone holding this position might respond to the Sorites paradox. 
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Having noted that the arrangement formation involves both simples and their 
relations, we might also seek to pick out just the relations that hold between the 
simples  which  cooperate  to  produce  the  form  of  the  object.  This  seems 
especially worthwhile given the difficulties in individuating simples alluded to at 
the end of Chapter One. We can coin the term ‗arrangement structure‘ to pick 
out just these relations. The idea of an arrangement structure can be traced by 
loose  analogy  to  structuralism  with  regards  to  physics  (see  for  instance 
(Chakravartty  2003),  (French  2006)),  which  is  a  thesis  about  fundamental 
particles in physics. Structuralism in physics comes in two forms, epistemic and 
ontological.  The  epistemic  form  says  that  we  can  never  know  about 
fundamental  particles,  but  only  about  the  relations  between  them.  The 
ontological form denies the existence of such particles, positing just the relations 
instead. 
 
We  can,  given  the  assumption  that  simples  exist,  explicate  the  way  that  an 
arrangement formation and an arrangement structure are related in terms of the 
Ramsey sentence gained by replacing all references to simples with variables48.  
 
Suppose that at a given time, t1, some simples s1 to sn (we may assume n is very 
large number) are arranged in a certain manner, and related in such a way that 
they jointly give rise to the form of a chair. That is, they jointly give rise to all 
the macroscopic properties of a chair. We may say that there is a chairwise 
arrangement  of  simples  at  t1.  So  far  we  have  begged  no  questions  of  the 
Organicist:  We  have  not  claimed  that  there  is  a  chair  or  that  the  simples 
compose something, we are merely using the term ‗arrangement‘ to pick out 
some simples exhibiting certain relations.  
 
If we consider all of the relations that the simples stand in, in relation to each 
other we will find that there are a very large number of relations. Each simple 
                                              
48 The method for doing this is taken from (Lewis 1972). By specifying structures in this way 
we can dodge questions about what ‘simples’ are, by simply defining them as whatever 
give rise to structures.    76 
will stand in some relation to each other simple, and there will be multiple place 
relations exemplified as well.  
 
Let us take the class of m relations (which we will notate Rm) that hold between 
s1 to sn,  and notate the claim that they all hold as Rms1-sn. It should be fairly easy 
to imagine replacing the singular terms denoting simples, which we have been 
pretending are individuals, with variables in order to produce what is effectively 
an open sentence Rmx1-xn, and we can of course introduce existential quantifiers 
to bind each of the variables (which we will notate as  x1-xn).  
 
We can take  x1-xn Rmx1-xn as describing the arrangement structure, and Rms1-sn 
can be understood as describing the arrangement formation.  
 
Here then, are the three technical terms that have been introduced so far:  
 
‗arrangement formation‘ (or ‗formation‘):  the  physical distribution of simples 
and relations (including bonds and such like) that hold between the simples in 
an object arrangement. In particular, in so far as they are described without 
reference to any particular sortal concept.  
 
‗arrangement-structure‘  (or  just  ‗structure‘):  the  relations  in  a  formation 
independently of the simples that are involved in the object-wise arrangement 
that gives rise to the formation.  
 
‗object-form‘: the physical properties associated with an object at all the times 
that it exists. Or, so as not to beg the question against Eliminativists, the macro-
level properties jointly caused by a succession of collections of simples arranged 
in some object-wise manner. 
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2.1.2  Multiple realisability of forms 
The form of an arrangement depends more on the arrangement structure than 
on the arrangement formation: there is nothing that depends on those particular 
simples  that  are  involved  in  the  formation  being  involved  in  the  formation. 
They could just as well be replaced by qualitatively similar simples. To see this, 
consider that a sufficiently qualitatively similar simple ‗a‘ replacing one of s1 to sn 
will be able to contribute everything that the original simple did to the structure. 
This is just as well, since, as was noted in the previous chapter, the status of 
simples as ‗individuals‘ is in any case far from certain. The place of simples 
could just as well be taken by distributions of properties (realistically conceived) 
or distributions of energy.  
 
More  importantly  from  the  perspective  of  this  thesis,  nothing  precludes  the 
possibility that a number of different structures would be quite capable of giving 
rise  to  the  same  form.  A  slightly  different  set  of  relations;  maybe  a  set  of 
relations  involving  n-1  simples,  could  just  as  easily  give  rise  to  the  form  in 
question. 
 
To see that different structures could realise the same forms one needs only to 
remember that the sort of formal account of a formation structure in terms of 
quantification over its Ramsey sentence is something of an idealisation. To see 
this,  one  need  only  consider  what  is  involved  in  saying  which  simples  are 
involved  in  the  formation  from  which  the  description  of  the  structure  was 
derived (we will, for the moment, retain the convenient idea that simples are 
individuatable).  If  the  formation  can  be  expressed  in  terms  of  the  multiple 
relations involved in Rm and the simples s1-sn that they relate, then, one might 
think that one should be able to also pick out the simples. That is, there should 
be a set S   s1, s2,… sn  .  
 
The problem with this is that we cannot suppose that any particular object in 
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simples; as the problem of the many shows us (see the Introduction of this 
thesis,  p.  9),  any  of  a  large  number  of  competing  sets  of  simples  may  be 
considered  to  constitute  an  object.  In  the  present  context  we  are  not 
presupposing  the  existence  of  objects,  but  the  problem  presents  itself  in  a 
similar way; there is no particular set of simples that may straightforwardly be 
said to give rise to a particular form.  
 
We are in a position to say, however, that the same form can be generated by a 
number of different arrangement structures. While the problem of the many 
poses a problem for objects if we think of composition as the major issue, it is 
not at all clear that we need be so concerned about the problem of the many 
with respect to forms.  
 
To see this, we might consider as an example two arrangement structures that 
differ from each other only minutely, say in terms of the involvement of a single 
simple.  Thus  we  might  have  the  arrangement  formation  A,  which  we  can 
describe as Rm s1…sn and compare it to arrangement formation B, which can be 
described as Rq s1…sn-1. Formation A, then, is constituted by the simples s1 to sn 
and the relations that hold between them. Formation B, on the other hand is 
constituted  by  one  less  simple.  It  is  fairly  natural  to  suppose  that  the 
arrangement  structures  in  A  and  B  will  also  be  different.  The  arrangement 
structure is comprised of the (possibly many) relations that hold between the 
constituent simples. If the number of constituent simples is different, then it 
seems natural to suppose that the instantiated relations will be different too.  
 
Let us suppose that the arrangement formation A produces a form F of (let us 
say)  a  cup.  It  was  noted  above  that  we  could  in  principle  exchange  the 
particulars  that  constitute  the  formation  with  qualitatively  similar  particulars 
without affecting the Form of the formation. It should be fairly evident that the 
form F would, for the purposes of a person‘s everyday interactions with it, be 
effectively  unchanged  if  a  single  atom  was  removed.  (We  can  make  this   79 
assumption for most cases—we need not assume that it is never the case the 
removal of one atom will affect the form). 
 
We should conclude then that the form could be realised by either A or B. That 
is, the macroscopic properties of the formation could be given rise to by any 
one of a number of overlapping structures. The key to this is the phrase ‗for 
everyday purposes‘.  
 
2.1.3  Forms: Object-forms and arrangement-forms 
The  notion  of  a  ‗form‘  was  introduced  above.  Forms  were  introduced  as 
collections  of  physical  properties,  and  some  examples  were  given.  In  this 
subsection the idea will be filled out in more detail.  
 
We can discuss forms in several distinct, but related contexts: 
 
  ‗Object-forms‘:  We  can  discuss  the  form  of  some  everyday  object  or 
other.  This  is  a  fairly  coherent  way  of  going  on:  it  is  to  talk  of  the 
macroscopic properties of the object in just the sort of ways that we 
normally do. So we can talk of the mass, hardness and dimensions of a 
pebble. In itself it does seem to presuppose the existence of objects. To 
the extent, however, that we should take seriously Organicists‘ claims to 
be able to account for the way the world appears to us in terms of the 
actions of object-wise arrangements of simples, we should be able to take 
our experience of object forms as non-controversial. In holding some 
form to be an object-form, we are saying that the properties involved in 
it coordinate in the ways we would expect the properties of objects (or 
object-wise arrangements) to coordinate. 
  ‗Arrangement-forms‘:  We  can  discuss  the  forms  that  are  the  causal 
effects of particular arrangement formations.  
  ‗Forms-simpliciter‘:  we  cannot  just  assume  that  all  properties  are 
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should be obvious how they hold together. If forms are just collections 
of properties, then we will need to frame a distinction between more or 
less  arbitrary  collections  and  collections  that  demonstrate  the  sort  of 
coordination we associate with objects. We shall take the term ‗form-
simpliciter‘ to pick out just a collection of macroscopic properties taken 
independently of any coordination that they may display. Object-forms 
and  arrangement-forms  will  also  be  forms  simpliciter,  though  not  all 
forms  simpliciter  need  be  object-forms  or  arrangement-forms  (and 
indeed most of them will not be). 
 
The suggestion being made here is that objects are constituted by object forms. 
What  we  interact  with  and  think  of  as  objects  are  collections  of  properties. 
Object forms are fairly easy to pick out: whenever we encounter something that 
we  would  normally  take  to  be  an  object,  we  can  count  the  combination  of 
properties which we associate with that object as a form. In most cases, when 
we do encounter something that we would take to be an object, this is also an 
encounter  with  an  arrangement  formation  that  gives  rise  to  a  coordinated 
bundle of properties, and hence an arrangement-form. As was noted above, it is 
these bundles of properties that we engage with in our environment.  
 
The  question  arises,  what  relationship  is  there  between  object-forms  and 
arrangement-forms?  It  was  argued  above  that  object-forms  are  multiply 
realisable in that the same set of properties could be generated by a number of 
different arrangement structures. None the less, when we encounter an object-
form  there  is  (in  all  actual  cases)  some  specific  arrangement  of  simples 
responsible for its causal properties. We can suggest then, that in the case of 
particular object forms that we encounter it is legitimate to identify the actual 
object-form with the actual arrangement-form that is causally responsible for it. 
Clearly, if the multiple-realisability claim above is right then we have to allow 
that a form exactly like that in front of us could have been generated by a 
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form we are not making reference to the simples49; we are making reference to 
the properties that they give rise to. It is therefore reasonable to identify an 
object form at a time with the form generated by a (possibly vaguely specified) 
particular arrangement structure and the simples that it relates at that time. In 
this sense then, we can identify object forms at a time with arrangement -forms 
at a time. 
 
Arrangement forms were originally introduced in terms of the macroscopic 
properties  generated  by   a  particular  arrangement  formation.  The  term 
‗macroscopic‘  expresses  an  anthropocentric  distinction—the  distinction 
between  being  visible  with  the  naked  eye  that  we  actually  happen  to  have 
evolved rather than being too small to be seen with that eye. In fact there is 
nothing problematic in positing microscopic forms too, we might term them 
‗micro-forms‘ to distinguish them. So construed, the difference between forms 
and micro-forms is just that micro-forms are too small for us to be aware of 
individual  instances  of  them.  It  is  only  because  of  the  invention  of  the 
microscope and the development of atomic theory that we think about them at 
all.  It is plausible to suppose that it is a subset of micro-forms that Organicists 
are picking out with their use of the word ‗simple‘. That is, they are picking out, 
more  or  less,  those  forms  described  by  atomic  theory.  We  could  dub  these 
atomic-microforms50.  
 
The distinction between macroscopic and microscopic properties involved in 
forms is not, however, entirely innocent. It was noted earlier that the very same 
                                              
49 Unless the right way to understand simples is simply as distributions of properties. 
50 Merricks at one point ( (Merricks 2001) p. 116) appears to entertain the thought that it 
would be okay to have a different account of composition at the micro to the macro level 
(specifically, that it is okay for microscopica to be overdetemined but not for macroscopica). 
This, however, seems very difficult to take seriously unless one has a less anthropocentric 
way of distinguishing between the two levels or a rationale for distinguishing ‘composition’ 
at these two levels.  
   82 
form may be generated by different structures. These structures though may not 
be clearly discrete; they can (and usually do) overlap.  We might think that at 
some level even microscopic changes in an arrangement structure, the loss of an 
atom say, or of a few atoms, must have an effect of some kind on the properties 
that  arrangement  structure  produces.  The  fact  that  these  changes  are  not 
appreciable  at  the  macroscopic  level  might  be  thought  to  be  irrelevant  to 
whether they take place.  
 
Relatedly, we might note that not all of the relations captured in a structure will 
be equally relevant to the generation of a form. Some relations will be causally 
significant, others may not be. Thus, in the case of Pebble, it seems plausible 
that the physical relations and chemical bonds between the simples making up 
the pebble are more relevant than, say, the ratio of the number of atoms on the 
right hand side of pebble to the number of atoms on the left hand side. We 
might then, distinguish the causally effective relations in a structure from the 
collection of relations that make up the structure as a whole. We can term that 
subset  of  the  relations  involved  in  a  structure  that  are  causally  effective  in 
producing the form associated with an arrangement formation the ‗efficacious 
sub-structure‘ in relation to that arrangement form. This might be contrasted 
with those relations that are part of the structure that are not relevant to the 
causal  production  of  the  form,  we  might  call  these  the  ‗non-efficacious 
substructure‘  in  relation  to  the  arrangement  form.  Clearly,  changes  in  the 
efficacious sub-structure of an arrangement formation and amongst the items 
that it relates, will produce more changes in the form that the structure causes 
then will changes in the non-efficacious substructure.  
 
One might think there is a potential problem for this sort of picture derived 
from the possibility of microscopic changes in arrangement formations. We can 
envisage microscopic changes in an arrangement formation having an effect for 
the properties that the simples in the formation cooperate to produce without 
those changes being appreciable at the macroscopic level. Thus, changes in the 
microstructure of the cup mentioned earlier might be such as to make the cup   83 
more fragile than it was previously, without this fragility being appreciable in 
terms of our everyday interactions with the cup.  
 
The challenge this presents to the view of objects to be presented here is two 
fold.  Firstly,  it  seems  that  in  our  normal  dealings  with  everyday  objects  we 
attribute to them both macroscopic and microscopic properties—to identify an 
object in terms of its macroscopic properties (that is, in terms of the object 
form) is all very well, but how do we then include its microscopic properties in 
the picture?  
 
Secondly,  if  we  allow  that  there  could  be  microscopic  changes  to  an 
arrangement-form,  this  raises  the  question  of  the  relationship  between 
arrangement-forms and object-forms. Arrangement forms were defined in terms 
of the properties generated by an arrangement formation. Object-forms are the 
properties that we in fact associate with individual objects. Now we might note 
that in most cases the properties that we associate with everyday objects are 
actually  generated  by  the  structures  within  an  arrangement  formation. 
Identifying object-forms and arrangement-forms, however, will be problematic 
if changes in the latter are not also changes in the former. 
 
It  was  suggested  above  that  the  object  form  and  the  arrangement  form  is 
identical at a time. We might further suppose that the microscopic properties 
that  are  implicated  in  the  production  of  the  arrangement  form,  should  be 
counted as part of that form in so far as they are properties associated with that 
arrangement.  This  would  lead  one  to  the  conclusion  that  the  microscopic 
properties that are implicated in the arrangement form should also be included 
in the object form.  
 
On  such  a  model  the  macroscopic  properties  produced  by  an  arrangement 
formation that we encounter are the equivalent of the visible tip of an ice berg, 
where the remainder of the berg remains submerged. The arrangement form on 
such  a  view  would  include  the  microscopic  properties  as  well  as  the   84 
macroscopic  properties  that  we  initially  associated  with  it.  On  the  view 
canvassed in the previous paragraph these ‗submerged‘ properties would also be 
involved in any object form that the arrangement gives rise to. 
 
To say that object-forms constitute objects, and to note that instances of object-
forms  are  often  the  same  as  instances  of  arrangement-forms  does  not 
necessarily tell us very much about objects. In particular it leaves the question of 
how to determine which forms-simpliciter are object-forms untouched. It will 
be argued here that what distinguishes object-forms is that they are suitable to 
satisfy our object concepts. In order to argue for this, however, we will need to 
clarify just what we are talking about when we use the term ‗object concept‘. 
That is the subject of the next section.  
 
2.2  Object concepts 
We are beings who inhabit an environment in which there are many material 
regularities. That is, there are arrangements of matter in our environment which 
behave  in  fairly  regular  and  predictable  ways.  These  regularities  in  our 
environment are a consequence of arrangement structures in our environment 
which are, themselves, populated with bits of matter.  
 
Let us consider a pebble brought home from Brighton beach and placed, for 
aesthetic effect, on the mantel piece. We can call it Pebble. Alternatively, if we 
do  not  believe  in  pebbles  let  us  take  the  simples  that  are  jointly  arranged 
‗pebblewise‘  and  name  them  collectively  ‗Pebble‘.  We  have  named  different 
things in each case, but let us stipulate that the same collection of matter will be 
involved in whatever is picked out. 
 
‗Pebble‘, on a beach or on the mantel piece, will be supposed by most people 
(even most people in the philosophy room) to be an object. Those of us who 
think that pebbles exist would be inclined to suppose that they are ontologically 
independent of us; that they would exist even if we did not. They are also,   85 
presumably, weakly objective: they would be the way they are even if no one 
ever existed to see them.  
 
 
The dictionary definition of  ‗pebble‘ is: 
‗A  small,  smooth,  rounded  stone,  worn  by  the  action  of 
water, ice, or sand‘ (www.OED.com accessed 25 July 2009)  
 
Leaving aside questions about what exactly dictionaries record, this seems for 
the most part to capture our notion of what is involved in something‘s being a 
pebble. In Jewish traditions pebbles are left on gravestones, but for most others 
there  does  not  appear  to  be  much  in  the  way  of  a  social  role  for  pebbles. 
Though, those of us who have experience of pebbles may well associate them 
with  various  things  and  experiences.  Such  associations  might  include,  for 
instance, beaches, rivers, and the practice of skimming them across the surface 
of a sea or a river.  
 
We might  suppose that there are or could be natural languages that do not 
include a separate word for pebbles. Such languages may have developed in 
areas where there are few watercourses, or where the geology was unsuited to 
the production of pebbles. Such a language might fail to distinguish pebbles 
from any other sort of rock.  
 
Despite the fact that the word ‗pebble‘ might be evocative for some people it 
would be difficult to make a case that pebbles are artefacts. For many, possibly 
most, of us no significant social role is associated with them. None the less, at 
some point in the history of our language members of the linguistic community 
speaking it or its predecessor felt it useful to distinguish pebbles from other 
things. The Oxford English Dictionary offers a number of theories for how the 
word entered our language. What seems clear is that it has been there for some 
centuries.  
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The object concept ‗pebble‘ then, is well established. A normal English speaker 
with  the  requisite  range  of  experience  (i.e.  a  range  of  experience  which  has 
enabled him or her to correctly gain the object concept ‗pebble‘) will be able to 
go to a beach and, if there are any there, discover pebbles. That is; upon arriving 
at the beach they will find things (or, arrangements) that fit the expectations 
they have of pebbles. A non-English speaker, even a speaker of a language that 
has no word for pebbles, will also be able to discover pebbles on a beach—
though it is likely they will not call them pebbles.  
 
Pebble is, or so we may assume, made of an arrangement of different chemical 
atoms, composed of a number of different elementary particles, some of which 
might take the form of particles that we can term ‗simples‘. These simples stand 
in certain relations to each other by virtue of which they produce the properties 
of Pebble. The properties of Pebble, its mass, colour, hardness and so on, jointly 
comprise the form of Pebble. The simples involved in Pebble then comprise an 
‗arrangement‘ of simples. The relations between the simples which give rise to 
the form of Pebble, can be understood as Pebble‘s efficacious sub-structure. All 
of the relations between simples (whether efficacious or not) constitute Pebble‘s 
structure.  The  structure  and  the  simples  taken  together  constitute  Pebble‘s 
arrangement formation.  
 
The form of Pebble is involved in all sorts of interactions with other things, and 
is such that we can reliably predict how it will interact with many of them. When 
propelled in the right way Pebble will bounce off other pebbles, skitter along 
concrete, sink in water (or possibly skim along the top of it). This pattern of 
interactions and potential interactions is what we will call the ‗formal role‘ of 
Pebble. It is, according Eliminativists, entirely explained by the actions of the 
Pebble formation, rather than a single thing called Pebble, but Eliminativists 
must allow that there is such a pattern of relations. To the extent that pebble has 
a place in social interactions, we may also say that it has a ‗social role‘. 
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We might then suggest the following: our ‗object concepts‘ are key to the way 
that we understand the world in which we find ourselves. They categorise and 
regiment the world around us in a way which enables us to make sense of it and 
act effectively.  For any given sort of object we are likely to have a collection of 
concepts that jointly say what is required for something to be a member of that 
sort. We can call this collection of concepts for any given sort our ‗conception‘ 
of that sort of object, and for a particular object, our ‗conception‘ of the object. 
We might suppose that part of the conception of a particular object will be its 
social role and some notion of what, in relation to forms, we termed a formal 
role. That is, the conception will include the way that the object fits in with our 
social structures, what if anything it is used for, and it will give us some sort of 
idea of the causal interactions it can engage in, as well of course as the sorts of 
changes it can survive.  
 
Following  Thomasson  ((Thomasson  2007)  pp.  39-41)  we  can  distinguish 
between the application and co-application conditions of object concepts. That 
is, the conditions that govern when it is correct to count someone as referring 
to, or establishing reference to, an object of a certain type on the one hand, and 
the conditions under which it is correct to conclude that one is referring to the 
same object on consecutive occasions on the other.  
 
What are here being called object concepts can be seen to have a good deal in 
common with what are more normally termed ‗sortal concepts‘. The notion of a 
sortal concept comes from Locke ((Locke 1689): Essay, III, iii, 15) via Strawson, 
(Strawson 1959) who uses the term to distinguish concepts which provide a 
counting principle from those which do not, to Wiggins.  
 
A sortal concept can be distinguished from a ‗property concept‘ by analogy to 
the grammatical distinction between nouns and adjectives. Nouns tell you what 
a thing is, and adjectives tell you about a property or properties of a thing. 
Similarly, sortal concepts categorise the objects in our environment in terms of   88 
the kind of object they are and property concepts collect things (which may be 
of various sorts) into things that have a qualitative similarity.  
 
Wiggins refers explicitly to the way that Strawson introduces the term, which is 
as follows:  
 
‗A sortal universal supplies a principle for distinguishing and 
counting  individual  particulars  it  collects.  Characterising 
universals on the other hand, whilst they supply principles of 
grouping, even of counting, particulars, supply such principles 
only for particulars already distinguished, or distinguishable, 
in  accordance  with  some  antecedent  principle  or  method.‘ 
((Strawson 1959) p. 168) 
 
We might then count the number of red things in a kitchen and the number of 
jugs. But, or so Strawson appears to be suggesting, there is a difference in our 
activity in each case. In counting jugs we are identifying objects as jugs and 
adding them to our jug tally. In counting red things, we are identifying things of 
whatever type and then determining whether or not they are also red things; 
where they are we add them to our red tally.   
 
Sortal concepts play a central role for Wiggins. In particular they are a key part 
of his account of the individuation of everyday objects. For Wiggins, to make 
the claim that two things are identical, e.g. that b=c is to say that they are the 
same f where f is a sortal concept. That is, the sortal concept under which an 
object falls is determined in an important sense by what that object is. In order 
to say that one thing is the same thing as another, according to Wiggins, one 
must have a notion of what the thing in question is, which is to say, what sortal 
concept  it  falls  under.  This  is  what  ‗organizes  our  actual  method‘  ((Wiggins 
2001), p. 56) of reidentifying things over time.  
 
The thought here is that when asked whether, for instance, we are playing with 
the same ball now as we were earlier, we go about answering the question in 
terms of what is required for the persistence of a ball. The ball may have been   89 
scuffed in the course of play. This does not mean that it is a different ball, it 
would mean though that it was, for instance, a different mereological sum of 
simples to that which we were playing with earlier. We know, roughly, what has 
to be the case for a ball to survive and to be counted as the same ball. Which 
means that we have a notion of what sort of spatio-temporal continuity would 
be required for this to be the same ball as we played with earlier. Crucially for 
Wiggins,  establishing  the  identity  of  something  at  the  present  time  with 
something with which we were earlier acquainted (or where we know of its past 
properties) licenses certain sorts of inferences. For instance, if we know that the 
ball we started playing with belonged to Percy, and that this is that very ball, we 
may conclude that this very ball belonged to Percy. Having identified something 
at two different times one is in a position to infer facts about its properties at 
those times on the basis of Leibnitz‘s law. 
 
The key role that sortal concepts have in Wiggins‘ account of individuation and 
of the identity of objects leads one to suspect that use of the notion of sortal 
concepts is in some sense question begging against the Eliminativist.  
 
Sortal concepts are explicitly categorising in two ways. Firstly, because of the 
way that sortal concepts are supposed to work, anything that falls under a sortal 
concept must be, by its nature, an individual. What is more, it is not the abstract 
sort of individual that property instances might be thought to be, but the sort of 
individual that is countable, that may be distinguished from other individuals of 
the  same  sort  and  whose  path  through  the  world  should  be  in  principle 
traceable. It is the sort of individual that has properties rather than the sort of 
individual (if there are such things) which is a property. Secondly, by virtue of 
falling under a particular sortal an object may also fall within a wider scheme of 
categorisation. Tibbles falls under the sortal ‗cat‘, but also ‗animal‘, ‗mammal‘, 
and ‗organism‘.  
 
An  Eliminativist  might  then  consider  the  introduction  of  a  notion  of  sortal 
concepts to be question begging on two grounds. The first of these is that it   90 
might be thought not at all clear how to make sense of the notion of a sortal 
concept  if  you  do  not  have  some  prior  idea  of  what  it  would  be  to  be  a 
persisting individual. Wiggins, like most philosophers, assumes from the outset 
the existence of medium sized concretia. If there are really no everyday objects 
then how are we to make sense of the notion of one persisting? According to 
Wiggins the application of our sortal concepts is exhibited in the way that we 
track the history of everyday objects through the world, but it is exactly this 
activity of tracking objects that Eliminativists about everyday objects want to 
question. Their claim is that there is nothing to be so tracked, and it is not clear 
how  sortal  concepts  could  be  made  sense  of  at  all  without  an  ontology  of 
objects for them to apply to. 
 
The point may be sharpened if we consider Wiggins‘ use of the notion of a 
sortal  concept  in  the  context  of  Aristotle‘s  account  of  what  a  substance  is. 
Aristotle, at  the start of  the Metaphysics Z (1026a33 (Aristotle 1984)  p. 1620) 
famously  takes  substances  to  be  those  things  of  which  properties  can  be 
predicated but which cannot themselves be predicated of anything else. The 
substances in question are not the broad metaphysical categories of Descartes 
(i.e. mental and extended substances), but rather, everyday objects.  
 
If we consider substances in this way, then it should be clear that the difference 
between sortal concepts and other sorts of concepts is just this; sortal concepts 
pick  out  and  categorise  substances,  other  concepts  pick  out  properties  of 
substances. It is not that the predicate ‗pebble‘ picks out a property of something; 
rather it picks out a particular sort of thing (or it distinguishes one sort of thing 
from other things). The application of sortal concepts seems to presuppose the 
existence of substances or individuals which are picked out by those concepts. 
What is more, it presupposes that the identity of those individuals is tied to the 
sortal that they fall under; it is not that  there is a thing, and that thing has 
properties such that, that thing happens to be a statue, but if it were to go 
through  gradual  enough  change  it  (that  very  thing)  could  be  turned  into  an   91 
aspidistra. Rather, there is a thing, which is a statue, and were that thing to stop 
being a statue, then it would cease to exist.  
 
The Eliminativist part of the Organicist thesis of course denies that there are 
substances that the vast majority of sortal terms pick out. Organicists do hold, 
however that sense can be made of object concepts. Van Inwagen supposes that 
most applications of object concepts in making statements about the world are 
‗made true‘ by arrangements of simples; which means that he denies that the 
application of object concepts entails the existence of substances that they pick 
out. Merricks holds that most everyday applications of object concepts to make 
statements are, strictly speaking, false. They are, however, according to Merricks 
sometimes ‗nearly as good as true‘, where they involve there being something 
that is an F, but there is an F-wise arrangement of simples. The plausibility of 
the idea that we can apply object concepts to a world without objects will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter Five of this thesis.  
 
The Organicist who is the main target of this thesis, of course, does think that 
there are some persisting objects (i.e. organisms), but he or she may still think 
that there is a problem with the very idea of sortal concepts fully filled out in the 
way that sortalists do, as follows. 
 
The second ground upon which the Eliminativist might think the introduction 
of sortal concepts as question begging is that their introduction brings with it a 
scheme of categorisation which Eliminativists are likely to find unpalatable. Van 
Inwagen, for example, could argue that on his account there are precisely two 
sorts of objects; organisms and simples. Thus, the only sortal concepts that may 
be instantiated are ‗organism‘ and ‗simple‘, just as the only things there are on 
such an account are organisms and simples. The scheme of categorisation that 
most of us have in mind when talking about sortal concepts includes more than 
this, covering the full gamut of everyday objects. The Eliminativists‘ objection 
to the introduction of sortal concepts can be sharpened further by considering 
that it gives rise to collocation of a sort that both Merricks and van Inwagen   92 
object to. Typically both essentialists and Eliminativists hold that identity is not 
relative to sortal types (and that will certainly be assumed here), and (as Wiggins 
argues at the start of (Wiggins 2001)), if one accepts that the same piece of 
matter can instantiate two different sortals at one time, where those sortals have 
different persistence conditions, one cannot accept that there is just one thing 
there. 
 
It will be argued in Chapter Five that whether or not the Eliminativist accepts 
the  notion  of  sortal concepts, if they want to make use of  the O-arranging 
manoeuvre then they are committed to our having a fairly sophisticated scheme 
of object concepts. What is more, they will need to accept that in actual fact 
discourse  utilising  those  concepts  is  fairly  disciplined  and,  outside  of 
philosophical make believe, it is rare that we face real problems applying our 
object  concepts.  The  point  is  that  these  object  concepts  cannot  be  sortal 
concepts as classically conceived, because the very notion of a sortal concept 
requires the existence of everyday objects.  
 
For now, it will be helpful to distinguish ‗object concepts‘, which pick out bits 
of our environment and classify them as being such and such an object, from 
sortal concepts, which pick out things in our environment and identify them in 
terms of the things that they are. This way we do not beg any questions against 
the Organicists. What is more, the role of these concepts should be clear; they 
are just the everyday concepts that we use to discuss objects with the sortalist 
commitments stripped away.   
 
The idea behind the account of objects being developed here is that our object 
concepts are satisfied by regularities in our environments; that is,  the object 
forms that were discussed in the previous sections of this chapter satisfy them. 
In the remainder of this chapter we will fill out some of the consequences for 
this account and address some potential worries about it.  We will revisit object 
concepts in Chapter Five, when we will address the question of how plausible it   93 
really is to suppose that there are no non-living everyday objects but that we can 
still effectively deploy our object concepts in order to navigate the world. 
  
2.3  A theory of everyday objects 
The suggestion being made here then is that everyday objects are constituted by 
object-forms that satisfy our object concepts. Further, we argued above that 
instances of object forms at a particular time are (almost always) identical to an 
arrangement-form at that time. This final section of the chapter examines some 
of the broader features of the theory being developed and the account it gives of 
everyday objects.  
 
In sub-section 2.3.1, the account of everyday objects associated with functional-
bundalism is made explicit. In sub-section 2.3.2, it is argued that we can think of 
everyday objects as themselves being elements in causal systems. Finally, in 2.3.3 
it is noted that the account presented here is based on a particular plausible 
intuition about what needs to be the case for there to be everyday objects, and 
we see that this intuition has general application to ontological questions.   
 
Before  proceeding,  however,  the  remainder  of  this  sub-section  broaches  the 
following question:   
 
What makes a given form-simpliciter an object form? 
 
Which  is  to  say,  what  distinguishes  those  collections  of  properties  that 
constitute everyday objects from arbitrary or random collections of properties? 
As already advertised it will turn out that object-forms are those forms suited to 
satisfy our object concepts. The claim being made, then, will be as follows:  
 
Objects are constituted by those forms that coordinate in a manner that 
is appropriate for satisfying our object concepts. 
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As has already been noted, Organicists have to accept the existence of object 
and arrangement forms. Forms are a consequence of their own position with 
respect to the arrangement of simples. As such they operate in the context of 
this work as non-controversial stand-ins for everyday objects. Organicists differ 
from the rest of us in holding that there are no everyday objects, but they hold 
in common with us that the things that we think objects do, do get done. We 
have here taken this seriously. We have taken it as a commitment to there still 
being those powers that we normally attribute to objects, even where there are 
no objects.  
 
If we take a form-simpliciter to be any collection of macroscopic properties, 
then it should be clear that there are many more arbitrary or gerrymandered 
forms-simpliciter  then  there  are  forms  that  could  plausibly  be  supposed  to 
constitute objects. My mass, the colour of the moon, and the hardness of the 
Queen‘s eye would constitute a form-simpliciter. Assuming then that we hold 
that there are objects, and that they are constituted by forms, we will need some 
further basis for distinguishing which forms constitute objects and which do 
not.  
 
One basis for doing this would be to appeal to coordination. The object-forms 
discussed  here  are  not  just  arbitrary  collections  of  properties;  they  are 
collections  of  properties  that  coordinate  appropriately.  What  distinguishes 
object-forms from other forms, we might think, is the way that the properties 
involved  in  the  form  go  together.  We  might  suppose,  for  instance  that 
something like the following is the case:  
 
Some collection of properties, P1 to Pn is an object C if and only if P1 to 
Pn are appropriately coordinated.  
 
Accepting  something  along  these  lines,  however,  would  require  an  adequate 
account  of  ‗appropriate  coordination‘.  We  might  term  the  problem  of 
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of unity. The same question is at stake here as when we ask, when do we have 
enough of a unity to constitute an object? 
 
To treat the matter in this way, however, puts the cart before the horse: we 
have,  in  practice,  no  problem  in  distinguishing  appropriately  coordinated 
properties from properties not so coordinated. The appropriately coordinated 
properties are those that we take jointly to be objects.  
 
The coordination requirement means that there will not be as many of these 
sorts of coordinated ‗forms‘ as there would be, for instance, mereological sums. 
It  is  not  the  case  that  just  any  collection  of  simples  will  coordinate  in  the 
required way, or will produce coordinated collections of properties. Nor is it the 
case that just any collection of properties will be appropriately coordinated. In 
the next chapter we will discuss different options for accounting for this sort of 
coordination.  Still though, there will very likely be coordination which we do 
not in the normal run of things want to say gives rise to objects.  
 
The  tip  of  a  compass  and  the  earth  coordinate  in  an  interesting  way.  In 
particular, it seems that there is a causal connection which means that the tip of 
the compass, when uninterfered with remains always orientated in a certain way 
with respect to the planet.  It would, perhaps, seem arbitrary to rule that the 
coordination of all the different parts of a car means that there is an object that 
is a car, and simultaneously to hold that the coordination of a compass and 
earth makes no compass-earth object. For that matter, there is a sense in which 
big  collections  of  things,  such  as  the  British  rail  system,  might  be  said  to 
coordinate  (at  least  on  a  good  day).  While  we  could  treat  these  large 
systematically  related  collections  of  objects  as  constituting  very  large  single 
objects in their own right, to do so would surely be a hefty stretch of our normal 
use of the term ‗object‘.  
 
The fact is that some forms in our environment are salient to us. For one reason 
or another it matters to us that they are the way that they are. This may be   96 
because  of  their  spatial  relations  to  us  (e.g.  the  form  arising  from  the 
arrangement constituting the bus (atoms arranged bus-wise) bearing down on 
us), or because it is important for us to be able to recognize them (e.g. the 
arrangement formations that constitute things that are good to eat). Our ability 
to track these salient forms (and ignore non-salient forms) is something that can 
reasonably be assumed to be an evolutionary fitness trait: an organism‘s ability 
to effectively track the regularities in our environment will, ceteris paribus, tend to 
result in a better chance of survival for that organism.  
 
One thing to note in connection with this though, is that we do in fact use the 
word  ‗object‘  in  fairly  diverse  ways.  If  the  term  applies  as  well  to  a  water 
molecule as it does to an aeroplane, there seems to be little harm in supposing 
that there might be an extended quasi-technical sense in which things such as 
transport  systems  are  objects.  It  is  quite  compatible  with  this  that  what  we 
normally think of as everyday objects be a more restricted class of entity. We 
might think of objects on a scale of everydayness, with those that we actually 
consider as unities being more everyday than those that we do not.  
 
We can summarise the picture so far developed as follows: We have introduced 
a  notion  of  regularities  in  our  environment  which  constitute  ‗forms‘.  These 
forms are regularities in part because of the way they function in the physical 
systems that make up the world in which we live. Although we could, if we 
wished, identify arbitrary collections of properties, it is only those collections 
which coordinate and function in these physical systems in a way appropriate 
for the satisfaction of our object concepts that are eligible to constitute objects.  
 
The  question  that  needed  to  be  answered  here  was  as  follows:  What 
distinguishes those forms which constitute objects from those forms which do 
not? I have suggested that the distinction should be made on the basis of which 
forms are of a kind suited to satisfying our object concepts, with those object 
concepts  we  have  emerging  on  the  basis  of  the  needs  that  we  have  for   97 
communicating, thinking and (perhaps most importantly) acting on things in our 
environment. 
 
2.3.1  The theory of objects: What are objects? 
The claim being made then is that objects are constituted by object-forms. This 
can be thought of as a ‗no more than‘ claim; it claims that no more is needed for 
an object to exist then there being a form which coordinates in the appropriate 
way to satisfy our object concepts. Organicists, by contrast, can be taken to be 
arguing that there is something more that is required for there to be an object, 
with that something more being composition. 
 
We might want more from a theory of objects, however, than a ‗no more than‘ 
claim; we might want it to say something positive about what objects are. One 
thing that we might want is for objects to turn out to be mind independent on 
the account given.  Someone looking at the account presented so far may worry 
that it makes what objects there are a function of what object concepts we have. 
 
It was claimed above that objects are constituted by those forms that coordinate 
in a manner that are appropriate for satisfying our object concepts. We might 
conclude from this that what objects there are is a matter of which of our object 
concepts are satisfied by the regularities in our environment. In considering this 
proposal, however, it is important not to lose sight of where, on this sort of 
account, our object concepts come from. Our object concepts are, on this view, 
a response to the environment we find ourselves in. They are, literally, tools for 
making sense of the physical world. 
 
Starting  from  the  position  of  someone  with  a  particular  scheme  of  object 
concepts and who is involved with their environment, it is difficult to separate 
objects  from  the  concepts  they  fall  under.  The  form  which,  because  of  the 
particular  harmonised  macroscopic  properties  in  front  of  us  leads  us  to 
conclude that  there is a tomato in front of us is only a ‗tomato‘ because it   98 
happens to be a tomatoey form. That is, a form that behaves in a way that 
satisfies our tomato concepts.  On the other hand, we only have the concept 
‗tomato‘  because  we  are  occasionally  confronted  with  tomatoes—that  is, 
tomatoey forms.  
 
This  offers  one  way  of  answering  the  question  ‗what  are  objects?‘  At  this 
seemingly trivial level, we might take the question to be about individual sorts of 
object, such as pebbles, chairs and tomatoes. We might then say that tomatoes 
are things that are tomatoey. They are things which have the right properties to 
make them a tomato: being a fruit, being a member of the solanaceae order, and 
so on. Similarly with pebbles, being a stone, being eroded in a certain sort of 
way, being a certain (admittedly vaguely defined) size. It is difficult to give a 
non-trivial answer to the question at this level because the properties that make 
a  form  a  ‗tomato‘  rather  than  a  ‗cabbage‘  are  just  those  properties  that  our 
concept  of  ‗tomato‘  requires  for  tomatoes.  We  can  claim  then,  that  for  any 
object O, that object exists just in case the object concept <O> is satisfied. 
 
Another way of reading the question ‗What are objects?‘, however, would be as 
a  question  about  the  metaphysical  category  of  objects.  Given  that  we  have 
object concepts, what is it that they apply to? The suggestion being made here is 
that objects just are regularities in the environment around us, manifested in 
what were above called forms.  
 
It should be fairly evident that what regularities there are in our environment is 
(at least if we exclude those that we have created ourselves) a mind independent 
matter. Thus, what forms there are is what Peacocke51 terms ‗weakly objective‘. 
Something is weakly objective if and only if it is the way that it is independently 
of there being any observer of it.  
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In this sense, what particular objects there are is objective. Given the tomato 
concept that we do in fact have, whether some form is tomatoey enough to be a 
tomato is entirely independent of whether or not there is anything around, or 
even in existence, to observe its tomatoey endeavours. Naturally, we could have 
had alternative concepts. But what matters in thinking about the world is how it 
fits into the concepts that we have, and although we can make sense of the idea 
that we could have had other concepts, we cannot make sense of how the world 
would  be  understood  in  terms  of  those  altered  concepts  without  ourselves 
actually having those other concepts.  
 
This now begins to make objects look a little mind dependent, and this might 
prompt  one  to  think  that  the  view  is  in  some  sense  ‗anti-realist‘  (see  the 
introduction to (Wright 1986)). But, consider that by at least some tests for 
realism, this account passes. In order to deem an account of everyday objects as 
‗realist‘ about objects, it is at least necessary that it yield affirmative answers to 
the following two questions: 
 
  Could there be objects of which we have no knowledge? 
  Could there be objects for which we have no concepts? 
 
On the view being advanced here, the answer to both of these questions is yes. 
There  is  nothing  on  such  a  view  to  say  that  we  have  discovered  all  of  the 
instances of objects for which we have concepts.  
 
What is more on this view, there could be objects undiscovered which we do 
not currently have the concepts to think about—so long as they could be fitted 
into  our  conceptual  scheme.  Note  that  it  is  not  necessarily  our  current 
conceptual  scheme  that  they  have  to  fit  with.  Some  future  revision  of  our 
current conceptual scheme will do, even if it is one that requires the removal of 
lots of our current concepts. The point is that the form has to be suited for 
fitting in with our conceptual scheme in this way. If some form cannot be fitted   100 
in with either our current conceptual scheme, or some past or future version of 
it, then it is of little concern to us; we could never think of it in any case. 
 
This account then, still allows that there are, almost certainly, objects for which 
we do not have object concepts. This means that, like Universalism, this account 
has to allow for more objects than we generally acknowledge. According to this 
story though, unlike in the Universalists‘ there is a strong explanation for why 
we have the object concepts that we do. On the universalists‘ account it just 
seems  arbitrary  that  some  ‗wholes‘  are  associated  with  being  an  object  of  a 
certain kind, and some closely related collection is not (which is, in fact the basis 
of Unger‘s rejection of everyday objects—this thesis can be taken to be arguing 
the  other  way).  On  my  account,  the  objects  we  recognise  are  just  those 
regularities in our environment that give rise to our object concepts.  
 
There  remains  the  question  of  whether  there  could  be  an  object  that  is 
inconceivable to us under any revision of our conceptual scheme. This account 
allows that there might be regularities that we cannot apply object concepts to, 
but beyond this it does not allow for inconceivable objects. It is worth noting in 
this connection however, that the account offered here is supposed to be an 
account  of  everyday  objects.  A  thing  of  which  we  could  not  ever  conceive 
would, one  may  suppose, be a  tad unusual.  As  such, we  have reason to be 
sceptical about regarding it as an everyday object. 
 
2.3.2  Object forms as elements in causal systems 
Everyday  objects  have  been  discussed  here  in  terms  of  collections  of 
macroscopic  properties,  these  properties  being  conceived  of  as  physical 
properties.  The  counterfactual  judgements  that  we  are  able  to  make  about 
everyday  objects  are  the  sorts  of  judgements  that  enable  us  to  be  effective 
agents in the environments in which we find ourselves.  
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It is fairly natural to move from this way of thinking about everyday objects, to 
thinking of them as elements, or parts, of causal systems. We exist among (and 
as)  causal  systems.  These  systems  have  sub-systemic  elements  which  are 
essential to the state and effects of the system as a whole. We understand the 
world around us as operating in terms of causes and effects, and we understand 
the objects within these systems as being the things that give rise to and receive 
causes and effects.  
 
We can think of a number of different sorts of causal systems that we exist 
within:  weather  systems,  eco-systems,  and  economic  systems,  and  more 
controversially, social systems.   
 
The term ‗system‘ is usually used to encompass a number of objects which are, 
in some way, related. A causal system then, is a collection of objects which are 
causally related in some way. It would be a stretch to think of all of the objects 
of the world fitting into such a system; while we may plausibly envisage any 
given physical object being brought into contact with any other, it is difficult to 
really think of all objects forming a system in anything but the loosest sense of 
the word.  
 
Accepting  the  forgoing,  we  might  think  of  a  ‗functional‘  system  as  a  set  of 
objects which are related in a way that tends to produce some given outcome. 
Thus  a  car  is  a  functional  system  in  that  it  is  a  group  of  components  that 
together work to produce a means of locomotion.  
 
If  we  take  seriously  the  notion  of  objects  (or  object-wise  arrangements  of 
simples as the Organicist would have it) as bits of our environment about which 
we can make the sorts of counterfactual predictions mentioned above, then one 
of the distinguishing features of object-forms is that we understand them as 
things that we can relate to each other as part of a causal system. To a large 
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make  small  functional  systems  (though  it  should  be  noted  that  often  the 
mechanics by which these systems work will remain very opaque to us).  
 
If this is the right way to think about object forms, then it makes sense that 
these  are  the  sorts  of  collections  of  macroscopic  properties  that  our  object 
concepts capture; that would give a purpose to object concepts. 
 
2.3.3  Functionalism about everyday objects 
The  account  of  everyday  objects  that  has  been  given  could  be  termed 
‗functionalist‘ in the sense that it differentiates those forms that are objects from 
those that are not in terms of their suitability to fit our object concepts, and we 
might think that the usefulness of forms for fitting in with our object concepts 
is a matter of utility. That is, that our object concepts develop because they are 
useful and thus the objects that they pick out are, in a sense functional. More 
importantly, objects on the view above are understood largely in terms of the 
things  that  they  can  do.  That  is,  in  terms  of  their  causal  powers.  It  is  also 
analogous to the position named ‗functionalism‘ in the philosophy of mind in 
that, just as that position allows for the multiple realisability of mental states, the 
position outlined here allows for multiple realisability of everyday objects.  
 
This  then  suggests  what  might  be  termed  a  ‗functionalist‘  approach  to  the 
ontology of everyday objects based on the notion that objects are conceived in 
terms of what they can ‗do‘. This functionalism about everyday objects is based 
on a very plausible  intuition. The intuition is as follows:  
 
  If all the chair things get done, then there are chairs52.  
 
It should be clear that the same intuition applies to any other kind of everyday 
objects. In fact we might explicitly schematise the intuition as follows:  
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  If all the O things get done, then there are Os 
 
It is this intuition about everyday objects that makes it plausible to suppose that 
chairs exist in the two worlds described in Chapter One (see p. 60). One thing 
that functionalists and Organicists can agree on is that the work of objects still 
gets done. The functionalist idea is that in having a certain object concept, the 
conditions for the satisfaction of that concept are set. If the properties in the 
world are arranged in such a way as to meet those conditions, then the object-
concept is satisfied and there is an object of the requisite type.  
 
Starting  from  this  rather  simpleminded  intuition  we  can  suggest  a  similarly 
simpleminded way to approach ontological questions about physical objects and 
properties.  
 
The simple empirical approach to ontological questions is as follows: In order to 
determine whether there are things of some kind K, one first determines what 
would have to be the case for things of kind K to exist and what would be the 
consequences of Ks existing, then one goes and finds out whether what would 
have to be the case for kind K to exist is in fact the case, and whether the 
consequences are possible and/or actual.  
 
Adopting the simple approach with respect to the question of everyday objects 
it would seem that we can identify the source of the functionalist‘s disagreement 
with the Organicist in the question of whether or not in order for everyday 
objects such as chairs to exist they must be composite. It was argued earlier that 
they need not be, at least in as far as Eliminativists have a meaningful notion of 
composition.  
 
The simple approach to ontology is, in effect, the way that physicists find out 
about the existence of such things as atomic particles. Of course, sometimes we 
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were  things  such  as  a  kangaroos  and  went  looking  for  them,  as  we  were 
wondering around our environment and just came across them. The same might 
be said of everyday objects. However, faced with the claim that there are no 
everyday objects, the simple approach to ontology seems to offer us a reason for 
presuming that there are. 
 
The simple approach to ontology need not be regarded as simplistic. It allows, 
for  instance,  that  different  categories  of  entity  may  need  different  sorts  of 
evidence to establish whether they exist. Thus, to discover that some physical 
property exists it is enough to discover what would physically need to be the 
case for it to be instantiated, and then to see whether the conditions for its 
instantiation could be met, or are now met. To test for a physical property one 
will have to do some empirical tests.  
 
Thus, to find out whether a posited subatomic particle exists, one figures out 
what  the  physical  effects  of  that  particle‘s  existing  would  be  (if  necessary 
manufacturing the conditions that would bring such effects about), and then 
one does some tests to find out whether those effects actually occur.  
 
We might think that metaphysical questions require a different approach. One 
ontological debate that will serve as an example is the debate about the existence 
of  universals.  Universals,  if  they  exist,  are  entities  that  can  be  instantiated 
simultaneously in a number of different places and are such that they are wholly 
in any place in which they are instantiated. They explain what it is that objects 
with the same properties have in common. They may be distinguished from 
‗tropes‘, which, like universals are supposed to account for the properties of 
objects, but are not supposed to be capable of multiple instantiation: tropes are 
aspects of an object that are held to resemble tropes of the same type. 
 
Tropes and universals, unlike the Higgs particle or phlogiston, are philosophical 
rather than physical posits. To determine which of tropes or universals exists 
requires philosophical theorising rather than empirical investigation. Though it   105 
should be noted that that does not have to imply that there is no truth of the 
matter: tropes and universals each have theoretical costs and benefits, to posit 
both would result in incurring all the theoretical costs of each.  
 
The basic approach to ontology in introducing metaphysical posits however, is 
not significantly different to the physical case. In order to establish whether a 
metaphysical  posit  is  warranted,  one  works  out  what  the  theoretical  and 
ontological consequences of making that posit would be, and then examines 
whether those consequences are possible (i.e. whether the posit rules itself out 
the  grounds  of  having  contradictory  consequences)  and  whether  they  are 
acceptable. In either the physical or the metaphysical context we are starting out 
by working out what would have to be the case if the posit existed and what 
would need to be the case for it to exist, and then we are finding out whether 
those  conditions  are  met.  The  difference  lies  in  the  role  of  experience  and 
reason in determining whether the required conditions are met. 
 
It may be that one lesson to be learned from Quine‘s work should be that there 
is no hard and fast distinction to be drawn between the ontological questions 
asked  by  physics  and  those  asked  by  philosophy.  In  ‗Two  Dogmas  of 
Empiricism‘, Quine‘s opposition to analytical truths was opposition to precisely 
the thought that there are some questions that are answerable only by a priori 
methods (see also (Quine 1951a) where he responds to (Carnap 1950)). While 
the simple approach to ontology allows that we might look for different kinds 
of evidence for different categories of entity, it does not require that this be the 
case. What we should be insistent about, however, is the sort of evidence that is 
going to be acceptable for the existence or not of everyday objects. 
 
What  Eliminativists  about  everyday  objects  (in  particular,  and  compositional 
ontologists generally) do, is apply the sorts of methodological considerations 
that would help one conclude whether certain metaphysical posits are justified 
to questions about whether or not we are justified in positing everyday objects. 
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exactly the same even if there were no everyday objects. Their argument for this, 
how  it  is  deployed,  and  how  it  should  be  dealt  with,  are  addressed  in  the 
Chapters Four and Five.  
 
There are a number of things that one might think are wrong with treating 
everyday  objects  in  the  same  way  as  we  do  such  metaphysical  posits  as 
universals and tropes. One is the immediacy of our interaction with everyday 
objects—it  is  difficult  to  see  how  any  argument  for  the  non-existence  of 
everyday objects could be more convincing than our experience of them.  
 
In thinking about everyday objects, one should start from the perspective of 
someone who is interacting with them. Objects occupy a particular place in our 
lives, and we locate ourselves in the world in relation to the objects that we take 
the world to be made up of. By the same token, our object concepts, those 
concepts that we use to think about the objects in the world around us, are an 
essential part of our mental economy. We cannot think about the world we 
inhabit  and  interact  with  in  a  way  which  does  not  make  use  of  our  object 
concepts. This is the starting point for philosophical consideration of the nature 
of everyday objects, and to start from a more abstract perspective, such as that 
of compositional ontology leads one to make mistakes about what objects in 
fact are. Functional-bundlism can be articulated from the same sort of abstract 
perspective as compositional ontology, but it makes essential use of our actual 
object concepts, and so cannot properly be made sense of except within the 
context of a scheme of object concepts.  
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The  previous  chapter  presented  a  view  of  objects  as  constituted  by  those 
‗forms‘, which is to say, those collections of regularities or properties, in our 
environment that satisfy our object concepts. The suggestion was that there is 
no more to there being an everyday object of type F, then our F concept being 
satisfied by some form. It was noted that in most actual cases (i.e. in cases 
except  for  those  that  are  relevantly  similar  to  the  two  hypothetical  worlds 
presented in Chapter One) the forms which satisfy our object concepts are the 
result of arrangement structures in our environment. 
 
There is a certain sense then, in which the account presented here might be 
considered  a  ‗property  cluster‘  account  of  everyday  objects,  where  this  term 
picks out theories that treat objects as collections of or ‗clusters‘ of properties.  
 
This chapter will place the view within the context of a traditional empiricist 
approach to everyday objects. In particular, the view resembles the account of 
everyday objects that Mackie (Mackie 1976) argues Locke should have adopted 
in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. The account given in the previous 
section has similarities to the views of other philosophers who take the basic 
building blocks of reality to be properties (conceived of as either universals or 
tropes) and objects as complexes of such properties53.  
 
A  good  deal  of  philosophical  work  was  done  on  the  nature  of  physical 
properties  in  the  20th  century,  with  notable  contributions  from  Russell  (see 
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(Russell 1912) chapters nine and ten), Stout (Stout 1921), David Lewis (Lewis 
1983a),  Keith  Campbell  (Campbell  1990),  Peter  Simons  (Simons  1994)  and 
many  others).  The  theoretical  terrain  has  been  most  completely  mapped  by 
David Armstrong  (Armstrong 1978a), (Armstrong 1978b),  (Armstrong 1989) 
however, and is now fairly well understood, though debates remain. The theory 
of properties is relevant to this thesis in the following sense: one of the issues 
that any theory of properties has to deal with is how properties are related to the 
individuals that instantiate them.   
 
The  theory  presented  here  though  is  a  theory  of  everyday  objects.  The 
properties  we  are  interested  in  are  the  properties  of  everyday  objects,  and 
everyday objects tend to be macroscopic. While it is not here being suggested 
that there is a difference of type between things that happen to be visible to the 
human eye and those that do not, it might still be thought that something needs 
to be said about property instantiation at the macroscopic level. Theorists about 
properties move fairly easily between discussions of properties of macroscopic 
and microscopic objects. Colours are a favourite as examples of properties54, but 
then so is the electrical charge of an electron, or the mass of a molecule. It has 
been suggested that there is a tension here . Schaffer  (Schaffer 2004) suggests 
that there is a tension between what he terms ‗scientific‘ versus ‗fundamental‘ 
conceptions of sparse properties. The ‗scientific‘ conception of properties takes 
sparse  properties  to  be  any  scientifically  respectable  properties  that  occur  at 
whatever level amongst objects, and the fundamental conception takes them 
only to apply at the level of fundamental physics.  Schaffer‘s conclusion is that 
we should adopt a scientific conception of properties, while allowing that the 
properties of fundamental physics are in some sense primary.  
 
This is an issue closely related to van Inwagen‘s concern about composition and 
‗rules of composition‘, where the properties of composite things are supposed 
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to be derivable from rules of composition (see (van Inwagen 1990) pp. 43-44. 
and pp. 278–279). Examples of a rule of composition might be something along 
the lines of ‗the mass of an object is equal to the mass of its parts‘. It should be 
noted that these rules appear to apply to object-wise arrangements (what van 
Inwagen in the later parts of Material Beings terms ‗virtual objects‘). In the case of 
non-living everyday objects Organicists hold that no composition takes place, 
but their thesis still relies on the macroscopic properties generated by collections 
of simples. Thus, supposing that sparse properties only exist at the fundamental 
level,  one  would  need  an  account  of  how  that  happens.  The  rules  that  van 
Inwagen terms ‗principles of composition‘ are not strictly rules that, even on his 
account, only apply to composites. Rather they are rules of microphysical to 
macrophysical  causation  and  rules  for  determining  the  joint  properties  of 
objects that are concatenated in certain ways.  
 
Suppose one were to take a conception of sparse properties as being only those 
that applied at the sub-atomic level, or at the most fundamental level there is (so 
perhaps  only  at  the  level  of  quarks  or  such  like).  Then  any  macroscopic 
properties would have to be held to be not really sparse properties. That is, they 
would have to be merely ‗abundant‘. Since the difference between sparse and 
abundant properties of objects is that the former and not the latter are causal 
relata55, this would amount to saying that macroscopic properties are not causal 
properties. Which is to say, all causation happens at the atomic  or sub-atomic 
level.  
 
Though they rarely discuss properties in these sorts of terms, Organicists would 
presumably be satisfied with this sort of conclusion in most but not all cases.  
                                              
55 In fact, there is a lack of consensus about how best to draw the distinction between 
sparse  and  abundant  properties.  There  has  been  a  tradition  of  treating  facts  or  events 
rather than property instances as the relata of causal relations (see e.g. (Davidson 1967)). 
However, when Lewis coined the distinction between sparse and abundant properties he 
took the intuitive basis of the distinction to be the idea that sparse universals ‘ground the 
objective resemblances and the causal powers of things’ (Lewis 1983a) p.345. Given this, it 
does  not  seem  unreasonable  to  take  property  instances  as  causal  relata.  See  Whittle 
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When they say that the properties that we associate with a chair or a table are 
really generated by the joint action of a chair-wise or a table-wise arrangement 
of simples, they are, presumably, suggesting something along these lines.  
 
Organicists are committed to macroscopic properties in two ways. In the next 
chapter we will see  that we  they are committed  to there being  macroscopic 
properties associated with arrangements of simples. The thing to note about this 
sort of macroscopic property is that Organicists do not suppose them to be 
properties  that  are  ‗had‘  by  particular  things.  Rather,  such  properties  are 
supposed to be the consequence (one presumes) of properties of simples.  
 
More interestingly, the positive part of the Organicist position requires them to 
hold that some things (living things) have properties that are not dependent on 
the microphysical level. This is clearest in Merricks‘ work. His argument for the 
existence of living things rests on the possibility of their having properties which 
are not the causal result of the actions of their parts. The property of ‗being 
conscious‘ is the main exemplar of such a property (see (Merricks 2001) chapter 
4, and (Merricks 1998)).   Thus for living objects at least, the Organicist must 
hold that their properties are not all merely a consequence of the workings of 
the properties of the subatomic parts.  
 
As we shall see in Chapter Six, this is central to Merricks‘ argument in a way that 
it is not to van Inwagen‘s. However, there is little reason to suppose that van 
Inwagen would reject the notion that living things could have properties in their 
own right, and it is difficult to see how he could resist the conclusion. In Section 
12 of Material Beings ((van Inwagen 1990) pp. 115-123), for instance, he argues 
that  some  living  things  must  be  composite  because  he  exists  and  he  is 
composite. He says that he thinks he exists for basically Cartesian reasons. But, 
if  it  would  be  possible  for  some  simples  to  have  the  property  of  thinking 
without thereby composing a thinking thing, it is difficult to see why Cartesian 
reasons would enable him to reach this conclusion. 
   111 
Merricks is explicit in supposing that there are living creatures with properties 
that are not caused by their microscopic parts, and it is difficult to see how van 
Inwagen can deny it. We may take it that Organicism is consistent with the 
claim that macroscopic objects can instantiate sparse properties.  
 
There remain, however, a number of issues that any property-cluster theory of 
objects  must  approach.  Since  the  view  presented  here  treats  macroscopic 
objects as collections of macroscopic properties, an account will be required of 
what  is  involved  in  some  properties‘  belonging  to  the  same  object.  In  the 
previous  section  it  was  noted  that  the  relevant  properties  coordinate  in  a 
particular way. Given that those property clusters  that we take to constitute 
objects  are  also  associated  with  particular  arrangement  structures  we  can  be 
fairly sure that this coordination is not accidental. This means that we are able to 
gesture towards an account of the relation between macroscopic properties and 
macroscopic  objects.  We  do  not  need  at  this  juncture  to  give  a  complete 
account of property instantiation. We only need to be able to explain why it 
makes sense to think of macroscopic collections of properties as constituting 
entities in their own right.  
 
The sections that form the bulk of this chapter place the property cluster theory 
advanced  here  in  the  context  of  contemporary  theories  of  properties  and 
objects.  In  particular  the  application  of  those  theories  to  the  properties  of 
macroscopic everyday objects are considered 
 
Two  sorts  of  property  cluster  theory  are  distinguished:  bundle  theories  and 
‗substance-attribute‘ theories. The case for positing some sort of substrata to 
bind  properties  together  into  objects  is  discussed.  Three  main  reasons  for 
positing substrata are examined. Of the three, it will be argued that one can be 
eliminated  by  adopting  trope  theory,  and  an  argument  is  produced  against 
another.    We  are  left  with  what  will  be  termed  ‗the  coordination  problem‘, 
which is the problem of why the properties of an object coordinate with each 
other in a systematic way. It is suggested that in the case of everyday objects we   112 
might  suppose  that  the  notion  of  an  efficacious  arrangement  sub-structure 
introduced in Chapter Two could fulfil that role. It is suggested that Mackie‘s 
reading of Locke on objects accords well with this sort of picture.  
 
Finally, a tension is introduced between the sort of bundle theories discussed so 
far, and a sortal-essentialist account of objects. It is argued that in many cases 
what determines the sortal category of an object are relational, and sometimes, 
social properties of the object. Property-cluster theories on the other hand tend 
to deal with sparse properties, and it is generally assumed that the properties in 
question are intrinsic to the object.  
 
3.1  Property cluster theories: substance-attribute or bundle? 
Within  the  range  of  property  cluster  theories  of  objects  we  may  distinguish 
‗substance-attribute‘ theories from ‗bundle‘ theories. (The distinction between 
substance-attribute and bundle theories is clearly explained in (Armstrong 1989), 
but  the  terms  are  common  currency).  The  distinction  can  be  filled  out  as 
follows:  Bundle  theories  hold  that  objects  are  just  bundles  of  properties.  
Substance-attribute theories on the other hand hold that there is some thing 
which ‗has‘ the properties. 
 
Returning to a tomato as an example: Associated with the tomato are a range of 
properties. Examples are, its greenness or redness, squishiness, its mass and its 
shape (at least when it is not being struck or squeezed). A bundle theory might 
hold that there is no more to the tomato than just the collection of properties. A 
substance-attribute  theory  would  hold  that  there  is  something  that  has  the 
properties. 
 
We can, for the moment term this added ingredient a bare particular, though we 
shall  see  that  this  is  perhaps  slightly  controversial.  An  ontology  of  bare 
particulars holds that there are two fundamental sorts of metaphysical elements   113 
to the world. Properties are one sort of metaphysical element. The other sort of 
element in the world according to a bare particular theorist is the bare particular.  
 
In relation to everyday objects then, we might raise the following question: is 
the position advanced in the previous section best considered a property bundle 
theory, or as a substance-attribute theory? No position will be taken here about 
which option would be best for a general theory of property instantiation. It 
will,  however,  be  suggested  in  what  follows  that  when  our  concern  is  with 
property instantiation by everyday objects some aspects of the role of the bare-
particular or substratum can be taken over by the notion of an arrangement 
structure that was introduced in Chapter One. It will not be suggested that this 
is a general account of property instantiation. 
 
There are three main reasons why one might posit bare particulars. One is as a 
solution to the coordination problem alluded to in the previous section. The 
problem, that is, of accounting for why properties coordinate in the way they 
do. Why if you squeeze a tennis ball does its colour and the distribution of its 
mass follow the change in its shape? Another depends on the assumption that 
properties cannot be ontologically independent, and so require an ontological 
base to be posited for them. These reasons will both be discussed below. The 
canonical reason for positing bare particulars, however, is as a response to what 
can be termed ‗the problem of difference‘.  
 
The  problem  of  difference56  arises from the notion that properties must be 
universals. The primary role of universals on such a conception is to provide the 
explanatory  basis  for  causal  similarity  in  our  environment.  Universals  are 
repeatable in the sense that they can be wholly in more than one place at a time.  
 
According to the universals theorist when two objects share a property there is, 
literally, something that they have in common; they have in common the 
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universal that is that property. Thus, two balls that are the same weight, say 30 
grams at sea level, can be said both to instantiate the property of having a mass 
of 30 grams. Those who posit universals will say that there is literally something 
that  they  have  in  common.  They  literally  have  in  common  the  universal  of 
having a mass of 30g.  
 
The  problem  of  difference  arises  when  two  objects  have  exactly  the  same 
properties.  Consider  two  objects,  a  and  b,  with  exactly  the  same  sparse 
properties, F, G, and H. According to one sort of universals theorist, the correct 
account of this is as follows: there are universals corresponding to F, G and H 
and  these  are  instantiated  by  a  and  b.  (What  instantiation  comes  to  here  is 
somewhat  problematic  as  it  cannot  be  a  relation—such  theorists  hold  that 
relations are also universals and so this would involve us in a regress when we 
tried to explain what it is for something to have the instantiation relation to the 
instantiation relation). Since universals are able to be wholly in more than one 
place, these universals F, G and H are wholly wherever a and b are. Since both a 
and b are qualitatively identical they are made up of identical universals. The 
problem of difference can be expressed in terms of the following question: Why 
should we suppose that a and b are two objects with the same properties, rather 
than the same object in two different places?  
 
One natural response to this is to suggest that a and b are individuated merely by 
being in different places. The idea being that their position in space is itself an 
individuating  factor.  There  are  three  things  to  note  about  this  response, 
however.  One  is  that  it  accepts  the  point  that  the  problem  of  difference  is 
supposed to raise, which is that if universals are posited then some means of 
distinguishing objects is required. It just says that spatial location is the means. 
The second thing to note is that it might be supposed that spatial location is an 
extrinsic rather than an intrinsic property of most objects and that it is slightly 
odd to utilise an extrinsic property as the main individuator of objects. Thirdly 
and finally, we might still think that the universe envisaged by Max Black is   115 
conceivable (Black, 1952). We might imagine a universe consisting of just two 
balls, a and b, where F, G and H, are the properties of extension, mass and 
solidity for the two balls and nothing else exists. In such a universe the spatial 
relations between a and b would be symmetrical, and so would not serve to 
differentiate a from b. We should conclude then that spatial location will be 
insufficient to play the individuating role for objects. 
 
Positing  particulars  that  instantiate  universals  and  are  distinct  from  all  other 
particulars would solve the problem of difference. Positing such particulars, for 
instance, would enable us to distinguish a and b, even in Max Black‘s world 
where the only objects are qualitatively identical.  
 
Universals then are posited to account for the problem of sameness; to account 
for how objects can have properties in common. Bare particulars are posited to 
account  for  the  problem  of  difference;  to  account  for  how  objects  that  are 
‗made up‘ of the same properties can be distinct objects. The argument for them 
is just that they are necessary in order to differentiate objects from each other57. 
 
An alternative way to approach the problem of difference is to treat properties 
not  as  universals  but  rather  as  ‗tropes‘.  The  trope  theory  of  properties  was 
introduced earlier in relation to the alphabetic conception of parts. Tropes are 
not repeatable in the same way as universals, and so do not raise the problem of 
difference. They are, in fact, themselves individuals. On a trope theory what 
makes it the case that two objects have the ‗same‘ property is that those objects 
are exactly similar in some respect, where that respect is a property. Tropes then 
can be classed in terms of resemblance.  
 
To give a full account either of trope theory or of universals theory would fall 
well outside of the scope of this thesis. The best exposition of universals theory 
is still that presented by Armstrong in (Armstrong 1978a), (Armstrong 1978b) 
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and  (Armstrong  1989),  with  further  reasons  for  positing  something  in  the 
property  role  being  provided  in  (Lewis  1983a).  Trope  theories  have  been 
defended by Donald Williams (Williams 1953), Bacon (Bacon 1995), G.F. Stout 
(Moore, Stout and Dawes-Hicks 1923), Keith Campbell (Campbell 1990) and 
Simons (Simons 1994).  
 
It will be suggested here that in so far as a theory of properties and property 
instantiation is required for everyday objects the properties should be conceived 
of  as  tropes,  rather  than  as  universals.  In  the  next  section  we  will  discuss 
Locke‘s account of substratum, and it will be noted that in so far as Locke had a 
theory of qualities it will do no harm to treat those qualities as tropes. (There is, 
in  any  case,  an  element  of  idealisation  in  the  way  that  this  chapter  relates 
contemporary sparse theories of properties to Lockian qualities). Even positing 
tropes however, one might think that there is still a need to posit some sort of 
bare  particular  or  substratum  to  fulfil  the  other  roles  that  were  mentioned 
earlier. 
 
The  coordination  problem,  it  will  be  recalled,  is  the  problem  of  why  some 
properties seem to coordinate in the right way to form objects. Why is it that the 
mass of a proton and its positive charge stick together in a coordinated way? 
Why does the greenness of a tennis ball never seem to come away from the 
extension of a tennis ball? The simplest answer to this sort of question is that 
the properties coordinate in these sorts of way because they belong to the same 
objects. One way (amongst others) of explaining that is in terms of there being a 
bare particular that is effective in coordinating the properties. Quite how this is 
supposed to work is not always entirely obvious, but it makes sense that if there 
is an ontological posit that is responsible for the instances of a property being 
instances of the same thing, then that posit would also be implicated in the 
property instances coordinating in the requisite way. For now, we will merely 
note that there is a need for something to account for coordination without 
commenting further on the suitability of the bare particular for performing this 
role.    117 
 
The final role to be discussed will be the role of ‗that which underlies‘. Locke 
can  be  read  as  supposing  that  property  instances  are  not  ontologically 
independent but rather depend on a substratum58, and one could still feel drawn 
to this position. Just what it is that properties‘ instances are supposed to be 
ontologically  dependent  upon  is  not  always  very  clear.  Locke  in  particular 
seemed very unhappy with the notion of a substrata that supplies the ontological 
underpinnings for properties, whilst still feeling the need to posit it.  
 
The  idea  that  properties  need  an  object  to  instantiate  them  makes  intuitive 
sense. It is difficult to see how properties such as mass or extension could be 
free floating without an object that they are the mass or extension of. Bundle 
theories,  however,  tend  to  take  the  bundling  relationship  as  a  basis  for 
ontological independence. The idea is that a bunch of properties that cannot 
exist independently can exist when bundled together. There is a general issue 
with how the bundling relation works—the issue being that it cannot actually be 
a  relation.  We  will  follow  Russell  in  terming  this  non-relational  tie 
‗compresence‘. The idea then is that when some properties are bundled they can 
jointly form an ontologically self-sufficient unit, with the bundling taking the 
form of a ‗non-relational tie‘. The thought is that while properties might be 
incapable by  themselves of being ontologically independent, groups  of them 
may be ontologically co-dependent, and thereby ontologically independent when 
taken together. Simons (Simons 1994) argues for a two stage bundling of tropes. 
Thus, an object may be constituted by an interdependent central core of tropes 
which are such that each depends on all the others for their existence, plus a 
collection of tropes that are not foundational in the same way. This allows for a 
bundle  theory  whereby  objects  may  have  both  essential  and  non-essential 
properties.  
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It is not in any case quite clear how much is gained by positing substrata in the 
role  of  the  ontologically  independent  base  for  properties  which  would  not 
otherwise be ontologically independent. The problem is that positing substrata 
in this role seems to commit one to the invidious sort of bare particular that was 
famously criticised by Elizabeth Anscombe (Anscombe 1964): a sort of object 
that  does  not  have  properties  of  its  own  but  yet  is  supposed  to  be  the 
instantiator of properties for some object. 
 
Philosophers such as Edwin Allaire and Gustav Bergmann who have endorsed a 
two category ontology consisting of bare-particulars and properties have not 
taken  the  bare-particulars  to  themselves  be  objects.  Objects,  even  on  the 
account of those who endorse bare-particulars are the combination of a bare-
particular with the properties that it instantiates. The bare particular then, is not 
supposed to be a property-less self-supporting entity. It is something that occurs 
in  the  presence  of  properties.  This  is  why  Armstrong  (see  for  instance 
(Armstrong 1989) p. 95) moves from the notion of a bare particular to a thin 
particular. The thin particular is not something that exists independently of the 
properties of an object, but rather something that is manifest in the instantiation 
of the properties59.  
 
One issue with bare particulars, which is noteworthy because it dramatises the 
commitments of sortalists, can be described in terms of the problems with 
counting  objects.  Bare  particulars  considered  as  ontologically  independent 
would be both ontologically fundamental and determining of particularity. This 
means that any question about the number of entities there are in a given 
context should be answered by reference to the number of bare -particulars 
involved. This presents two related issues. Sortalist philosophers will reject the 
notion that we can count things without stipulating what sort of things we are 
counting. Thus if we ask how many things there are in my room, we need to be 
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clear whether we are counting medium sized everyday objects, molecules, atoms, 
teapots or what. Bare particularist theories require that what there is should be 
countable without reference to the sorts of things that they are: The number of 
things in the room is the same as the number of bare particulars, and a bare 
particular is a basic ontological category.  
 
This demand for countability that is independent of sortal category is one with 
which Organicists would probably be sympathetic. Van Inwagen, for instance, 
takes ‗exists‘ to be equivalent to ‗there is at least one of‘ (van Inwagen 1998). He 
also argues (contra Wittgenstein and Putnam) that there is a correct answer to 
the question ‗how many things are there‘ (van Inwagen 2002). This, taken with 
his actual ontology is consistent with a sortalism which only acknowledges two 
sortals— ‗mereological simple‘ and ‗living thing‘.  
 
The more normally noted problem with bare particulars turns on the difference 
between  ‗having‘  properties  and  ‗bearing‘  properties.  If  the  point  of  a  bare 
particular is just to be the ‗instantiator‘ of properties, then this seems to suggest 
that it itself has no properties. We might, however, distinguish the  ‗bearing‘ 
relation that such an individual has to the properties it instantiates from the 
‗having‘. This would allow that bare particulars themselves could have certain 
formal properties such as being the sorts of things that are bearers of empirical 
properties.  
 
A more fundamental objection that one might have to bare particulars as the 
ontologically independent element of substances is that one seems committed to 
the notion that there could be bare particulars that do not at some given time in 
fact instantiate any properties. Thus, we would have un-located entities floating 
around the universe, presumably waiting to be recycled the next time something 
that does have properties is brought into existence. Since such a bare particular 
could be neither created nor destroyed (at least not through any causal process), 
we would have to accept that there have always been the same number of things 
in  the  universe,  that  that  number  cannot  change,  and  that  that  number  is   120 
fundamentally unknowable to us. There seems good reason to reject this sort of 
position, and little enough reason to accept it.  
 
If though we reject this invidious notion of a bare particular and replace it with 
something  like  Armstrong‘s  ‗thin  but  clothed‘  ((Armstrong  1989)  p.  95) 
particular, then we are essentially saying that bare (or thin) particulars exist only 
when  there  are  properties  that  they  instantiate.  But  then  it  seems  that  the 
particular is as dependent for its existence on the properties that it instantiates as 
those properties are on the particular. If this is the case then we seem to gain 
little in the way of ontological independence by positing bare particulars to play 
the role of substrata. 
 
We identified then three metaphysical roles that could constitute a reason for 
positing bare particulars. Bare particulars could be posited as individuators, to 
help with the coordination problem, and as what ‗underlies‘. It has been argued 
in the forgoing that the need to posit them as individuators is less pressing if we 
endorse a trope theory of properties, and that it is not clear what they really 
contribute as ontologically independent entities that underlie. This leaves the 
coordination problem, the problem of how to explain why properties coordinate 
appropriately60.  
 
The next section features a brief discussion of Locke‘s notion of substance, 
which it will be noted has clear parallels to the position presented here. It will be 
noted  that  there  is  a  reconstruction  of  Locke  that  can  be  attributed  to  J.L. 
Mackie whereby the primary role of substrata is as a solution to the coordination 
problem  for  everyday  objects.  It  will  be  suggested  that  we  could  utilise  the 
notion of an arrangement structure as a place holder for what fulfils this role for 
everyday objects.  
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While this is neat, however, it does not entail a commitment to a substance-
attribute ontology. It can still be maintained that we do not need to posit any 
distinct ontological category of thing to account for objects: we do not need to 
posit  two  categories  of  entity  to  account  for  the  particularity,  ontological 
independence and coordination of properties that we find in everyday objects. 
That said, there is nothing in what has been said that rules out a substance-
attribute  account  of  property  instantiation  generally.  The  focus  here  is  on 
everyday objects.  
 
We will see then that far from being a novel theory of objects, the foundations 
of the position presented here can be found in Locke and in a scientifically 
informed empiricist account of objects which runs through to the present day.  
 
3.2  Locke’s substance-attribute theory 
Locke offers a substance-attribute account of properties and objects. Parts of 
the following are quoted or referenced from Locke in support of this reading61: 
 
‗The Mind being, as I have declared, furnished with a great 
number of the simple Ideas, conveyed in by the Senses, as 
they are found in exteriour things, or by reflection on its own 
Operation, takes notice also, that a certain number of these 
simple Ideas go constantly together; which being presumed to 
belong  to  one  thing,  and  Words  being  suited  to  common 
apprehensions, and made us of for quick dispatch are called 
so united in one subject, by one name; which by inadvertency 
we are apt afterward to talk of and consider as one simple 
Idea, which indeed is a complication of many Ideas together: 
Because, as I have said, not imagining how these simple Ideas 
can  subsist  by  themselves,  we  accustom  our  selves,  to 
suppose some substratum, wherein they do subsist, and from 
which  they  do  result,  which  therefore  we  call  Substance.‘ 
((Locke 1689) Book II, Chapter xxiii, 1) 
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We should conclude from this paragraph that Locke‘s attitude toward substance 
is ambivalent at best. He notes that we do in fact act and think as if there were 
such things as ‗substances‘, but seems to think that substance is in some sense 
out of reach, not itself being  something  that  can be experienced. Given his 
epistemology, this last point is an issue for him. 
 
This is further emphasised in the paragraph immediately following:  
 
‗So that if any one will examine himself concerning his Notion 
of pure Substance in general, he will find he has no other Idea of it 
at all, but only a Supposition of he knows not what support 
of such Qualities, which are capable of producing simple Ideas 
in  us….  If  any  one  should  be  asked,  what  is  the  subject 
wherein Colour or Weight inheres, he would have nothing to 
say, but the solid extended parts; And if he were demanded, 
what is it, that that solidity and Extension inhere in, he would 
not  be  in  a  much  better  case,  than  the  Indian  before 
mentioned; who, saying that the World was supported by a 
great Elephant, was asked, what the Elephant rested on; to 
which  his  answer  was,  a  great  Tortoise:  But  being  again 
pressed  to  know  what  gave  support  to  the  broad-back‘d 
Tortoise, replied, something, he knew not what.‘  
((Locke 1689) Book II, Chapter xxiii, 2) 
 
One element of the intent of this section in the Essay that does not seem to be 
noted very often is the parallel that Locke draws between mental and physical 
substances; the point being that we have no more knowledge of one than we do 
the other. Our positing of either is drawn from the notion that there must be 
something underlying the properties that are collected together. This seems to 
be in effect a stakes raising exercise: if one intends to reject physical substance, 
one must reject mental substance for the same reason. 
 
The picture of substance that we find in Locke can be seen to follow, at least in 
part, from his account of where ideas come from. Locke holds that we have   123 
simple ideas and that these derive from two sources62: sensible qualities (which 
for the most part are found in objects) and reflection on the operations of the 
mind.  What  Locke  terms  ‗sensible  qualities‘  of  objects  can  be  considered 
analogous  to  what  are  now  termed  ‗sparse‘  properties.  That  is,  the  intrinsic 
causal powers of a thing rather than any of the other ‗abundant‘ properties that 
may be predicated of it. Thus a tomato, might weigh 45g, and be red, but it is 
also saleable and edible, and these last two might not be thought to be causal 
properties of the tomato itself.  
 
While we can see that Locke is unhappy with the notion of substratum, and in 
particular the difficulty we have in saying anything about it or experiencing it, it 
is a central part of his notion of substances. ‗Substance‘ is introduced by Locke 
as a complex idea in contradistinction to the other sorts of complex idea, which 
he takes to be ‗modes‘ and ‗relations‘. The difference between a mode and a 
substance on this account (see (Locke 1689) Book II, Chapter XII, 3-6) is that 
substances are able to subsist by themselves. Thus: ‗…The Ideas of Substances are 
such combinations of simple Ideas, as are taken to represent distinct particular 
things subsisting by themselves…‘ (Essay Book II, Chapter XII, 6). 
 
Brandt  Bolton  (Bolton  1976)  notes  in  passing  that  one  of  Locke‘s  initial 
examples of substances is ‗lead‘ and argues that this rules out substances as 
analogues  to  Aristotelian  substances—or  concrete  particulars.  This  does  not 
seem altogether convincing, as the idea of ‗lead‘ could just as well be the idea of 
which sparse properties all pieces of lead have in common, and Locke could be 
taken to be writing loosely. It does, however, highlight a variation in the way 
that the term ‗substance‘ is used that is worth noting early. 
 
                                              
62 See (Locke 1689) Bk II, chapt. I. 
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The term ‗substance‘ is sometimes used to pick out everyday objects such as 
tables and chairs and the like. It might be extended to pick out any concrete 
particular, so including microscopic objects such as molecules and atoms. In this 
usage it picks out individuals ‗with being‘, that is (for our purposes), existent 
individuals. It can be thought of as Aristotelian in contradistinction from, for 
instance, a notion of substance as a more fundamental ontological category such 
as Descartes‘. Aristotle‘s discussion of substance is multifaceted. The notion is 
Aristotelian  in  so  far  as  it  extends  to  roughly  those  things  which  Aristotle 
thought of as substances (not necessarily in terms of the metaphysics that he 
attributes to the term). Aristotle took organisms to be exemplars of substances, 
but thought that there were other everyday objects that also counted.  Since on 
this sort of notion substance is tied to both individuality and to existence we 
can,  when  using  this  sense  of  the  word  ‗substance‘  put  the  claim  of  the 
Organicist  as  follows:  There  are  no  non-living  substances  except  for 
mereological simples.  
 
Another very common use of the term ‗substance‘ however picks out not so 
much individual objects as the stuff they are made of. Thus gold is a substance 
in this sense, whereas a piece of gold, or a statue made of gold is a substance in 
the Aristotelian sense. It is this sense of the word substance that we can take 
chemists to be using when they discuss, for instance, the atomic number of 
some  material  or  other.  We  can  term  these  sorts  of  substances  ‗material 
substances‘. Very roughly, if we were inclined to hylomorphism, we might think 
that one gets an Aristotelian substance when one combines a material substance 
with a ‗form‘, where ‗form‘ is understood as an organising principle rather than 
in the way outlined in the Chapter Two.  
 
One way of reading Locke‘s discussion in (Locke 1689) Book II, Chapter xxiii is 
as  trying  to  give  an  account  of  the  instantiation  of  sparse  properties  by 
substances,  where  other  modes  are  reducible  in  some  way  to  substances.  
Substratum on such a view is needed to account for substances‘ ability to subsist 
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of their properties. On such a view it is substratum that differentiates the idea of 
substance from other complex ideas. 
  
We can read the first of the quotes from Locke given above as introducing both 
the  coordination  problem  and  the  subsistence  role  for  substratum.  The 
argument for a substratum as ‗underlying‘ properties seems to require something 
like  the  following  reasoning,  though  it  will  be  noted  that  Locke  is  worried 
enough about the notion of a substratum to put this reasoning in quite tentative 
terms:  
 
1.  We encounter properties in the world around us 
2.  Properties cannot subsist by themselves 
3.  There must be some ‗other thing‘ upon which properties are dependent 
for their subsistence 
 
Locke writes that we are led to the conclusion (3), because we ‗cannot imagine 
how‘ properties can exist by themselves63.  
 
We noted earlier reasons to doubt the second premise of this argument, and in 
particular the usefulness of positing a substratum in order to ensure ontological 
independence. Locke‘s worry appears to be to do with the need for substances 
to be ontologically independent, where this is taken to mean that they do not 
depend on anything else for their existence. Here we can see, however, why 
Locke  discusses  the  coordination  and  subsistence  problems  together: 
                                              
63 Berkeley is critical of the view of substance as what underlies and binds together bundles 
of  ideas  ((Berkeley  1710)  §§  16-17  and  77).  I  however  find  myself  in  agreement  with 
Mackie  on  this:  Locke’s  text  ‘not  imagining  how  these  simple  Ideas  can  subsist  by 
themselves’ should not be read as concerning ideas but as concerning the properties that 
give rise to simple ideas (see (Mackie 1976)). In introducing the notion of a simple idea in 
((Locke 1689) Bk II, Ch. VIII, § 8) Locke notes that he occasionally in the text will use the 
term ‘idea’ where what he is actually talking about is a ‘quality’.  
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Coordination can be explained on the assumption that the properties belong to 
the  same  substance,  but  substances  are  supposed  to  be  ontologically 
independent and properties themselves seem to depend on the substance they 
belong to for their existence.  
 
It  was  argued  above  that  positing  a  substratum  as  a  sort  of  entity  which 
underlies  objects  and  supplies  their  ontological  independence  is  not  very 
successful: there is no reason to suppose that bundles of properties may not 
supply their own ontological ground, and it is not at all clear once we have 
posited a substratum why we should suppose that its properties should depend 
ontologically  on  the  substratum  rather  than  the  other  way  around.  The 
significant thing to note for our purposes is that we (or at least Locke) might 
take a different attitude in respect of the need for substratum at the level of 
subatomic particles to the attitude we take concerning the need to posit one for 
everyday objects.  
 
The focus of this thesis is everyday objects—those everyday continuants that we 
encounter  around  us  everyday.  For  Locke,  everyday  objects  are  one  of  the 
sources of the simple ideas which are the basis of experience, and hence our 
understanding of the world (the other source of simple ideas being reflection). 
Although Locke followed Boyle in thinking that objects are made up of smaller 
parts, he also seems to have thought that this internal structure of objects was 
occult in the sense of being unknowable64. His comments about substances and 
objects  then,  can  be  taken  as  comments  about  everyday  objects,  and  his 
comments  about  properties  can  be  read  as  comments  about  macroscopic 
properties or about the sorts of properties of objects  that can be seen with an 
optical  microscope.  In  this  respect  Locke  is  somewhat  different  from 
contemporary writers. Writers such as Armstrong and Simons who advocate 
realist accounts of properties (though universals and trope accounts) take as 
example properties things such as the mass and charge of electrons and protons 
                                              
64 See (Locke 1689), Bk IV, Ch. III, § 16.   127 
as well as properties of larger objects. This is not to say that they deny that there 
are macroscopic properties (Simons is explicit that he does not, see  (Simons 
1994)), but current theorising about properties must be seen in the context of 
the atomic theory of matter as developed by Dalton, Rutherford and others, as 
well as the complications that quantum theory has thrown up for it.  
 
Mackie ((Mackie 1976) p. 82) suggests that in reconstructing what Locke should 
have said (leaving aside what he actually did say as a different issue) we could 
suppose that his discussion of substrata really applies to macroscopic objects. 
What Mackie suggests Locke should say about this is as follows:  
 
‗There are particular substances, such as a horse, gold (or a 
piece of gold), and so on, each of which is constituted not 
only  by  a  combination  of  easily  detectable  instantiated 
properties  that  go  around  together  but  also  by  many 
accompanying  powers,  and  also  by  an  internal  constitution 
which holds these properties together and is their source and 
the basis of those powers. This internal constitution is mostly 
unknown, but is reasonably postulated.‘ p. 82 
 
The suggestion then is that we (charitably) read Locke as positing substrata in 
order to solve the coordination problem for properties of macroscopic objects. 
Mackie  is  suggesting  that  we  take  ‗substrata‘  in  this  instance  to  pick  out 
whatever elements of the internal structure of objects do in fact account for 
their macroscopic properties. There is then a clear parallel between ‗substrata‘ in 
this sense and the notion of an efficacious substructure that was introduced in 
Chapter Two of this thesis. The notion of an arrangement structure (and in 
particular its efficacious sub-structure) introduced there could, one might think, 
stand in the place of the ‗substratum‘ that Locke, on this reshaping of his view, 
sought.  To  see  this,  consider  that  it  is  the  (efficacious)  arrangement  sub-
structure which is causally responsible for the properties of macroscopic objects 
in the account given. 
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Object forms, it will be recalled, are the collections of macroscopic properties 
that we attribute to objects. There is a fairly clear analogy to be drawn then to 
Locke‘s  view.  Locke  takes  the  idea  of  a  substance  to  be  a  complex  idea 
generated  by  collecting  together  a  number  of  our  simple  ideas  of  sensible 
qualities and joining them together with the notion of a ‗substratum‘ which is 
explanatory of both how those ideas coordinate and of how they are generated 
in the world. Because simple ideas are supposed to be the result of qualities in 
the world (leaving aside for now the distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities); we can infer that Locke really is positing sensible qualities in the world 
and some unknowable organising principle to coordinate them. The notion of 
an object form then looks very much like the collection of properties that Locke 
thinks give rise to the complex idea of an object, and the structure could go 
some way to stand in the place of the substratum. 
 
What this brings out clearly is which way the direction of inference should go in 
determining the ontology of everyday objects. What goes on at the atomic and 
sub-atomic level is much better understood than it was in Locke‘s time, but the 
advent  of  quantum  theory  still  makes  what  goes  on  at  that  level  somewhat 
mysterious. What we can remain sure of is (contra the Organicist) that there are 
macroscopic objects, that they have macroscopic properties that roughly match 
those that we attribute to them, and that they have an internal structure (an 
efficacious substructure) which is causally responsible for these properties.  
 
Care must be taken when considering  macroscopic properties.  Chapter Two 
introduced a number of related notions with respect to objects. The object form 
of some object was supposed to be the collection of properties of that object, 
and we argued that in most cases the object form would in fact also be  an 
arrangement form. That is, we argued that the properties belonging to an object 
would also (in most cases) be those that are generated by a causally efficacious 
sub-structure of an object-arrangement. Little was said about the nature of the 
properties that we take to make up an object form. 
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The properties that we associate with everyday objects, and in particular those 
by which we distinguish them from other objects and determine ‗what they are‘, 
might be thought to be less causally explanatory than sparse properties are really 
supposed to be. Sparse properties as introduced by Armstrong are supposed to 
be those that are discovered (or discoverable) by science. Lewis (Lewis 1983a) 
introduces sparse properties as ‗natural properties‘ as a necessary addition to 
what was previously his account of properties as sets of objects across possible 
worlds. His earlier position allows for many more properties than we even have 
predicates  for,  meaning  that  in  the  new  position  we  have  in  effect  three 
groupings of different sorts of property: all the properties there are (i.e. every 
possible set of possible entities), those properties which we pick out using those 
predicates that we actually use, and properties which are causally explanatory. 
Lewis allows that causal explanatoriness is not a clear concept and suggests that 
properties may be more or less natural as they are more or less necessary for 
causal/scientific explanation. Sparse properties are described by Lewis as those 
that  could  ‗comprise  a  minimal  base  for  describing  the  world  completely‘ 
((Lewis 1983a) p. 183), though he notes that this is a simplification and that 
Armstrong allows for conjunctive universals.  
 
The positive account of objects being presented in this thesis has two main 
elements. The first is a notion of objects as being constituted by bundles of 
properties in our environment. The second is the claim that these bundles of 
properties can be taken to be those things which satisfy our object concepts. 
This account is what allows it to be claimed that if the everyday object things get 
done, then there are everyday objects.  
 
This chapter argues that the first of these claims does not entail a general view 
about property instantiation. The focus has, rather, been on the way that the 
view of everyday objects as constituted by property bundles can be made sense 
of.  
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The view presented here is that property bundles constitute objects. Objects 
then, are, in a sense, property bundles. But the sense of ‗are‘ in question is the 
sense of constitution rather than identity. It might be suggested that this means 
that the position is more similar to a substance-attribute theory than a bundle 
theory. The thought being that ‗pure‘ bundle theories should treat objects as 
identical to bundles of properties.  The bundle theorist should reject pressure to 
accept this for the same reason that one should reject the notion that an object 
is identical to its parts: an object is one thing, and its parts or properties (on this 
view at least) are a number of things. If one were to identify an object with its 
properties, it would have to be with the collection of its properties, or with the 
properties and the non-relational tie holding them together. This would require us 
to treat the collection of properties as distinct from the properties just as they are.  
 
In so far as the account presented here does not identify the bundled properties 
with the object it can be taken to be analogous to a substance-attribute account. 
Someone adopting the account, however, is not committed to the sort of two 
category ontology that has been the mark of the substance-attribute account. 
The position is consistent with an ontology of tropes. It was argued in this 
chapter  that  there  are  three  main  reasons  for  adopting  a  substance-attribute 
model of  objects. It was suggested that  the  problem  of difference  does not 
require a substance as a solution if one adopts an ontology of tropes rather than 
universals. We saw that positing substrata does little to help with the problem of 
ontological independence. Finally it was suggested that in the case of everyday 
objects,  to  the  extent  that  we  need  an  explanation  of  the  coordination  of 
properties, this can be found in the fact that for a given object they are likely to 
be the causal products of the same arrangement structure.  
 
3.3  Bundle theories and sortal theories 
We have then three separate stories (in addition to the Organicists‘) that we can 
tell about everyday objects. Two of these stories concern the constitution of 
objects  and  are  what  were  above  called  ‗property  cluster  accounts‘.  On  the   131 
bundle theory, everyday macroscopic objects  are constituted by (though one 
need not thereby conclude that they are identical to) bundles of properties. On 
the substance-attribute view objects are bundles of properties together with an 
entity  of  a  different  category  that  is  responsible  for  the  bundling  of  the 
properties.  To  these  two  positions  we  can  add  a  position  suggested  by  the 
account of sortal concepts discussed in Chapter Two (section 2.2). 
 
‗Sortalism‘ may be taken as having the following two components: 
 
1.  the view that reference to objects can only be established under a sortal 
concept.  
2.  The view that identity is governed by the principle of the indiscernibility 
of identicals: that if a=b then any property that a has at a time is also a 
property of b at that time (i.e. if a=b then Fa iff Fb).  
 
Sortalism, as developed by Wiggins, is not equivalent to a sortal relativism; the 
idea is not that identity is sortal-relative in the sense that what is true of some 
single object depends upon what sortal concept is applied to it. It is not that the 
same thing has the persistence conditions of either clay or a statue depending on 
how we think of it. 
 
Sortalism then, is a position concerning our concepts of objects, but is closely 
related to a position with respect to the metaphysics of objects. Sortalism fits 
fairly naturally with a view of objects that treats them as substances which have 
some properties essentially. By identifying something under a sortal concept we 
also establish the conditions under which that thing will cease to exist. Sortal 
concepts then, must latch on to real things in the world if we are to accept this 
view and also suppose that what exists is not at root a matter of which concepts 
we have.  
 
It makes the most sense to associate sortalism with some sort of essentialism 
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of their properties necessarily65. If some property F were a necessary property of 
an  object  a,  then  whenever  a  exists  it  instantiates  F.  If  it  were  to  stop 
instantiating F it would cease to exist. Sortal concepts, taking in as they do the 
persistence conditions of an object, must cover also those properties which if 
they fail to have them would entail the non-existence of the object. Essentialism 
and  sortalism  are,  then,  natural  bedfellows.  We  might  ask  however  how 
sortalism and essentialism might fit with a bundle theory, or with a substance 
attribute-theory. 
 
There  seems  no  inconsistency  between  thinking  about  objects  as  substances 
with  properties  on  the  one  hand  and  the  supposition  that  some  of  those 
properties must be had essentially by the object on the other. That is, we can see 
essentialism as consistent with the idea that an object is a cluster of properties.  
 
While the letter of the two positions may be largely consistent, however, there is 
perhaps  a  difference  in  the  spirit  of  the  two  accounts.  The  sortalism 
propounded by Wiggins treats objects as a category in their own right. Our 
tracking  of  objects  through  the  course  of  their  existence  is  the  tracking  of 
substances that are in themselves of a kind, and that is quite a different way of 
looking at them to that adopted by people who argue in favour of property 
cluster accounts.  
   
The question Wiggins is asking is fundamentally about objects understood as we 
interact with them. His account is of the substances around us that we interact 
with and how we trace them through our environment. The question is: We 
have  this  object,  when  is  it  the  same  object  as  that  one?  We  can  compare 
Wiggins‘ concern in Sameness and Substance Revisited (Wiggins 2001) with Russell‘s 
starting point in The Problems of Philosophy (Russell 1912). We find the issues that 
each writer is concerned with quite different. Russell is less concerned with the  
                                              
65 Though Kit Fine (Fine 1994) has argued for a more nuanced version of essence whereby 
a thing’s essential properties are not those which are its necessary properties, but rather 
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questions of the identity, identification and survival of everyday objects then 
with the relationship between the appearances of such objects and whatever the 
source of those appearances is.  
 
One possible source of tension between property-cluster theories and sortalism 
may also raise issues for the account presented in this thesis. The remainder of 
this chapter discusses the issue in question.  
 
Wiggins holds that, for some object a, if it is the case that there is an object b 
such that a=b, then there must be some sortal concept F, which they both fall 
under, such that a is the same F as b. The tension between the Sortalist account 
and  cluster-property  accounts  arises  from  the  fact  that  the  properties  which 
determine what sortal some individual falls under might be relational.  
 
This is easily demonstrated with the now common example of the statue and its 
clay. We may suppose that a certain statue, which we can call ‗Statue‘ is made of 
a certain lump of clay, which we will now term ‗Clay‘. We may presume that 
Clay existed before Statue, as this would need to be the case for Statue to be 
made of Clay. Statue comes into being once Clay is moulded into the statue 
shape. On the other hand we can see that it is at least possible for Clay to 
outlast Statue. While Clay is statue shaped both Clay and Statue exist, but if Clay 
were  to  be  flattened  then  arguably  Clay  would  continue  to  exist  but  Statue 
would cease to exist.  
 
Supposing  that  statue  is  created  at  time  t1,  and  destroyed  at  time  t2  this 
generates a problem which can be understood in terms of the incompatibility of 
the following three claims:  
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1)  Statue = Clay 
2)  Clay exists before t1 and after t2, and Statue does not exist before 
t1 and after t2 
3)  It is impossible for something to both exist before t1 and after t2 
and not exist before t1 and after t2 
 
There is a well-developed literature on this particular problem66. Sortalists are 
generally clear that the option to be rejected should be 1). They are, that is to 
say, clear that objects are not identical with the matter which constitutes them. 
In this case, what distinguishes Statue from Clay can be put down to a number 
of relational properties. Plausible candidates  include, being created for the 
purpose of being a piece of art, being a representation of something, depicting 
something, and being designated an artwork by the art world (see for instance 
(Dickie 1974), though he probably would not draw the ontological conclusion). 
 
It was noted in the section on object concepts ( Section 2.2 above) that the 
sortalist takes identifying an object to involve identifying the sortal concept that 
it falls under. This requires that one be able to answer the question ‗what is it?‘ 
for the thing being so identified. There are a number of sorts of thing such that 
establishing what sort of thing they are involves identifying relevant relational 
properties. Being a statue, for instance, involves being created in a certain way, 
for a certain purpose. If Statue were a natural formation in a cave on Mars that 
at no point in its history was observed by a living creature, one would have to 
say that Statue was not a statue.  
 
At the extreme end of these sorts of position, the answer to the ‗what is it?‘ 
question might be determined by the social function of the thing in question. To 
sharpen the point we might consider the example of an object with the exact 
physical constitution of a board rubber. In our society it is used exclusively as a 
board rubber. If one were to ask someone in our society what the object is, the 
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response would be a ‗board rubber‘. One can imagine, however, a society very 
similar to ours where things of the very same design are used exclusively as 
classroom missiles for the disciplining (or possibly awakening) of recalcitrant 
pupils. In such a society, the object would be identified as a ‗classroom missile‘. 
The essentialist will be inclined to say that in a world with both societies there 
are two objects that share the same material constitution; the classroom missile 
and the board rubber67.  
 
The properties involved in cluster accounts of objects however are not the sort 
of socially determined relational properties that might be thought to determine 
the identity of things in this sort of case. The properties involved in cluster 
accounts of objects are supposed to be sparse prop erties— which is to say the 
sorts of intrinsic properties that fall within the domain of science. This means 
that it is very likely that the identity conditions associated with objects construed 
as property clusters will not be the same as those associated with those objects 
identified by the sortalist or essentialist. There are likely to be a much wider 
range of objects acknowledged by the essentialist than by the cluster theorist.  
 
It  was  also  noted  earlier  that  on  pain  of  begging  the  question  against  the 
Organicist, we cannot presuppose a sortalist account of object concepts.  
 
What we should conclude from the forgoing is that the relationship between 
object-concepts and object forms is likely to be a complicated one. We do, as a 
matter  of  fact  interact  with  the  objects  around  us  in  ways  that  are  highly 
influenced by the culture(s) which we in fact participate in.  
 
Tilley in (Tilley 2002) explores the central ceremonial place that canoes have in 
the society of the tribes-people of Wala Island, just off the coast of Vanuatu. 
The  significance  of  a  Wala  canoe  prow  to  us  will  be  quite  different  to  the 
significance it has to the Wala, who have rituals associated with its production 
                                              
67 This was Fine’s position when I suggested the example in conversation in 1998.   136 
and  attribute  particular  symbolic  significance  to  the  design,  perhaps  to  the 
extent  that  a  sortal-essentialist  would  construe  the  Wala  as  interacting  with 
objects that we cannot. Similarly, the significance of the mace in the House of 
Commons, or the Queen‘s throne, might be somewhat lost on a Wala.  
 
On a more general level, it is quite likely that cases will occur, such as that of the 
statue and the clay, where different object concepts will be associated with same 
object forms. Whether or not we should conclude on this basis that there is 
more than one object instantiated is not something that needs to be determined 
at this stage.  
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So far a number of challenges to the Organicist have been presented. In the first 
chapter, it was suggested that Organicists‘ conception of ‗composition‘ is too 
anaemic  to  support  the  theoretical  weight  that  Organicists  place  on  it.  In 
particular, it was argued that it does not provide the resources necessary to deny 
a claim that everyday objects are, far from non-existent, in fact simple. This line, 
while consistent with Organicists‘ principled claim that the only things that exist 
are  mereologically  simples  and  living  things,  clearly  leaves  them  with  an 
ontology  quite  different  from  the  one  they  suppose  themselves  to  have.  It 
would require them to abandon their negative ontological claim—the claim that 
there are no everyday objects.  
 
In the second and third chapters a positive position was presented in which we 
see the objects in our environment as bundles of properties (which we termed 
‗forms‘) arising from the existence of an arrangement structure. The challenge 
this account presents for the Organicist is as follows: if our object concepts are 
satisfied, what more is required for the existence of objects? The Organicists‘ 
stock answer to this is ‗composition‘—but we have already argued that their 
notion  of  composition  cannot  by  itself  establish  whether  or  not  there  are 
everyday objects.  
 
In  this  chapter,  we  see  that  the  use  Organicists  make  of  the  O-arranging 
manoeuvre commits them to two things that (it was claimed in Chapter Two) 
are sufficient for the existence of objects.  That is, it commits them to there 
being forms and to those forms satisfying our object concepts. The following   138 
chapter will strengthen this point by focusing on how the Organicists account 
for our object speech and thought in the light of their denial of the existence of 
everyday objects. 
 
The current chapter is structured as follows. The first section describes the way 
that the O-arranging manoeuvre is formulated; we see that both Merricks and 
van Inwagen require our actual scheme of object concepts in order to make 
sense of the idea of object-wise arrangements of simples. The second section 
discusses the rhetorical use to which they put the manoeuvre. It is argued that 
the O-arranging manoeuvre is in fact essential to making their position even 
remotely plausible. In the final section of the chapter we note that part of the 
role of the O-arranging manoeuvre is to explain the existence of what were 
earlier termed ‗forms‘ in our environment. Thus, it seems that by deploying the 
O-arranging  manoeuvre  Organicists  have  committed  themselves  to  the 
obtaining of the conditions that (it was argued in Chapter Two) are sufficient 
for the existence of objects. That is, once we accept the O-arranging manoeuvre 
we have allowed that there are regularities in our environment that satisfy our 
object concepts.  
 
4.1  What is an O-wise arrangement? 
We  have  already  come  across  the  O-arranging  manoeuvre  on  a  number  of 
occasions and by now the idea should be quite familiar. Since the manoeuvre is 
partly a rhetorical move, it can be well illustrated with a dialogue between an 
Organicist (O) and someone he meets on the Clapham Omnibus (WCO):  
 
  O:     There are no everyday objects.  
WCO:   That‘s crazy. Of course there are objects—I‘m sitting on 
one—it‘s  called  a  ‗chair‘.  Last  month  I  went  skiing  on 
one—it was called a ‗mountain‘. If there were no objects 
I‘d fall to the ground, and I wouldn‘t have been able to go 
skiing.   139 
O:   You‘re so naïve! What you take to be a chair is in fact 
nothing  more  than  a  collection  of  mereological  atoms 
arranged ‗chairwise‘, and what you skied down last month 
was not a mountain but a collection of simples arranged 
‗mountain-wise‘.  
 
The  manoeuvre can be articulated schematically: Wherever there is apparent 
reference  in  our  language  to  some  non-living  everyday  object  O,  we  are  to 
suppose that we can replace it with discussion of the activities of ‗some simples‘ 
arranged O-wise. Instead of a teapot, we have a teapot-wise arrangement and so 
on.  We have so far allowed that this sort of manoeuvre makes sense, but there 
are, none the less, worries about how it is to be formulated. In particular, one 
might be concerned about how it is that we are able to recognise object-wise 
arrangements of simples in our environment. In this section we address the 
question, what is an object-wise arrangement? We will see that Merricks and van 
Inwagen  differ  in  the  way  that  they  formulate  the  notion  of  an  object-wise 
arrangement. What both formulations have in common, however, is the way 
that they depend upon our object concepts.  
 
So what is an object-wise arrangement? Both Merricks and van Inwagen fill out 
the notion in terms of an example. The implication is that we should be able to 
schematically apply the same procedure by which they generate their examples 
to any (virtual) objects that we come across. It will repay our effort to look at 
what they say about their examples in some detail. Doing so, will help clarify 
where the Organicist position differs from that offered in this thesis, but also 
how the O-arranging manoeuvre is supposed to work and what relationship 
Merricks and van Inwagen suppose object-wise arrangements to stand in to our 
object concepts. 
 
Van Inwagen‘s example is a chair-wise arrangement. Van Inwagen describes a 
chair-wise arrangement as what is in a ‗chair receptacle‘, where chair receptacles 
are regions of space that:   140 
   
‗… according to those who believe in the existence of chairs 
are occupied by chairs‘ (van Inwagen 1990) p. 10568. 
 
Van Inwagen ‗concedes‘ the following about a chair receptacle: 
 
(A)  ‗The  chair-receptacle  [R]  is  filled  with  rigidly 
interlocking  wood-particles;  the  regions  immediately 
contiguous  with  R  contain  no  wood-particles;  the  wood 
particles  at  the  boundary  of  R  (that  is,  the  wood-particles 
within R that are not entirely surrounded by wood particles) 
are  bonded  to  nearby  wood-particles  much  more  strongly 
than they are bonded to the non-wood particles immediately 
outside  R;  the  strength  of  the  mutual  bonding  of  wood-
particles  within  R  is  large  in  comparison  with  the  forces 
produced by casual human muscular exertions.‘ (van Inwagen 
1990) p. 105 
 
He then denies:  
 
‗B)  There is something that fits into R 
C)  There is something that the wood-particles within R 
compose‘ 
 
And proceeds to make the following claims: 
‗Now if either (B) or (C) were true, there would be a chair. If 
either of them is false, then there are no chairs. (Or, at least, 
there is no chair in R).‘ (van Inwagen 1990) p. 105 
 
Van Inwagen suggests that he differs from other philosophers in not supposing 
that B and C are entailed by A.  
 
One thing that is immediately evident is that there is a straightforward way in 
which A is false. There are no ‗wood particles‘ and so there cannot be any 
spaces  occupied  by  them.  Van  Inwagen  grants  that  the  notion  of  a  ‗wood 
                                              
68 Granting that this way of characterising a chair-receptacle makes sense, it would still 
need  some  development:  Some  spaces  that  people  who  believe  in  chairs  take  to  be 
occupied by chairs are in fact not occupied by chairs for reasons quite different to those put 
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particle‘ is an idealisation, but presumably holds that it is an innocent one. It is 
not clear, however, that he is correct in this regard. We have already seen that 
there are reasons to doubt whether the Organicists can really make sense of 
mereological simples, or if they can, that these simples need be microscopic. 
The idea that there might be simples that are wooden is misleading in that it 
suggests an atomism  that allows for substance kinds at the  sub-atomic level 
(where substance kind is to be understood in the sense of ‗material substance‘ 
kind).  
 
In fact, as we are taught in secondary school science lessons, different chemical 
elements are distinguished from each other by their atomic number. The atomic 
number of an element is itself determined by the bonding relation of sub-atomic 
particles (how many protons an atom of that particular kind has). The chemical 
properties  of  complex  substances  also  involve  the  relations  of  sub-atomic 
particles.  The  atoms  involved  in  a  chair  stand  in  a  number  of  interesting 
relations  to  each  other,  and,  to  an  extent,  these  are  hierarchical:  subatomic 
particles  form  atoms,  atoms  form  molecules  and  molecules  are  chemically 
bonded in order to form ‗wood‘. If one thought that the way to find out about 
composition is to find objects, and then to investigate empirically the relations 
that hold between their parts, then these are precisely the sorts of relations that 
one might think to investigate. Glossing over them in order to discuss ‗wood 
particles‘ subtly favours the idea that ‗composition‘ is one sort of relation, and 
that we might best find out about it by a priori reasoning. 
 
Leaving to one side any worries about the term ‗wood-particles‘, as primarily 
rhetorical, we might briefly consider what would be involved in A‘s entailing B 
and C. What sort of entailment is there supposed to be here? The most natural 
way to read van Inwagen is as saying that most philosophers think that if A is 
true, then B and C must be true. That is, to take the sort of entailment involved 
as  straightforward  material  implication,  treating  each  of  A,  B  and  C  as 
expressing propositions. It does seem likely that many philosophers who believe 
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complicated variation that corrects for the notion of ‗wood particles‘). Certainly 
one  could  give  up  such  an  implication  without  allowing  that  there  are  no 
objects: one way, following the argument in Chapter One would be to allow that 
A and B are true but that C is false.  
 
It is, however, misleading to gloss the issue at stake between those who believe 
in  everyday  objects  and  those  who  deny  them  in  terms  of  this  supposed 
implication. Recall that a chair-receptacle is, by hypothesis, a space that ‗those 
who believe in the existence of chairs‘ believe to be ‗occupied by a chair‘. But if 
that is the case, then suggesting that those who believe in chairs think that B and 
C are entailed by A is like suggesting that they must believe that if there is a 
chair made of wood, then there must be a chair made of wood. To see what is 
going on here, reread A, but replace the words ‗there is a chair receptacle‘, with 
the words ‗There is a chair, and the space it fits in can be called R…‘. B follows 
immediately by existential generalisation. That is, if one believes in chairs then 
one is likely to think, given R, that it is a fairly trivial entailment involved in 
determining the truth of B.  
 
Similarly, those who believe in chairs generally suppose them to be composite 
objects. Thus, they would infer from the fact that there is a chair that occupies 
R  that  there  is  a  composite  object  that  occupies  R.  Once  we  start  to  see 
composition  as  a  problematic  relation,  this  inference  becomes  more 
problematic. But as was noted in  Chapter  One, once composition  has been 
problematized we are still left with the option of just supposing that there is a 
chair in R, and rejecting the notion that it must be composite. The Organicist 
has put the notion of ‗composition‘ under a level of pressure that it cannot 
sustain. This may seem a little trivial, but to suggest that those who believe in 
chairs infer B and C from A, only makes sense if they do not already (contra 
hypothesis) believe that R is occupied by an object. It is to assume already the 
conclusion  that  the  O-arranging  manoeuvre  is  supposed  to  secure  for  the 
Organicist. That is, the conclusion that the existence of everyday objects is not 
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The  thing  that  must  be  noted  about  van  Inwagen‘s  formulation  of  the  O-
arranging  manoeuvre  is  its  reliance  on  our  everyday  object  concepts.  In  the 
sequel it will be argued that the way that Merricks formulates the manoeuvre in 
Objects and Persons69 is just as reliant upon our object concepts. Object concepts 
on these accounts distinguish bits of our environment from other bits, and in 
most cases, the application of them is accepted as being quite unproblematic. 
 
Merricks formulates the notion of an object-wise arrangement in terms, which, 
if his metaphysics is correct, would be impossible. He takes some simples to be 
arranged chair-wise in the following case (just the choice of example object has 
been changed, Merricks‘ account is of atoms arranged statuewise):  
 
M1:  ‗Atoms are arranged chairwise if and only if they both  
have the properties and also stand in the relations to 
microscopica  upon  which,  if  chairs  existed,  those 
atoms' composing a chair would non-trivially supervene.‘ 
(Merricks, 2001) p. 4 
 
This is quite odd. The idea seems to be that in order to find out what a chair-
wise arrangement is like we should apply something like the following four stage 
procedure:  
 
  Stage 1:  Imagine a possible world W1 where there are chairs  
  Stage 2:   Pick out a chair C 
Stage 3:   Have  a  look  at  the  properties  and  ‗relations  to 
microscopica‘ that the atoms x composing C instantiate 
Stage 4:  Have a look around the actual world for some atoms y that 
supervene on the way that the atoms x would be (i.e. ‗have 
the properties and stand in the relations to microscopica‘) 
in W1 
                                              
69 There is at least one place where Merricks characterises object-wise arrangements in a 
way much more similar to van Inwagen’s (Merricks 2000).   144 
 
The reason that this is an odd way of characterising the notion of an O-wise 
arrangement  is  that  if  Merricks‘  Organicist  position  is  correct,  W1  is  not  a 
possible world. It is impossible. One assumes that the Organicists‘ claims are 
supposed to be necessary truths. Merricks‘ arguments, if they are sound, would 
seem to apply to any world which had a physics that was similar enough to the 
actual world for this procedure to make sense.  
 
It will be argued below that the problem is that if we take Merricks at his word 
as to what is required for some things to compose another thing, it is not clear 
why we should think any chair which satisfied those conditions would have a 
microstructure at all like that of chairs in the actual world. Merricks‘ argument 
from  over-determination  will  be  discussed  in  detail  in  Chapter  Six.  For  the 
present it will be sufficient to note that Merricks is committed to the following 
principle concerning composition:  
 
If some xs compose an O, then O has a property that is not caused by 
the cooperation of the xs.  
 
Consider for instance, what he thinks would have to be the case for there to be 
a  world  where  there  are  chairs.  In  such  a  world,  there  would  have  to  be  a 
property  that  chairs  had  that  the  chairwise  arrangement  of  parts  did  not 
produce. Let us suppose that chairs in this world make a high-pitched scream70. 
But what sort of physics would a world have to have for this to be the case? The 
scream would need to be caused by the chair and not by its constituent simples, 
and it is difficult to imagine how this would come about. More importantly we 
might wonder why we should think that the microstructure of such a thing 
would be anything like that of a chair in our own world.  
 
                                              
70 Merricks uses this example in (Merricks 2005). See also commentary on that article in 
(Barnes 2007) and (Merricks 2007).    145 
Or  let  us  suppose  that  the  properties  that  chairs  have  in  W1  are  those 
macroscopic properties that we associate with a chair. Then at least we could 
make sense of an analogy between C and a chair (or what non-Organicists take 
to  be  a  chair)  in  our  world.  The  problem  then  is  that  applying  Merricks‘ 
principle we have to conclude that the simples x are not causally responsible for 
those properties. If this is the case, of course, then either the simples in a chair-
wise arrangement would not supervene on the simples x and their properties 
and relations, or they would so supervene, but not be causally responsible for 
the  macroscopic  properties  of  the  chair.  If  they  are  not  responsible  for  the 
properties of the chair, then supervening properties in our world are unlikely to 
be a chairwise arrangement.  
 
Merricks, of course, notes that chairs are as far as he is concerned, counter-
possible and that this might be taken as an objection to his account of chair-
wise arrangement. He says that any metaphysician must be willing to talk about 
counter possible circumstances or they would not be able to critically examine 
the possibility that they were wrong when they made claims that they take to be 
necessary truths. He suggests that those who feel uncomfortable with this might 
prefer a fictionalist account whereby: 
 
‗atoms are arranged statuewise just in case, according to the 
‗folk-ontological  fiction‘,  they  have  properties  and  stand  in 
microscopic relations upon which their composing a statue 
supervenes.‘ (Merricks, 2001) p. 5 
 
The  folk  ontological  fiction,  of  course,  is  based  upon  our  normal  object 
concepts.  
 
There is a difference, however, between acknowledging that we can talk about 
counter-possibilia  and  requiring  reference  to  them  in  order  to  be  able  to 
formulate your position, and the issue is more pertinent here then it might be in 
other  debates  (Merricks  mentions,  for  instance,  debates  about  persistence 
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than, as van Inwagen does, in terms of our everyday beliefs, Merricks gives the 
impression  that  the  notion  of  an  object-wise  arrangement  is  not  dependent 
upon our actual object concepts.  
 
To  see  this,  one  might  compare  Merricks‘  claim  with  a  claim  about  some 
possible object. Someone makes a claim about it being possible for there to be 
some object, let us say a transporter device as used to philosophical effect in 
Star Trek. Translating the idiom of talk about what is possible to talk of possible 
worlds, we can interpret the claim as the claim that there is a possible world w 
where  there  is  a  transporter  device.  What  we  have  then,  is  essentially  a 
functional definition of the device and a claim that there is a possible world 
where that definition is satisfied.  
 
We could move from this position to a position with respect to how things 
would have to be in our world in order for there to be such a device. We might 
say for instance, that if there were simples in the actual world which stood in the 
same relations and instantiated the same properties as the simples that compose 
a transporter in possible world w (and the laws of physics were relevantly similar 
in  both  worlds)  then  there  would  also  be  a  transporter  in  the  actual  world. 
Whether such a thing is in fact possible (given the physics of the actual world), 
is a matter of empirical fact. Either it is possible to make such a transporter or it 
is not.  
 
Compare  this  example  with  Merricks‘  use  of  impossibillia,  however.  In  our 
example,  whether  a  transporter  is  possible  or  not  is  a  matter  entirely 
independent of whether or not we have the concept of a transporter. It might 
have been that such a device is possible but it never occurred to us to make one. 
It might also be that somewhere in the universe such a device came about by 
accident without anyone ever knowing about it. 
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By defining object-wise arrangements in terms of supervenience on the sub-
structure  of  ‗possible‘  objects,  Merricks  appears  to  define  object-wise 
arrangements in a way which is similarly independent of whether we have any 
concept  of  the  objects  upon  whose  substructure  they  are  supposed  to 
supervene.  In  fact  though,  because  Merricks  thinks  that  such  objects  are 
impossible there is no way that any simples could supervene on the substructure 
of one. What we have is just the functional definition of the object that would 
have to be satisfied in a world where it existed – just as we have a notion of 
what would have to be the case for there to be a transporter device.  The only 
possible source for this sort of functional definition with respect to everyday 
objects is our actual scheme of object concepts. 
 
In  fact,  Merricks,  like  van  Inwagen,  cannot  fill  out  a  notion  of  object-wise 
arrangement without utilising the object concepts that we in fact have. Merricks 
and van Inwagen therefore accept the basis of the account of objects presented 
in the previous chapters: they accept that there is matter in our environment, 
they accept that our object concepts pick out arrangements of this matter that 
generate macroscopic properties and they are clearly committed to our ability to 
deploy our object concepts. What they deny is that there are objects that satisfy 
our object concepts.  
 
The suggestion being made here, therefore, is that without a robust conception 
of composition on which to base  their claim that everyday objects  must be 
composite, the Organicists‘ position is in effect self defeating. The O-arranging 
manoeuvre depends upon our having everyday object concepts and it entails 
that there are arrangement structures in our vicinity that satisfy those concepts. 
It was argued in Chapter Two that this is all that is necessary for there to be 
everyday objects. However, as we shall see in the next two sections, abandoning 
the O-arranging manoeuvre is not really an option for Organicists. 
 
 
   148 
 
4.2   What is the point of the O-arranging manoeuvre? 
The manoeuvre has an important role for Eliminativists about everyday objects 
in mitigating the initial implausibility of their position: If they cannot get past 
the  fact  that  their  position  seems  self-evidently  false,  then  the  rest  of  their 
arguments  will  be  ineffectual.  The  other  important  role  for  object-wise 
arrangements  that  will  be  noted  below  is  that  according  to  Organicists  the 
object-wise  arrangements  in  our  environment  are  responsible  for  the 
macroscopic properties that we encounter. This does not, however, exhaust all 
the work that the O-arranging manoeuvre does for Merricks and van Inwagen. 
The  O-arranging  manoeuvre  also  plays  a  part  in  the  argument  from  over-
determination which is Merricks‘ master argument for the Eliminativist position 
and is discussed Chapter Six. It is also a key part of the argument behind van 
Inwagen‘s claim that his position is not contrary to common sense (see the next 
chapter). 
 
One major consequence of the manoeuvre is that it enables the Organicists to 
make the ‗no difference‘ claim:  
 
No-difference:   Even  if  there  are  no  objects,  everything  would 
seem just the same as it in fact does seem. 
 
The importance of this for Organicists can be brought out by consideration of 
an alternative to compositional ontology. Compositional ontologies, it will be 
recalled, are based on the thought that we should be able to detail ‗what there is‘ 
by  reference  only  to  mereological  simples  and  rules  of  composition.  An 
alternative to this approach to ontology was suggested in Chapter Two. It was 
suggested that the way to find out what is in the world is to go and have a look 
at it. Rather than trying to find a priori rules of composition in order to generate 
an ontology, we should go and find what things there are, and consider whether 
they have parts. We might call this approach Simple Empirical Ontology.   149 
 
‗Simple Empirical Ontology‘ suggests that the way to find out what there is, is to 
go out and look at the world and see what we find. But if the O-arranging 
manoeuvre is allowable and it entails the no-difference claim then what there is, 
is no longer something that can be discovered empirically. If the O-arranging 
manoeuvre is right it makes no empirical difference whether there are objects or 
not—the findings of experience on this account will be the same whether or not 
there  are  objects.  Philosophical  rather  than  physical  investigation  will  be 
required to limn the structure of the universe. 
 
As was hinted at in the dialogue at the start of this chapter, a common reaction 
of non-philosophers when confronted with the negative ontological claim is that 
it is obviously false. This response is generally combined with an incredulous 
stare71. Where an incredulous stare i s not forthcoming it is often because the 
person has imagined that the thesis must be less extreme than it in fact is. 
 
This  may  be  because  there   is  a  way  of  understanding  the  O -arranging 
manoeuvre and the Organicist position which is quite natural, is liable to seem 
more charitable, and also involves misconstruing the negative ontological claim. 
This response takes the Organicist not to be making a claim about existence, but 
rather a claim about what things are fundamental 72. This involves the following 
line of thought, which might seem appealing: 
 
We  know  that  the  world  is  made  up  of  atoms/quarks/sub -atomic 
particles, what we encounter as everyday objects are then ‗made of‘ these 
particles. We may suppose that these particles are the most basic building 
blocks of reality and everyday objects are not part of the fundamental 
building blocks of reality.  
                                              
71 Other philosophers receive incredulous stares too, most famously Lewis (Lewis 1986) pp. 
133-135. Roy Sorenson also reports receiving incredulous stares in response to a bald 
statement of Epistemicism about vagueness. 
72 See (Williams Forthcoming) for an attempt to make systematic sense of this thought.   150 
 
If the Organicists‘ claim was something along these lines, then their position 
would  be  of  interest  less  for  the  controversial  negative  claim  than  for  the 
suddenly interesting positive claim—the claim that organisms are a fundamental 
part of reality while tables are not. This though is not the Organicists‘ claim. As 
van Inwagen is at pains to point out, his claim is not that objects are ‗not real‘, 
or have some second-class status, it is that they are non-existent:  
 
‗Many  philosophers,  in  conversation  and  correspondence, 
have  insisted,  despite  repeated  protests  on  my  part,  on 
describing  my  position  in  words  like  these:  ―Van  Inwagen 
says that tables are not real‖; ―…not true objects‖; ―…not 
actually things‖; ―…not substances‖; ―…not unified wholes‖; 
―…nothing  more  than  collections  of  particles.‖  These  are 
words  that  darken  counsel.  They  are,  in  fact,  perfectly 
meaningless. My position vis-à-vis tables and other inanimate 
objects is simply that there are none. Tables are not defective 
objects or second-class citizens of the world; they are just not 
there at all. But perhaps this wretched material mode is a part 
of  the  difficulty.  Let  us  abandon  it.  There  are  certain 
properties  that a  thing would have  to  have to be properly 
called a ‗table‘ in anyone‘s understanding of the word, and 
nothing has all these properties. If anything did have them, it 
would be real, a true object, actually a thing, a substance, a 
unified  whole,  and  something  more  than  a  collection  of 
particles. But nothing does. If there were tables, they would 
be composite material objects, and every composite material 
object  is  real,  a  true  object,  actually  a  thing,  a  substance,  a 
unified  whole  and  something  more  than  a  collection  of 
particles.‖ (van Inwagen 1990) pp. 99-100. 
 
The  Organicists‘  negative  existential  claim  is  not  the  reasonable  sounding 
(though still substantial and interesting) one that everyday objects are not the 
fundamental units of physics or reality. The claim is that they do not exist at all. 
In order to make the negative existential claim plausible the Organicists must be 
able to make the ‗no-difference‘ claim, and the only way to do that is with the 
O-arranging manoeuvre.  
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It is difficult to overstate the importance of the ‗no-difference‘ claim for the 
Eliminativist, or the importance of the O-arranging manoeuvre in establishing it. 
It can perhaps be brought out by considering what an Organicist might say to 
the following argument: 
 
1)  Organicism entails that there are no non-living everyday objects 
2)  It is self-evident that there are non-living everyday objects 
3)  If it is self-evident that there are non-living everyday objects then 
there are non-living everyday objects 
4)  There are non-living everyday objects 
5)  Organicism is false. 
 
The  reason  that  it  is  fairly  natural  to  suppose  an  interpretation  of  the 
Organicists‘ claim that makes it less bluntly ontological is that, taken as it is 
presented, it seems self evidently false. One naturally reaches for a charitable 
reading for it. To counter an argument such as this the Eliminativist needs to be 
able to respond to the second premise. He needs to be able to say that it is not 
really self-evident that there are everyday objects; it merely seems that way.  This 
then, is one part of the role of the O-arranging manoeuvre, another is to allow 
the claim that things would seem just as they do if there were no objects, this 
claim is explored in the next section.  
 
4.3  The property role. 
We  have  seen  then,  how  necessary  the  O-arranging  manoeuvre  is  for  the 
Organicists73.  It  moves  their  position  from  being  an  obviously  false 
philosophical sideshow to a theory in good standing that can be compared to 
other theories. In this section we will discuss its role in establishing that the 
world is causally as we suppose it  to be, or as van Inwagen puts it, that the 
things that objects do, still get done. We will see later on  that this is also a 
                                              
73 It is also used by nihilists such as Cian Dorr (Dorr, 2002).   152 
fundamental premise in Merricks‘ master argument for his Eliminativist thesis: 
the argument from over-determination. Here we will discuss the role of object-
wise arrangements in ‗doing what objects do‘.  
 
Van Inwagen puts the issue as follows: 
 
‗Consider  the  sentences  ―the  sun  shines‖  and  ―The  shelf 
supports the books.‖ According to the view I am advocating, 
there are no stars to do any shining and no shelves to do any 
supporting.  Still,  as  one  might  put  it,  the  shining  and  the 
supporting somehow get done. How, in my view, do they get 
done?  Well  they  get  done  in  virtue  of  the  cooperation  of 
simples. The simples that are arranged shelfwise cooperate to 
support  weight;  the  simples  that  are  arranged  sunwise 
cooperate to produce light.‘ (van Inwagen 1990) pp. 117-8.  
 
‗The simples‘ in van Inwagen‘s formulation is to be read as a multiply referring 
term. Thus, ‗the simples arranged shelf-wise‘, as used by van Inwagen, refers to 
some specific simples that are jointly engaged in a particular activity. In the case 
of shelves they are engaged in the activity of ‗supporting‘.  
 
One of the obvious problems with denying the existence, of, say, aeroplanes, is 
that many of us will have travelled places in them. If there are no aeroplanes, 
then our ability to travel swiftly from one place to another by travelling through 
the air is in need of explanation. Similarly with chairs. We might construct an 
argument about chairs as follows:  
 
1)  Jeremy Bentham is sitting in a chair 
2)  The chair supports Jeremy Bentham‘s weight 
3)  If there were no chair, then Jeremy Bentham‘s weight would not 
be supported 
4)  If Jeremy Bentham‘s weight were not supported, then he would 
fall to the ground.  
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Our grasp of counterfactuals is strong enough to allow us to conclude on the 
basis of this that if the Organicists‘ thesis were correct, and chairs were non-
existent, then the premises above would entail Jeremy Bentham‘s falling to the 
ground. Since Jeremy does not in fact fall to the ground, we might suppose that 
this  fact,  together  with  the  above  premises  constitutes  an  argument  against 
Organicism. To defeat it, the Organicists must deny one of the above premises. 
  
The premise that the Organicists would deny is premise three. They are able to 
do  this  because  of  the  O-arranging  manoeuvre.  Premise  three  concerns  the 
‗activities‘ of the chair, which have so far, been called properties of the chair. In 
particular it concerns those activities that are involved in its supporting Jeremy 
Bentham. It is key to the Organicists‘ position that they be able to deny the 
counterfactual claim (and others of the same form) that if the chair were not 
there, Bentham would not be supported. The O-arranging manoeuvre allows for 
this by substituting a collection of simples for the chair, and suggesting that they 
do the supporting. This then, can be understood as a more ambitious version of 
the no-difference claim74: 
 
No-causal-difference:  If there were no everyday  objects it would 
make no causal difference in the world.  
 
It needs to be noted that the no -difference and no-causal difference claims are 
essential to the Organicists‘ position and that it is the O-arranging manoeuvre 
which makes them plausible.   
 
It would be tempting, but potentially misleading, at this juncture to suppose that 
the manoeuvre could be schematically filled out in something like the following 
way and that this is a corollary of no-causal-difference: 
                                              
74 Because perception is a causal process we can think of the original ‘no difference’ claim 
as a weaker version of the no-causal-difference claim. 
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If one would in the normal course of things suppose that there was an 
everyday object with properties F,G,H and so on, then in fact there is an 
object-wise arrangement of simples that cause F,G,H  and so on. 
 
The  risk  of  being  misled  comes  from  the  phrase  ‗there  is  an  object-wise 
arrangement of simples‘. This can be read in one of two ways. If read as ‗there 
are some simples which cooperate in order to produce the properties‘, then this 
is okay. The risk is that one might read the phrase as reifying the object-wise 
arrangement. Organicists talk about object-wise arrangements, but they do not 
suppose that there is any ‗thing‘ which is an object-wise arrangement. This may 
be one reason why one sometimes feels that there is an element of sleight of 
hand in the O-arranging manoeuvre. It allows for one to talk as if there were 
some replacements for objects (to wit, ‗object-wise arrangements‘) but in fact 
posits no such things. Van Inwagen at points, and quite often towards the end 
of Material Beings, writes of object-wise arrangements as ‗virtual objects‘. This 
reads  as  a  hypostatization  of  object-wise  arrangements  and  is  potentially 
misleading. It will be important in what follows to keep in mind that object-wise 
arrangements are not supposed to be ‗things‘ or ‗substances‘. In fact, they are 
not supposed by Organicists to exist at all: the Organicists‘ claim is that there 
are simples arranged in certain ways, but there are no arrangements of simples. 
It  is  an  important  part  of  the  Organicists  position  that  a  bunch  of  simples 
arranged in a certain way, do not thereby constitute an arrangement of simples. 
 
The  Organicist  strategy  then,  does  not  involve  denying  the  existence  of 
properties in the environment around us. Not even macroscopic properties75. 
Rather it involves suggesting that they occur without th ere being any single 
entity to which they belong. In the last two chapters we saw that supposing that 
                                              
75  Though  Merricks  at  one  point  suggests  that  macroscopic  properties  are  not  properly 
sparse (Merricks 2003) p. 736, as they are dependent on microphysical properties that are 
more fundamental. This is not something that I need to dispute—so long as we accept the 
systematic link between subatomic properties and macroscopic ones.   155 
there are properties but no objects gives rise to the coordination problem. That 
is,  it  leaves  the  following  question  unanswered:    Why  is  it  that  properties 
coordinate in the way that they do, if there is no object for them to coordinate 
about? On this subject, Organicists are almost entirely silent.   
 
One reason for their silence might be that they do not acknowledge the sorts of 
sparse  properties  that  were  introduced  and  discussed  in  the  last  chapter. 
Merricks has not, to date, proposed a theory of properties, although he has a 
good deal to say concerning the supervenience of macroscopic properties on 
microscopica, and in (Merricks 2007) he argues for a fairly minimalist theory of 
truth,  and  certainly  against  the  notion  of  ‗truth  makers‘.  Van  Inwagen  does 
advance a theory of properties (van Inwagen 2004), but there are significant 
reasons to suppose that the theory he proposes is of merely tangential relevance 
to the quote above, as we shall now see.  
 
Van Inwagen takes properties to be ‗things that can be said‘ of objects. His is an 
‗abundant‘ account of properties, and he is quite clear that the properties that he 
is discussing are ‗abstract‘. He contends that while it is difficult  to precisely 
characterise  what  being  abstract  amounts  to  there  is  fairly  broad  agreement 
amongst philosophers about which sorts of things should be characterised as 
abstract and which as concrete. Generally, we may take War and Peace, as abstract 
in the following context  ―‗War and Peace has been translated into 39 languages‘‖, 
but the particular copy of War and Peace in my bag is concrete (van Inwagen 
2004), p.108. 
 
Van  Inwagen  then,  does  not,  and  is  explicit  that  he  does  not,  think  that 
properties  are  things  that  belong  to  objects;  he  dismisses  the  notion  of 
alphabetic parts (as introduced above in section 1.3) out of hand. His view is 
not, in spirit, very different from the sort of pleonastic realism about properties 
advocated by Stephen Schiffer (Schiffer 1996). Schiffer though, links his account   156 
to a minimalist account of truth and meaning76. If one is going to advocate an 
abundant view of properties then this raises a ques tion about the relationship 
between properties and meanings (i.e. propositions), and truth. On such an 
account, remember, what properties there are is closely related to what we can 
say.  Without  an  account  of  this  relationship  it  is  difficult  to  draw  any 
conclusions  concerning  how  these  properties  should  be  related  to  our 
metaphysics.  
 
In what follows the term ‗property‘ will be retained to apply to the sorts of 
sparse  properties  presupposed  by  the  last  four  chapters.  Where  abundant 
properties are under discussion, the term @property will be used. 
 
We need to be clear that even if Organicists were to adopt a minimalist account 
of truth or an abundantist account of properties they would still need to give an 
account of the (sparse) properties that objects have. At the macroscopic level, 
these properties are just regularities in our environment that, even assuming a 
minimalist  theory  of  truth  and  an  abundant  theory  of  @properties,  are 
implicated in the way that we think about the world, and hence what predicates 
there  are  and  what  @properties  we  actually  talk  about.  Armstrong  in 
(Armstrong 1978a) argues for the separation of the theory of universals from 
the theory of semantics. The property theory offered by van Inwagen is, given 
the current state of property theories, a retrograde step. Even if we accept his 
account  though,  one  can  still  distinguish  @properties  generally,  from  those 
@properties that relate to properties that are necessary posits of a complete 
science or track causal relata in the world.  These latter @properties are such 
that, even if they are said of  an object, whether they are true of the object 
depends in a very concrete way on how the world is.  
 
                                              
76 See also (Horwich 1998a), (Horwich 1998b) for an alternative version of a ‘minimalist’ 
account of truth. Both Schiffer and Horwich are approaching the question of properties in 
order to solve problems in the philosophy of language, rather dealing with metaphysical 
issues such as causation.   157 
Here is a way of understanding this point. One of the ways we use property 
language is to explain things. For instance, the tray on a set of scales sinks one 
way rather than the other because the objects on one side weigh more than on 
the other. Which is to say: objects on one side had a greater mass than the other, 
and so, being under an equal gravitational field, exerted a greater downward 
force. Notice  that in  this example there is nothing  that the  Organicist  need 
object to.  
 
Let us suppose that the weight of the objects in question is one kilogram. We 
can  say  of  the  objects  that  they  weigh  one  kilogram.  They  therefore  have, 
according to van Inwagen, the property of weighing one kilo. This is something 
that we can say, and it something that is true (let us suppose). But the reason we 
can say this is the way the objects act in given contexts (of which being placed 
on a scale is just one).  
 
This is all we need to get the position outlined in the previous chapters going. 
And it is the function that in the quote above (see p. 152) van Inwagen was 
attempting to explain with the O-arranging manoeuvre. Placing ourselves in the 
position  of  one  of  the  early  British  empiricists,  considering  the  impressions 
which come to him, we exist in a world that appears to us a certain way. It 
appears that way because of regularities in the way that it is arranged. We need 
no more than this to arrive at the notion of an object form.  
 
The claim of this chapter then is as follows. The O-arranging manoeuvre is 
integral  to  the  Organicist  position.  Organicists  need  it  to  account  for  the 
regularities in the environment around us; they need it to make their position 
even plausible; and they need it to make  the ‗no difference‘ and ‗no-causal-
difference‘ claims, which are also integral to their position.  
 
Once they have deployed the  O-arranging manoeuvre and the no difference 
claims, Organicists have to acknowledge two things that allow the argument of 
the last two chapters to get off the ground.    158 
 
The first of these is that there are collections of regularities in our environment, 
which we take to be objects and which exhibit properties. This is a feature of 
our experience of the world and is in fact part of the data that the Organicist is 
trying to account for with the O-arranging manoeuvre. If the ‗no-difference‘ 
claim is to be accepted, then so must the existence of those regularities. We 
were therefore justified in positing object forms in Chapter Two.  
 
The second is that the very idea of an object-wise arrangement licenses the use 
that  was  made  in  the  previous  chapters  of  the  notion  of  an  arrangement 
formation and the related notion of an arrangement structure. If arrangements 
of  simples  are  to  do  the  things  that  Organicists  require  them  to,  then  they 
cannot  just  be  arbitrary  selections  of  matter.  To  see  that  the  O-arranging 
manoeuvre requires arrangement structures it should be enough to note that the 
atoms which, in their chairwise formation, support Jeremy Bentham, would not 
do so at all if instead they were laid out in a line along the M1. They are only 
causally effective because of their arrangement, or in the terminology developed 
here, because of the structure that relates them to each other.  
 
The O-arranging manoeuvre, therefore, supplies us with all we need for there to 
be objects. We have collections of regularities in our environment (i.e. object-
forms),  and  we  have  arrangement  structures  (because  otherwise  the  simples 
would be causally inefficacious) that give rise to them. If the Organicists use the 
O-arranging manoeuvre, as they must, then they have provided us with all that 
we need to warrant our conclusion that there are indeed everyday objects and 
hence that the Organicists‘ negative ontological claim is false.   159 
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We have seen some of the ways that the O-arranging manoeuvre has been used 
by  Organicists,  and  it  has  been  argued  that  the  manoeuvre  is  absolutely 
fundamental to the Organicists‘ position. We have also seen that the manoeuvre 
cannot be formulated except in terms of the object concepts that we actually 
have. At this point it is worth exploring the relationship that Organicists think 
holds between our object concepts, the terms they are expressed with and the 
world. Above it was argued that if our object concepts are satisfied, then there 
are objects. Here it will be argued that Organicists, by virtue of the use they 
make  of  the  O-arranging  manoeuvre,  are  committed  to  our  object  concepts 
being satisfied.  
 
Clearly  Organicists  cannot  hold  that  our  object  concepts  pick  out  objects, 
because Organicists hold that there are no such objects for them to pick out. 
Neither  can  they  hold  that  our  object  concepts  just  fail  to  express  anything 
about the world: They must bear some relation to the world because as a matter 
of fact they do rather well in helping us to get around in it. Organicists must be 
able to distinguish between concepts  such as ‗chair‘ which they say refer to 
things that do not exist but which most people take to pick out bits of the 
furniture of the world, and concepts which apply to things that we all agree do 
not exist, such as the hydra of Greek legend. The obvious line for Organicists to 
take, given the O-arranging manoeuvre, is to say that the utility of our object 
concepts can be explained in some way in terms of our relations to collections 
of simples arranged object-wise.    160 
 
The issue can be understood in one of two ways. It can be understood in terms 
of a question about beliefs. Construed this way, the question is: If there are no 
everyday objects, how come we do so well at navigating the world with our 
object concepts? Alternatively the issue can be recast in terms of the semantics 
of our object terms. Understood this way, the question is, how are we to make 
sense  of  the  apparent  truth  of  so  many  of  our  object  expressions—those 
elements of our language that we usually take to be referring to objects? 
 
Clearly these  two  questions are closely  related; our beliefs about  objects are 
expressed with those object expression in question. The most straightforward 
explanation for the utility of our object-directed beliefs is that they are (for the 
most part) true.  
 
Those  of  us  who  think  that  the  world  is  populated  with  objects  have  an 
interesting story to tell about the way that those objects relate to our object 
expressions. Reference to the bodies in our environment is a somewhat complex 
matter, and much has been written about it, including some of the classics of 
20th  century  philosophy  (e.g.  (Strawson  1959),  (Quine  1960),  (Evans  1982), 
(Wiggins  2001)).  Most  of  these  accounts  simply  assume  the  existence  of 
everyday objects and can be taken to be consistent  with the metaphysics of 
objects presented in the foregoing chapters.  
 
If we assume the existence of everyday objects then certain other assumptions 
become reasonable77. One of these is the assumption that whatever account of 
reference to physical objects we develop will have to allow that the reference of 
object terms is established in the context of causal interactions with objects.  
 
                                              
77  Reasonable  does  not  mean  uncontroversial.  Someone  with  a  descriptive  theory  of 
reference might accept that as a matter of fact it is often the case that reference to objects 
is established in the context of causal interactions with them without accepting that this has 
anything to do with determining what the term picks out.    161 
Some  sort  of  causal  constraint  can  be  plausibly  supposed  to  be  a  necessary 
condition for our ability to talk about everyday objects. We can label the causal 
relationships, whatever they are, that are required for us to talk about everyday 
objects, the ‗causal constraint‘ on reference relations. We will take this term to 
encompass  whatever  causal  relations  are  required  in  order  for  our  object 
concepts to be used to pick out objects.  
 
This specification of the causal constraint on reference for our everyday object 
concepts  is  quite  weak.  It  does  not,  for  instance,  mean  that  reference  to 
anything at all must involve some sort of causal relation to the referent. It may 
be that there are  numbers and that we are able to refer to  them quite well 
without  ever  standing  in  a  causal  relation  to  them.  We  also  need  a  way  of 
picking out in conversation fictional things and other non-existents. Everyday 
objects, however, are not those sorts of thing. Everyday objects are the sort of 
things that, if they exist and we can refer to them, must stand in some sort of 
causal relation to us. The causal relation might be at some remove. It may be 
that  I  can  talk  about  my  grandfather‘s  vegetarian  cat,  even  though  I  never 
encountered it myself, but there is none the less some sort of causal relation 
involved. Noting that there are causal relations that ground our ability to refer to 
everyday objects does not commit us to a purely causal theory of reference. 
What matters is that in general, the notion of reference presupposes some causal 
interaction between the things being referred to and some act of reference78.  
 
The  account we give of the way that the re ferences of our everyday object 
concepts get established will need to take account of this causal constraint on 
reference79. We might think, for instance, that we fix the concept of ‗chair‘ by a 
combined process of having examples of things with chair functions pointed 
out (‗look a chair‘), just observing what others pick out when they use the word, 
                                              
78 This line will clearly be most consonant with a causal theory of reference such as those 
presented in ((Evans 1973) or (Kripke 1980)). Even if one were attracted to some sort of 
description theory, however, arguably causal relations to objects would still be needed in 
order for us to be able to give descriptions of any of them.   
79 See for instance, (Devitt and Sterelny 1987), (Evans 1982), (Jackson 1998).    162 
and  by  having  the  norms  of  use  socially  enforced  (‗that‘s  not  a  chair,  it‘s  a 
table‘). But part of our concept of a chair covers its causal properties and the 
ways that we can interact with it. Even on this very simplistic sort of account of 
reference fixing80, what it is that we are referring to with the word ‗chair‘ will 
depend upon what was pointed out to us when we learned the word ‗chair‘.  
 
While Organicists do not think there are non-living objects, they do, as we saw 
in  the  previous  chapter,  suppose  that  the  causal  interactions  of  objects  still 
occur;  only  they  take  them  to  be  the  cooperative  interactions  of  simples 
arranged object-wise rather than of objects.  In Chapter Two we coined the 
term ‗object-form‘ to pick out the collections of macroscopic properties that we 
associate  with  objects.  We  can  suggest  without  begging  the  question  against 
Organicists that the reference of our object terms is established in the context of 
reference fixing acts that are directed to these forms. It will be argued in what 
follows  that  Organicists  too  must  accept  such  a  causal  constraint  upon 
reference. 
 
A  fortiori  the  linguistic  issue  for  Eliminativists  about  everyday  objects  arises 
because it is clear that if there are no everyday objects, then there are no objects 
for us to be picking out with our object concepts.  Clearly, however, our object 
concepts are not picking out nothing; there are things that are causally related to 
our use of object concepts. Our object concepts pick out bits of the world in a 
systematic  and  comprehensible  way.  If  there  are  no  objects,  then  this  is 
something  that  is  in  need  of  explanation.  For  Organicists  object-wise 
arrangements of simples have an important role to play in such an explanation.  
 
It will be helpful in what follows to focus on what semantics requires for the 
truth of our object-expressions.  To bring the problem into sharper focus, we 
can consider that something along the lines of the following is often taken to be 
                                              
80 Some comments from van Inwagen suggest that he would accept an analogous model 
for establishing reference to groups of simples arranged object-wise. See for instance (van 
Inwagen 1990) p. 109 fn. 40.   163 
a basic assumption of truth conditional semantics, this version is taken from 
(Evans 1982), p. 4981 and gives reference conditions for atomic sentences: 
 
‗(P)  If S is an atomic sentence in which the n-place concept 
expression R is combined with n singular terms t1…tn, 
then S is true iff <the referent of t1… the referent of 
tn> satisfies R.‘ 
 
The point of this principle is that it ties reference to truth. A sentence comes 
out true if and only if the singular term in the sentence picks out something that 
satisfies the concept. Given an assumption along these lines, the problem for 
Organicists can be summed up with the following question: Where our everyday 
sentences appear to refer to everyday objects, is there in actual fact a failure of 
reference?  If  a  sentence  such  as  ‗this  chair  is  uncomfortable‘,  fails  to  refer 
because there is no chair to be the referent of the sentence, then presumably it 
comes out false according to P82.  If much of our object speech turns out to be 
false, then this finding will also be true of our beliefs; we can suppose that some 
similar principle to P  will need to hold in giving truth conditions for mental 
content (as well as for more complex linguistic expressions). The same issue will 
arise for other parts of speech that have been thought to be singular referring 
terms. Whether or not a d efinite description such as ‗the chair in the living 
room‘ is taken to be a referring expression or a quantifier phrase, it shares with 
atomic sentences that contain referring expressions that it requires something of 
the world in order for it to be true.  
 
There are two options for the Organicist here. One option is to ascribe a global 
error to everyone using object concepts and hold that most of the time when we 
use  object  expressions  we  say  something  false.  This  would  follow  from  a 
                                              
81  It  is  also  referenced  in  (Sainsbury  2005)  p.  79.  Sainsbury  notes  that  an  analogous 
principle seems equally plausible with respect to plural referring expressions. 
82 If we take ourselves to be ontologically committed to those things that have to exist for 
what we believe to be true, then P tells us that if we believe ‘this chair is uncomfortable’ is 
true, then we are committed to the existence of a referent of the term ‘this chair’ which is 
uncomfortable.   164 
principle such as (P) and the purported fact that there is nothing that can satisfy 
our  non-organic  object  concepts83. Given the argument that was presented 
earlier that if our object concepts are satisfied then there are objects, this first 
option might seem attractive to Organicists, and it is the line that Merricks takes.  
   
The other option is to offer an alternative semantics whereby most of our uses 
of  sentences  containing  object  expressions  (and  hence  our  object -directed 
beliefs) come out as true.  We will treat this as th e position that van Inwagen 
takes, though at places (e.g. on (van Inwagen 1990) pp. 102–103) he notes that 
he could retreat to a position more closely approximating Merricks‘. In what 
follows we will find that both these responses lead the Organicist into trouble.  
 
5.1   Merricks on the falsity of our object speech and beliefs 
Taking the first of these options, Merricks holds that claims that we might make 
about the existence of everyday non-organic objects in the normal course of life 
are false since there are no such objects.  
 
Merricks only explicitly discusses existential claims, but it is worth noting that if 
these are false then that transfers to many other areas of speech84. Given (P) we 
can take it that a sentence such as ‗that cricket ball is red‘ would turn out false if 
                                              
83 We can envisage this sort of reference failure happening in several ways. Expressions 
such as ‘this is a chair’ (said when gesturing to a chair), can be taken to be constituted by a 
referring expression ‘this’ and an object concept expression ‘chair’. Clearly, if there is no 
chair then nothing satisfies the concept ‘chair’. There will also be reference failure where 
everyday objects feature as the referent to which some non-object concept is being applied. 
e.g. ‘this chair is a bit rickety’.  
84 Since Quine (Quine 1953) it has been a philosophical commonplace that the statements 
that matter for the purposes of establishing metaphysical commitment for some category of 
entity are those which can be interpreted as involving quantifiers (see  (Devitt 1980) and 
(Jackson 1977)  (reprinted in  (Mellor and Oliver 1997) ) for good examples of how the 
technique of paraphrase plays out in a debate between nominalists and people who hold 
that there are universals). The basis for this is Quine’s claim that we can paraphrase empty 
referring terms in terms of trivial descriptions which are analysable in terms of quantifiers. 
Here, however, we are not inferring ontological commitment to the referents of referring 
expressions  from  the  use  of  those  expressions.  Rather  we  are  establishing  whether 
paraphrase would be needed in order for applications of our everyday object concepts to 
come out true.   165 
it turned out that there are no such things as cricket balls. We can suppose, that 
is,  that  in  the  absence  of  cricket  balls  there  is  no  referent  that  satisfies  the 
concept expression ‗is Red‘ in the context given. If our everyday object speech is 
false when it concerns non-living things, then so are the relevant beliefs.  
 
According  to  Merricks,  the  fact  that  everyday  object  claims  are  false,  while 
surprising, does not matter. Take the following sentence:  
 
  S1:  There is a chair that I‘m sitting upon 
 
The reason Merricks thinks that it does not matter that our everyday object 
sentences are false is that they are, as he puts it ‗nearly as good as true‘. In saying 
S1  I  have  said  something  false,  but  I  have,  according  to  Merricks,  said 
something ‗nearly as good as true‘ where: 
 
‗Any folk-ontological claim of the form ‗F exists‘ is nearly as 
good as true if and only if (i) ‗F exists‘ is false and (ii) there are 
things arranged F-wise.‘ (Merricks 2001) p. 171 
 
Thus, although I have said something false in talking about my chair, I have not 
said anything as bad as ‗there is a flying horse that I am sitting on‘, which would 
fail to be true, but also fail to be ‗nearly as good as true‘. Merricks accepts that 
our everyday speech and beliefs involve a substantive metaphysical commitment 
to the existence of chairs and that as a consequence our chair related speech is, 
for the most part, false. Suppose a person, B, says the sentence S1. According to 
Merricks this is false as there is no chair that she is sitting on. It is, however, 
‗nearly  as  good  as  true‘  because  although  there  is  no  chair,  there  are  some 
simples arranged chair-wise.  
 
Worries can be raised about this line of argument however. One concern is how 
the semantics of ‗nearly-as-good-as-truth‘ are supposed to work. There is a long 
and distinguished philosophical literature discussing what is involved in some   166 
sentence  or  proposition  being  true85.  There  is  l ess  literature86  on  what  is 
involved in something‘s being ‗nearly as good as true‘. What goes right when 
what one says is nearly as good as true? 
 
We can express what is required for any given sentence S to be true with the 
following uncontroversial truth schema:  
 
  T:   ‗S‘ is true iff S 
 
Thus when ‗there is a chair that I am sitting on‘ is true, it is because there is a 
chair that I am sitting on. We have a pretty good understanding what goes right 
when a sentence turns out to be true. We also understand why truth is a good 
thing: actions based on true beliefs are more likely to be successful, and if we 
have true beliefs that means we are in a useful way connected with how the 
world is.  Merricks‘ strategy is to ‗piggy back‘ his account of ‗nearly as good as 
true‘ upon the much better understood account of truth. If this is to work, 
however, then it must work for a wider range of sentences then the exemplar he 
gives  nearly-as-good-as-truth  conditions  for.  It  needs  to  work  not  just  for 
sentences such as ‗F exists‘, but also for sentences which predicate properties of 
everyday objects and sentences, such as S1, that claim that there are relations 
that objects stand in to other things.   
 
Merricks maintains that S1 is false, but he should accept that it is (in his terms) 
‗nearly-as-good-as-true‘. If it is not nearly-as-good-as-true then many sentences 
like it will turn out to be neither true, nor nearly as good as true. This is not a 
result that Merricks can accept. He must accept that sentences that refer to non-
living objects are nearly as good as true.  
 
                                              
85  See for instance, (Tarski 1944), (Davidson 1967), (Horwich 1998a). 
86 Though, there is some recent work which might prove fruitful in this area e.g.  (Williams 
Forthcoming).   167 
Suppose that S1 is, as Merricks must say, false, but nearly-as-good-as-true. It is 
difficult to see why this being ‗nearly as good as true‘ would be any comfort to 
us unless we can give a reason why being nearly-as-good-as true is valuable. We 
need an explanation of what goes right when something is nearly as good as true 
which is parallel to the explanation of what is right when something is true.  
 
Taking S1 as an example, we can see what such an explanation would have to 
look like. Suppose a person, B, were to utter S1 in circumstances where we 
would normally take an utterance of S1 to be true. Granting for the moment 
that there are no chairs, what ‗went right‘ when B said S1 could be glossed as 
follows:  
 
If S1 had been true, then there would have been a relation R between B 
and a chair (the ‗sitting on‘ relation) and S1 states that R is satisfied by B 
and the chair. While there is no chair, R does hold, but between B and 
some simples arranged chair-wise. Thus, while S1 is false, the relation 
that it says is satisfied is still satisfied. 
 
One  could  expand  on  this.  It  is  tempting  to  think  that  we  could  posit  a 
systematic replacement of objects referred to in our language with collections of 
simples arranged object-wise87. Wherever a sentence Fa predicates something of 
an object, we might think that it ‗is almost as good as true‘ if there are some 
simples which cooperatively satisfy F. They are almost as good as true because 
they are justified by our experience in a way that straightforwardly false beliefs 
are not. What is more, beliefs that are nearly as good as true will enable us to 
navigate  the  world  as  well  as  true  beliefs,  because  the  real  properties  and 
relations that would make true beliefs true are still captured by nearly-as-good-
as-true beliefs.  
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We might, however, ask the following question. If simples arranged object-wise 
stand in all the same relations that we thought objects stood in, why does this 
not go for reference relations as well? Why is it that when someone uses the 
word ‗chair‘ this should be interpreted as her failing to refer to a chair, rather 
then  as  her  succeeding  in  referring  to  some  simples  arranged  chairwise?  (This 
seems particularly pertinent given the ‗no-difference‘ claim that was discussed in 
the previous chapter (p. 148)). 
 
Merricks‘ position suggests that he assumes that our object concepts are such 
that in general we know what we intend them to apply to. S1 is false, according 
to Merricks, because it was intended to apply to an object, but in fact it only 
applies to some simples arranged in the manner of an object. However, if he is 
correct  then  the  world  is  phenomenally  just  as  we  take  it  to  be,  but  is 
metaphysically  quite  different  from  how  we  take  it  to  be.  Given  those 
circumstances  the  assumption  that  we  know  what  we  intend  our  object 
expressions  to  apply  to  seems  unwarranted.  It  may  be  (granting  Merricks‘ 
position  with  respect  to  what  things  are  composite)  that  what  our  object 
concepts  actually  latch  onto  is  things  that  are  not  composite.  In  this  case, 
despite what we would normally be willing to say about our object concept 
ascriptions,  it  may  be  that  our  object  concepts  pick  out  object-wise 
arrangements of simples.  
 
It is argued in earlier  chapters  that  what our object concepts map  onto are 
clusters  of  properties—regularities  in  our  environment—and  that  these  are 
caused  by  arrangements  of  simples  (arrangement-formations).  Granting  this 
claim, we have good reason to suppose that our object concepts relate to object-
wise arrangements in just the way that they would need to in order to refer to 
the object-form that they give rise to.  
 
Earlier we noted that in order to make sense of the way that object expressions 
track things in the world we need to acknowledge the causal relations involved 
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causal relations in question can be usefully filled out in terms of object forms. 
Object  forms,  it  will  be  recalled  are  those  collections  of  properties  that  are 
generated by arrangement-formations. They are also a key part of the causal 
context in which the references of object expressions are established. As was 
noted in the previous chapter; the Organicist is not in a position to deny the 
existence of object forms.  
 
My argument then is as follows: In order for there to be explanatory value to 
our  object  expressions  being  ‗nearly-as-good-as-true‘,  such  expressions  must 
capture  real  properties  and  relations  in  the  world  that  are  instantiated  by 
collections of simples arranged object-wise. These real properties are generated 
by  object-arrangement  formations  (or,  more  precisely,  by  the  efficacious 
substructure of those formations).  As these are the things that stand in the 
relevant  causal  relations  to  people  when  the  reference  of  object  terms  is 
established, they are the referents of those terms. We can put this conclusion 
loosely in Merricks‘ terms: regardless of what we think we are referring to with 
our object expressions what they actually pick out are object-wise arrangements 
of simples. This is only a loose way of putting the point because the terminology 
introduced in Chapter Two allows for a more nuanced account of object-wise 
arrangements than Merricks‘ discussion does. In particular, Merricks does not 
allow for the notion of an object form. Merricks would likely object that there is 
no  such  thing  as  an  arrangement  of  simples,  but  this  is  in  itself  somewhat 
counter-intuitive  as  once  you  have  some  simples  distributed  in  space,  their 
arrangement seems like a pleonastic addition. 
 
We  have  then,  at  least  some  reason  to  think  that  when  we  deploy  object 
concepts we succeed in referring. What we succeed in referring to are object-
forms  that  are  generated  by  object-formations  in  our  environment.  If  we 
succeed in this way, then when we use the term ‗chair‘ successfully what we are 
referring to are chairs in the only way that have of understanding the term. To 
think that there must be some more objective understanding of chair (one that 
involves, for instance, their being composite) over and above that which we   170 
actually have is to insist that our chair concepts fit in with some platonic form 
of chairness88. 
 
Were we to accept for the sake of argument that Merricks is right and there are 
no non-living composite objects, then the general failure of some predicate to 
be satisfied by everyday objects would only occur because we had failed to pick 
out some simples arranged object-wise with our object-concept. But then if the 
Organicist thesis is correct, it would be false to say that we generally fail in this 
way. For if it is correct it is object -wise arrangements that our object concepts 
refer to. But if our object concepts are satisfied, what possible sense can there 
be in a claim that there are no objects?  
 
5.2   Van Inwagen on the truth of object speech and beliefs 
Van Inwagen‘s account of our object concepts is quite different from Merricks‘. 
Van Inwagen argues that our everyday use of object concepts does not involve 
any sort of metaphysical commitment to the existence of everyday objects. This 
may  at  first  blush  appear  a  slightly  odd  position  for  him  to  hold,  but  it  is 
particularly  incongruous  in  the  context  of  his  other  views  on  the  existential 
quantifier.  
 
In (van Inwagen 1998) van Inwagen defends what he terms a ‗meta-ontology‘ 
that is ‗broadly Quinean‘89. What he means by this is that he defends the view 
that  there  is  only  one  sort  of  being  or  existence,  and  that  this  is  what  is 
expressed  formally  by  the  existential  quantifier.  He  is  quite  explicit  that  the 
existential quantifier is a translation of our normal, everyday, use of the words 
‗exists‘ and ‗is‘.   
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some way different from the ‘chair’ concept which we, as a matter of fact, do actually use. 
89 He keeps that position and develops that article in (van Inwagen 2009).   171 
It would seem then, that according to van Inwagen when one assents to the 
following sentence:  
 
  S1:    There is a chair that I am sitting on  
 
That this should be translated straightforwardly as:  
 
  P1:  x (x is a chair & I am sitting on x) 
 
By any Quinean set of standards this involves an ontological commitment.  
 
It  is  worth  noting  here  one  option  which  is  not  open  to  Organicists.  They 
cannot say that there is an arrangement which stands in the ‗sitting‘ relation to 
me. Organicist must deny that there is any implication from: 
 
  ‗There are some simples arranged chair-wise‘ 
 
To: 
 
  ‗There is a chair-wise arrangement of simples‘.  
 
While to most of us such an inference seems natural, Organicists must reject it. 
To accept such an inference would allow their opponents to say (what is argued 
here) that what we pick out with our object expressions are arrangements of 
simples. 
 
Van Inwagen however, argues that he can use the O-arranging manoeuvre in 
order to provide a paraphrase of sentences such as ‗There is a chair that I am 
sitting  on‘,  which  does  not  commit  us  to  the  existence  of  chairs  (or  to  the 
existence of chair-wise arrangements of simples). Van Inwagen ((van Inwagen 
1990), pp. 109-111) gives us three versions of the paraphrase, but they all make 
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with what he takes to be a ‗reasonably difficult case‘ ((van Inwagen 1990) p. 
108), which is ‗some chairs are heavier than some tables‘. His claim is that he 
would be able to perform a similar paraphrase for any other speech about non-
living objects. His favoured paraphrase is as follows: 
 
P2:  ‗There are xs that are arranged chairwise and there are ys that are 
arranged tablewise and the xs are heavier that the ys‘ p. 109 
 
We may extrapolate from this to the somewhat easier case introduced above. 
‗There is a chair that I am sitting on‘ becomes: 
 
P3  There  are  xs  that  are  arranged  chairwise  and  I  am  
sitting on the xs 
 
The paraphrase P3 then, contains no reference to any thing which is a chair. 
Only  xs,  which  in  this  context  are  simples,  are  quantified  over.  The  only 
ontological  commitment  here,  or  so  van  Inwagen  would  argue,  is  to  these 
simples90.  
 
This sort of paraphrase manoeuvre has become fairly common in philosophy. It 
enables Quine, for instance, to avoid commitment to universals  ((Quine 1953)). 
Standardly, however, it has been used to show how  reference to some entity or 
other does not involve one in an ontological commitment. Here, however, van 
Inwagen  is  arguing  (somewhat  quixotically  one  might  think)  that  making  an 
explicit claim that something exists (or that there is some thing of a given type) 
does not involve an ontological commitment. 
 
We may reasonably take the Quinean account of quantification defended by van 
Inwagen  in  (van  Inwagen  1998)  to  be  fairly  standard,  and  we  may  take  the 
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account  of  concept  satisfaction  encapsulated  above  in  (P)  as  standard  too. 
Given this it is most natural to read van Inwagen as proposing a non-standard 
account of the meaning of our object terms. Van Inwagen takes it to be the case 
that our everyday object speech is (for the most part) true when we think it is 
true.  But  if  that  is  the  case  then  he  is  giving  a  different  account  of  the 
satisfaction conditions for our everyday objects concepts then the standard one 
represented by (P). If the standard semantics is correct then ‗this is a chair‘ (said 
while pointing to a ‗chair receptacle‘) comes out true only if there is something 
that satisfies the concept ‗chair‘—and van Inwagen thinks it comes out true 
even though nothing satisfies that concept91. 
 
It is thus slightly surprising to find that van Inwagen explicitly denying that he 
thinks the meaning of our object expressions are captured by his paraphrases, 
for instance: 
 
‗…I will revert briefly to a topic touched on in the preceding 
section and emphasize that paraphrases are not supposed to 
capture the meanings of their originals‘ (van Inwagen 1990) 
p.112 
 
This is puzzling. If his paraphrase is not supposed to capture the meaning of 
our object speech, then there is an important lacuna in his position. He owes us 
an account of the semantics of our object terms.  Whatever account he offers 
will not be the standard one. Van Inwagen‘s master argument is that his theory 
of everyday objects is better than the alternatives. But if the superiority of his 
metaphysical theory is bought at the expense of  truth conditional semantics, 
then  that  is  a  significant  cost  to  weigh  against  the  purported  benefits  of 
Organicism. 
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they were made out of a living thing. A chair hollowed from the bough of a still living tree 
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What  van  Inwagen  does  say  is  that  the  meaning  of  our  object  speech  is 
indeterminate between the standard and paraphrased meanings92. One way of 
construing this is by saying that whi le the semantics of our everyday object 
speech might suggest (or even entail) the existence of objects, when we use such 
sentences we are speaking in a ‗loose and popular‘ way. That is, we are saying 
something which is literally false, but that what we are claiming by making that 
speech is true93.  
 
This last reading seems to be born out by the analogies that Van Inwagen uses 
to illustrate his position (e.g.  (van Inwagen 1990) p. 101). The analogy that he 
treats as ‗most instructive‘ concerns one of our contemporaries saying ‗the sun 
has moved behind the trees‘. We would not, he suggests, challenge the utterer of 
such a sentence to justify their pre-Copernican astronomy94. Van Inwagen‘s idea 
is that the same fact (the change in orientation between the speaker and the sun, 
such that the sun has been occluded by the trees) can be described in two ways, 
one of which is complicated and Copernican, one of which is ‗everyday‘ but 
simpler  and  equally  true.  Similarly  we  are  supposed  to  understand  everyday 
object  speech  as  accurately  describing  ‗the  facts‘  even  if  not  being  strictly 
correct.  
  
It has been pointed out (see (O'Leary-Hawthorne and Michael 1996)) that this is 
actually a curiously bad analogy to choose. We are very used to making sense of 
speech  about  relative  motion.  My  speed  relative  to  the  passengers  of  a  fast 
moving train will be different depending upon whether I am on the train or on 
the platform watching it go past, and we have no difficulty making sense of this 
                                              
92  This  in  fact  appears  to  be  his  position—but  if  we  accept  this  then  we  are  owed  an 
account of just what the semantics of everyday object speech do commit us to. 
93 Alternatively: our speech communicates truths even though it is false. This then, begins 
to look a lot like Merricks’ position, and it seems difficult to resist the suggestion that what is 
being communicated is that there are object-forms in the various relations that we take 
objects to be in. 
94 These analogies have been effectively criticised by Penelope Mackie (Mackie 1993). Van 
Inwagen’s general ‘compatiblist’ approach is discussed in (O'Leary-Hawthorne and Michael 
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in everyday speech95. The point is that there is a disanalogy between movement 
speech and object speech. Any plausible account of the semantics of our 
everyday speech about movements would need to take in to account the fact 
that we understand movement in a relative way. If I am standing on the station 
and I see a train shoot past and say ‗that train is going fast‘ it is plausible to 
suppose  that an account  of  the  meaning  of  that utterance, and even of  the 
sentence itself, will need to include the fact that it is moving fast relative to me. 
There is no analogous reason to suppose that the normal meaning of our object-
terms should take into account the atomic theory of matter, or the possibility 
that there are no objects. 
 
Similarly, Merricks criticises van Inwagen‘s account on the basis that while we 
might acknowledge that someone talking about the movement of the sun is 
talking  in  a  loose  way  for  convenience  sake,  this  seems  to  be  an  unlikely 
conclusion to draw concerning someone who says ‗there is a chair that I‘m 
sitting upon‘. The latter person seems to be speaking in a perfectly clear and 
precise way ((Merricks 2001) Chapter 7).  
 
We have then reason to reject the suggestion that our object speech is ‗loose and 
popular‘, and even if this were acceptable, we could still ask van Inwagen for a 
semantics of our object speech which does not make it come out false.  
 
Van Inwagen proposes four features of the paraphrase: 
 
‗(A)  The paraphrase describes the same fact as the original. 
 
(B)  The  paraphrase,  unlike  the  original  does  not  even 
appear to imply that there are any objects that occupy chair-
receptacles96.  
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(C)  The paraphrase is neutral with respect to competing 
metaphysical  theories,  viz. the  ―received‖ theory, that there 
are  objects  that  occupy  chair-receptacles,  and  the  theory  I 
have proposed according to which there are no such objects. 
 
(D)  The original, though it doubtless does not express the 
same proposition as the paraphrase, has the feature ascribed 
to  the  paraphrase  in  (C):  It  is  neutral  with  respect  to  the 
question whether there are objects that fit exactly into chair-
receptacles.‘ (van Inwagen 1990) p. 113 
 
 
His position then is that when I say ‗there is a chair that I am sitting on‘, this 
does not commit me to the existence of a chair, nor to there only being some 
simples  that  are  arranged  chairwise.  (This  makes  more  sense  when  you 
remember that for van Inwagen the difference between the truth of one or the 
other  is  just  a  matter  of  whether  the  simples  that  do  the  work  of  a  chair 
compose something).  
 
What then is the content of the sentence ‗there is a chair that I am sitting on‘ 
supposed to be? Well the clue to this can be found in the ‗no-difference‘ claim 
discussed in the last chapter. There it was noted that one of the dialectical roles 
of the O-arranging manoeuvre is to show that the world would seem just as it is, 
even if the negative ontological claim of the Organicists were true. If we grant 
this, it is somewhat plausible to suppose that whether there are chairs does not 
impact on the truth (or not) of S1. The reason for this is that S1 can be taken as 
describing the same bit of the world whether or not there are chairs, and as the 
world is qualitatively unchanged regardless of whether or not there are everyday 
objects this means the same distribution of properties in the world is described.  
 
Taking this line, we can understand van Inwagen to be saying that our everyday 
object speech is true for more or less the same reason that Merricks takes it to 
be  nearly-as-good-as  true:  because  the  properties  our  speech  picks  out  are 
instantiated and the relations that it picks out do hold, whether they are relations 
between simples arranged object-wise or relations between everyday objects.    177 
 
If this is the thought, however, then it seems as though what our object speech 
picks out is actually the collections of properties that we associate with objects 
of various kinds. To put the point in the terminology developed in Chapter Two 
of this thesis: our object concepts are satisfied by object-forms. If this is the 
conclusion, then, it has been argued here, we have no reason to suppose that 
there are no objects. If this is what our object concepts pick out, then our object 
concepts are satisfied by our environment and there are objects.  
 
It might be objected that reference to an object form is not quite the same as 
reference to an object-arrangement. It was noted in the last chapter however, 
that  an  important  role  of  the  O-arranging  manoeuvre  is  to  account  for  the 
causal  properties  of  objects.  Occurrence  of  such  properties  and  object-wise 
arrangements will coordinate in the vast majority of actual cases. What is more, 
any experience of object-wise arrangements  will  really be experiences of the 
causal properties that they produce. It seems unreasonable then to expect our 
unreflective  deployment  of  object  concepts  to  mark  a  sharp  demarcation 
between  forms  and  the  object  structures  (and  hence  the  actual  object 
formations) that give rise to them. 
 
The thesis defended earlier was that if our object concepts are satisfied then 
there are objects. It has been argued here (in Chapter 2) that contrary to what is 
supposed  by  van  Inwagen  and  Merricks,  satisfaction  of  our  object  concepts 
does  not  require  that  objects  are  composite,  particularly  given  the  arguably 
tenuous status of the ‗composition‘ relation. In the last chapter it was argued 
that  formulating  the  O-arranging  manoeuvre  requires  an  acceptance  that  we 
have object concepts. In this chapter it has been argued that by utilising the O-
arranging  manoeuvre  in  the  ways  that  they  do,  the  Organicists  commit 
themselves  to  our  object  concepts  being  satisfied.  Van  Inwagen  does  this 
directly. In Merricks‘ case we have presented a challenge to the notion that we 
can plausibly attribute a global error to people with respect to object concepts.  
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In  this  chapter  so  far  then,  we  have  seen  that  Organicists  have  taken  two 
distinct approaches to the claim that their position is contrary to our everyday 
beliefs. Merricks has accepted this claim, and van Inwagen has rejected it. We 
have seen that involved in each of these approaches are commitments to the 
way that our object concepts relate to the world. It was argued here that van 
Inwagen‘s position makes it seem clear that what satisfy our object expressions 
are object forms. The challenge for him is to say why this is not sufficient for 
there to be objects.  
 
Merricks argues that his position is contrary to our everyday beliefs and that is 
why it is surprising. It was argued above that this is difficult to make sense of 
unless our object concepts pick out arrangements of simples in the way that we 
take them to pick out objects. We suggested that the utility of Merricks‘ notion 
of nearly-as-good-as-true comes from the satisfaction of our object concepts by 
object-forms. Given this, the challenge for Merricks is to say what is ‗going 
right‘ when we say something that is ‗nearly as good as true‘ and why we should 
not treat object concepts as successfully referring to object forms.  
 
5.3  Objects and objectivity 
There  is  more  to  say  with  respect  to  Merricks‘  position  on  the  relationship 
between  our  object  concepts  and  objects.  There  are  two  places97  in which 
Merricks presents an argument that can be restructured as an argument for the 
explicit rejection of the claim that all that is required for there to be objects is 
the satisfaction of our object concepts, and this argument will be addressed in 
the last part of this chapter. The basis of Merricks‘ objection is that this would 
make  ontology,  at  least  in  part,  a  matter  of  definition.  We  could,  Merricks 
supposes,  bring  objects  into  existence  merely  by  thinking  up  new  object 
concepts.  
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This allegation, if true, would go some way to vindicating the compositional 
approach to ontology. The advantage of a compositional approach, the thought 
would go, is that it gives us a way of determining what there is that is mind 
independent. We just figure out what the basic units of matter are and then we 
can  work  out  what  other  things  there  are  by  a  priori  reasoning  about 
composition. Such an approach makes what there is a mind independent matter 
and so it must be. For the world is objective, it is (to use Bernard Williams‘ 
phrase ((Williams 1978) p. 64) ‗…what is there anyway‘.  
 
Merricks suggests the possibility of a gerrymandered object a ‗slithy tove‘ which 
he defines as the thing composed of the atoms that make up his ear and the 
atoms made up of someone else‘s nose (he dubs this other person P, but we 
shall name her Pauline Pauline). In fact, any arbitrarily selected collection of 
atoms would do for his purposes, but let us stick with the Slithy Tove.  
 
Merricks suggests that we could imagine a society where the use of the term 
‗Slithy Tove‘ is well entrenched: Where people talk about the Slithy Tove, where 
there may be laws governing the places that the Slithy Tove is allowed to be, and 
so forth. People in such a society might well say such things as ‗there is a Slithy 
Tove‘, and they might ask where the Slithy Tove is, and so on.  
 
Merricks suggests that in such a society a philosopher might claim that there is 
not really a Slithy Tove, and that people would take the same attitude to him as 
most  people  in  the  real  world  take  to  those  who  argue  for  the  negative 
ontological claim. We can call this philosopher stMerricks.  
 
The point of Merricks‘ example is that our object concepts are just that, ours. 
They are subjective in that they are the product of human minds and brains. The 
example is supposed to suggest that the idea that we can identify what there is 
by identifying which of our object concepts are satisfied is mistaken: It has (the 
argument  goes)  the  unacceptable  consequence  of  making  everyday  physical 
objects mind dependent (though one might still be tempted to take the line that   180 
it is better for them to be mind-dependent than non existent). We can in fact 
strengthen the argument in order to frame it as an explicit rejection of the idea 
(argued  for  in  Chapter  Two  of  this  thesis)  that  if  our  object  concepts  are 
satisfied there are objects. 
 
In order to see how the argument will work we need to compare our world to 
Slithy  Tove  world.  Physically  they  are  very  nearly  identical;  if  there  are  any 
differences at all they will be in the physical realisation of mental states required 
for  the  inhabitants  to  think  about  the  Slithy  Tove  and  in  changes  in  the 
distribution of objects that arise from rules related to the Slithy Tove. None of 
these sorts of differences would normally be thought relevant to ontology as a 
whole.  
 
Merricks‘ argument then can be laid out as follows (see for example (Merricks 
2001) chapter 1 section 3):  
 
1)  Given the physical similarities between our world and Slithy Tove world, 
we should suppose that all of the same objects exist on each world: since 
there  is  no  significant  physical  difference  between  the  worlds,  there 
should be no object in one world that is not also in the other world. 
2)  There is no Slithy Tove in our world. 
3)  People in Slithy Tove world believe that there is a Slithy Tove.  
4)  Since (from 1) and 2)) there is no Slithy Tove, people on Slithy Tove 
world believe something false and stMerricks is right. 
 
The  conclusion  we  are  supposed  to  draw  is  that  we  are  analogous  in  our 
attitudes to objects to the way that people on Slithy Tove world are in their 
attitudes to the Slithy Tove: if their belief in the Slithy Tove is unfounded then 
so is our belief in everyday objects. 
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We can also run the argument as targeting explicitly the following claim:  
 
Simple Ontology (SO):  All that is required for there to be an object 
o  is  for  our  object  concept  <O>  to  be 
satisfied. 
 
The argument, so structured, runs as follows:  
1)  SO: All that is required for there to be an object o is for  our object 
concept <O> to be satisfied       (for reductio) 
2)  Given the physical similarities between our world and Slithy Tove world, 
we should suppose that all of the same objects exist on each world: since 
there  is  no  significant  physical  difference  between  the  worlds,  there 
should be no object in one world that is not also in the other world. 
3)  There is no Slithy Tove in our world 
4)  There is no Slithy Tove in Slithy Tove world   (from 2) and 3)).  
5)  The ‗Slithy Tove‘ concept is satisfied in Slithy Tove world. 
6)  There is a Slithy Tove in Slithy Tove world    (from 1), and 5)) 
7)  But then there both is and is not a Slithy Tove in Slithy Tove world 
(from 6 and 4) 
 
This argument is presented here because the response to it helps to clarify a 
point about the notion of objects that is defended in this thesis and because the 
argument presents a challenge to the account of objects suggested in Chapter 
Two. 
 
We  might  respond  to  this  argument  by  asking  what  would  happen  were  a 
person from Slithy Tove world to be invited to our own world and introduced 
to Merricks and Pauline. Presumably the person from Slithy Tove world would 
be just as capable of deploying their concept in our world as in their own. She 
would be able to claim not just that there is a Slithy Tove in her world, but also 
that there is one in our own world (she might, for instance, express shock at our 
lack of rules governing the whereabouts of the Slithy Tove).    182 
 
The point of this is that the third premise of the reductio (and the second premise 
of Merricks argument as laid out above) is unsupported. In his presentation of 
his version of the argument Merricks merely assumes that if universalism about 
composition is not true than it must be the case that there is no Slithy Tove. But 
why not say just that the Slithy Tove in our world has not been identified as 
such? The Slithy Tove is, after all, nothing more than an arbitrarily stipulated 
collection of simples. It does not have the same sort of functional and causal 
status as an object such as a chair. What is more, we need not have specified the 
simples to be included in the Slithy Tove in terms of composition; we could just 
as well have specified it in terms of the ‗simples constituting Merrick‘s ear and 
Pauline‘s nose‘. The object concept for Slithy Tove as deployed in Slithy Tove 
world does not require for its satisfaction anything more than the existence of 
Merricks‘ ear and Pauline‘s ear; it is not a particularly substantial concept. 
 
Merricks‘ basis for not considering this option presumably lies in the way that 
he initially defined the Slithy Tove. The Slithy Tove as defined by Merricks is 
that thing composed of the atoms arranged his ear wise and Pauline‘s nose wise. 
The important relation for Merricks is composition: he takes it to be the case 
that there is no Slithy Tove because no one but a universalist would take those 
atoms  to  compose  something.  But  we  argued  in  Chapter  One  that  whether 
composition  takes  place  or  not  is  not  what  matters  in  determining  whether 
some everyday object exists. As was argued in Chapter One, there is nothing in 
the  notion  of  composition  appealed  to  by  Organicists  to  rule  out  everyday 
objects being simples. If that is true of other everyday objects, then there is no 
reason to think it would not also be true for a Slithy Tove. At least, that is the 
case if we are to take seriously the idea that there could be a valid analogy 
between the Slithy Tove and everyday objects98. At this stage to just claim that 
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composite, then there is (given the argument of Chapter One) no reason to suppose that 
one can draw an analogy between the Slithy Tove and everyday objects (which could be 
simple).    183 
we must assume that this notion of composition is the basis for determining 
what there is merely begs the question. 
 
Even so, one might think that the example shows that endorsing SO entails that 
we  must  accept  that  objects  are  mind-dependent  or  subjective.  Some  of 
Merricks‘ remarks would seem to suggest that this is what he thinks is at issue: 
 
‗Let me focus on what I think is the fundamental point at 
issue. I assume that there is an objective fact of the matter 
about  what  exists.  And  I  think  we  use  the  apparatus  of 
existential  quantification—expressions  like  ‗there  is‘,  ‗there 
are‘, and ‗exists‘—to say what (we believe) objectively exists. 
But there is nothing magical about ‗there is‘, ‗there are‘, or 
‗exists‘. We control them; they do not control us. So we can 
use these bits of language however we choose. Thus we could 
use  them  ‗deviantly‘,  to  do  something  other  than  describe 
what (we believe) exists. For example, we could use ‗there is 
an F‘ to mean we wish there were an F.‘ (Merricks 2001) p. 18 
 
Merricks goes on to argue that his use of ‗there is‘ (the one which he supposes 
entails that there are no non-living everyday objects and no Slithy Toves either) 
is the non-deviant one. The insinuation being that if we endorse SO here we are 
thereby  accepting  a  deviant  meaning  for  exist  (one  which  allows  for  the 
introduction of arbitrary objects). But allowing that there could be a Slithy Tove 
in both worlds does not commit us to any deviant notion of existence. What 
determines whether or not the ‗Slithy Tove‘ concept is satisfied is entirely mind 
independent, what is not (and cannot be) mind independent is the concept itself. 
This is just as we should expect. 
 
The Slithy Tove argument is presented, in part, as a response to what Merricks 
terms the ‗linguistic charge‘. The ‗linguistic charge‘ is the charge that Organicism 
is somehow self-contradictory because ‗there is a statue‘ just means ‗there is a 
statue-wise arrangement of simples‘99.  
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the linguistic charge. Thomasson develops a notion of ‘analytical entailment’ whereby one   184 
 
In objecting to this, Merricks writes as follows: 
 
‗If  the  linguistic  charge's  assumption  about  the  ordinary 
meaning of ‗there is a statue‘ is correct, ‗there is a statue‘ does 
not  ordinarily  mean  that  there  is  some  x,  such  that  x  is  a 
statue. It means, instead, that there are some things, none of 
which  is  a  statue,  in  certain  arrangements.  Thus  if  the 
linguistic  charge's  claim  about  ordinary  meaning  is  correct, 
then  ‗there  is‘  is  used  deviantly  in  ordinary  occurrences  of 
‗there is a statue‘. Eliminativism has nothing to say about such 
deviancy. Eliminativism claims only that ‗there is a statue‘ is 
false  when  ‗there  is‘  is  being  used  as  a  legitimate  and 
straightforward existential quantifier.‘ (Merricks 2001) p. 18–
19 
 
 
Merricks‘ point here is this: the semantics of our language require that in order 
for ‗there is a statue‘ to be true there must be some one thing that is a statue, it 
is not enough for there merely to be a number of things which do all the things 
that a statue do. Given the way that he construes the linguistic objection, this is 
not  an  unreasonable  point  for  Merricks  to  make.  It  has  here  been  argued, 
however, that we have reason to suppose that whenever we are in a position to 
say that there is an object-wise arrangement, there is an object-form present 
which we can treat as the reference of the object-term. Thus, if someone says 
‗there is a chair‘, this is true just in case there is a chair-wise arrangement of 
simples. The novel feature of the position taken here is that we need not think 
that composition is relevant. 
 
We need not think that what is deviant here is the understanding of existence or 
the meaning of the words ‗there is a‘. We can agree on what ‗exists‘ means and 
on ‗there is a‘, and we can allow for the sake of argument that Organicists might 
                                                                                                                                
statement analytically entails another if, given what both statements mean, the same states 
of affairs must obtain for one to be true as must obtain for the other to be true. This would 
be the case for ‘there is a statue’ and ‘there is a statue-wise arrangement’ because ‘statue-
wise arrangement’ has been stipulated by Organicists to be true just when we would think 
that ‘there is a statue’ is true. Thomasson’s formulation of an analytic entailment will be 
discussed in slightly more detail in Chapter Seven.    185 
be  able  to  demonstrate  that  statues  are  non-composite.  This  would  be  a 
surprising fact about statues. It would not show that they do not exist.  
 
We have considered one plausible option for rejecting the Slithy Tove argument, 
the option of allowing that there could be a Slithy Tove in this world. Another 
option, which may appeal to sortalists is to suppose that there is a Slithy Tove in 
Slithy Tove world, but not our own. As has been noted already (see Section 3.3) 
sortalists already hold that some objects exist only because they were created in 
given  social  contexts.  If  they  already  hold  this,  then  they  should  have  no 
compunction  about  denying  premise  two  of  the  reductio  (premise  one  of 
Merricks‘  argument).  If  they  accept  that  social  context  is  important  in 
establishing what sorts of objects there are there is no reason for them to accept 
that two worlds which are physically identical (except in terms of the brain-
states of its inhabitants) must have the same objects in them. What is more, 
sortalists are not thereby guilty of any sort problematic idealism: the difference 
between ST world and our own is not that there is more matter in one than the 
other, it is just that in one world some of that matter constitutes something that 
the corresponding matter in the other world does not. 
 
5.4  Object concepts revisited 
One of the reasons that the Slithy Tove argument is misleading is because it 
seems  to  suggest  that  there  may  be  something  slightly  arbitrary  about  our 
everyday object concepts. It suggests that the concept of a Slithy Tove stands in 
just as good standing as the concept of a chair. This though, is not quite right. 
Although  our  object-concepts  are  generated  by  us,  they  are  not  generated 
arbitrarily  or  randomly.  They  are  generated  in  response  to  stimuli  in  our 
environment.  
 
Part of the issue here is what is involved in something‘s being an object concept. 
Object concepts are those concepts that pick out things, that in Aristotelian 
terms, things can be said-of (Metaphysics Z in (Aristotle 1984)). That is, object   186 
concepts are those concepts which pick out the bits of our environment of 
which things may be said, rather than those concepts that merely say things 
about bits of our environment. As was discussed earlier (in Section 2.2) we have 
here, in deference to the Organicists, restricted our discussion, for the most 
part, to object concepts, rather than ‗sortal‘ concepts. Even so, we will need to 
note that object concepts are not, on the account presented here, just developed 
arbitrarily. In Chapter  Two it was argued that our object concepts  are, as a 
matter  of  fact,  generated  in  response  to  collections  of  regularities  in  our 
environment—that is, object forms. In this chapter, I have argued that it is these 
forms, as caused by object-arrangements, that our object concepts pick out.  
 
We  also  noted  in  Chapter  Two  that  in  many  cases  there  are  social  roles 
associated with objects. We might think that there is a class of objects which are 
very largely socially determined; that the social role does actually determine that 
the form caused by some particular collection of matter constitutes a thing of a 
given kind. Thus, we might think that what makes a particular object form a 
‗chair‘ rather than just a ‗wooden artefact‘ is the fact that it has a certain social 
role100. Organicists, while accepting that there are concepts such as this, and 
social roles, and allowing that these roles are performed, must deny t hat there 
are objects which do the performing.  
 
In  the  previous  chapter  it  was  argued  that  by  deploying  the  O-arranging 
manoeuvre Organicists commit themselves to there being object-arrangements 
in our environment that are causally responsible for object forms. They commit 
themselves to the things necessary, on the account presented here, for there to 
be everyday objects.  
 
 
                                              
100 If one were tempted by this sort of line, however, it would be best to adopt a full on 
sortalism. From a sortalist position it would not be terribly problematic to suggest that the 
same object-form constituted more than one object (thus, that the collection of properties 
constituting a statue also constitute a piece of gold) .   187 
In this chapter we have looked at the consequences of the Organicist thesis for 
theories about the meaning of our everyday object terms. It has been argued 
that the Organicist has two options; either ascribe a global error with respect to 
our normal beliefs about everyday objects or develop an alternative semantics 
for our object speech and object beliefs. It was argued that both options lead 
the Organicist to a position where it is hard for them to deny that what our 
object concepts actually map onto are collections of properties generated by 
arrangements of simples: object forms. This leads us to the conclusion that, 
even if we grant the Organicists‘ thesis about composition our object concepts 
are still satisfied. In earlier chapters it was argued that the satisfaction of our 
object concepts is sufficient for the existence of objects, and in the last part of 
this chapter this claim was defended against one of Merricks‘ arguments.  
 
The next two chapters will show how the theory of everyday objects developed 
so  far  can  be  used  to  respond  to  some  of  the  positive  arguments  that 
Organicists have put forward in favour of their position. Two lines of argument 
that  have  been  advanced  by  Eliminativists  about  everyday  objects  will  be 
targeted. One line of argument is the claim (heavily involving the O-arranging 
manoeuvre) that everyday objects, if they existed, would be causally superfluous 
as  all  the  causal  work  that  we  attribute  to  objects  is  really  done  by  simples 
arranged in an object-wise fashion. The other argument to be addressed is the 
argument from utility: the argument that Organicism does better at dealing with 
puzzle  cases  (such  as  the  Ship  of  Theseus  and  the  Sorites  puzzles)  about 
everyday objects than other theories of everyday objects. I will argue that the 
best they can claim is that they do as well as other theories, and that therefore 
the  benefits  they  claim  to  enjoy  in  relation  to  these  puzzles  are  in  fact 
misappropriated.  
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So far in this thesis I have presented a positive argument against the Organicists‘ 
negative ontological claim. I presented two lines of argument. Firstly, I argued 
that Organicists are not able to draw the ontological conclusions that they want 
to on the basis of the notion of composition that they have at their disposal. 
Secondly, I argued that our object-concepts are, in the only way they can be, 
satisfied and that this gives us reason to conclude that there are objects. In the 
last two chapters we saw the role of the O-arranging manoeuvre in making the 
Organicist position a plausible addition to ontological debate, and I argued that 
by deploying the O-arranging manoeuvre Organicists commit themselves to just 
those conditions that I argued in earlier chapters are required for the existence 
of objects.  
 
In this chapter and the next we will address some of the positive arguments for 
the Organicist position. It might seem a little unusual to leave the discussion of 
the positive arguments of one‘s opponents this far into the thesis. Here it has 
been done for two reasons. Firstly, in the case of Organicism to actually address 
the  arguments  discussed  in  this  chapter  is  to  concede  something.  It  is  to 
acknowledge that the O-arranging manoeuvre is effective enough that the self-
evident falsity of the Organicists‘ position has been mitigated. One thing that 
Organicists claim about their position is that it does a better job of dealing with 
the traditional philosophical puzzles about everyday objects (such as the sorites 
paradox and the Ship of Theseus paradox) then other theories do, but this claim 
is only worth testing if their position gets off the ground at all. If this thesis is 
correct, then one might think that the Organicist position is not strong enough   189 
to pass this test. Secondly, it was necessary to establish the positive theory of 
objects presented in Chapters Two and Three in order to provide the tools for 
showing why the Organicist arguments discussed in this section are unsound.  
 
Two lines of Organicist argument will be discussed in this chapter and the next. 
This chapter discusses the argument from over-determination that constitutes 
Merricks‘ master argument for the negative ontological claim. The next chapter 
will discuss the claim that Organicism does better at dealing with ‗the puzzles‘ 
then other positions with respect to ontology. The point of this chapter and the 
next  is  not  to  refute  these  arguments  so  much  as  to  show  that,  given  the 
arguments presented in this thesis, the argumentative burden still lies with the 
Organicist.  
6.1  The argument from overdetermination 
In Chapter three of Objects and Persons Merricks presents his master argument for 
Eliminativism with respect to non living everyday objects101. Merricks takes the 
O-arranging  manoeuvre,  together  with  the  traditional  puzzles  concerning 
everyday objects  to give us  reason  to be agn ostic  about  the existence of 
everyday  objects  (see  (Merricks  2001)   p.73).  The  argument  from 
overdetermination is supposed to give us reason to exclude them from our 
ontology.  
 
The basic idea of the argument from overdetermination comes from the ‗no 
causal difference‘ claim discussed in Chapter Four. That claim was that if there 
were no everyday objects the distribution of causal properties through the world 
would be unaffected. It is made plausible by the O-arranging manoeuvre. The 
argument is that since everything that we take objects to be causally responsible 
for is actually the causal responsibility of simples arranged object-wise, objects 
are,  in  themselves,  causally  superfluous.  The  conclusion  drawn  is  that  since 
                                              
101 In the remainder of this chapter we will need to remember that Merricks does not take 
his exclusion argument to apply to people.   190 
objects are not causally efficacious, we have reason to remove them from our 
ontology; that is, to conclude that they do not exist.  
 
Merricks is not the only person to argue in this way. Cian Dorr (Dorr 2002) also 
advances  a  version  of  the  overdetermination  argument.  Dorr‘s  is  a  more 
thoroughgoing  Eliminativism  about  everyday  objects  than  Merricks‘.  Dorr 
argues  that  there  is  nothing  beyond  simples,  thereby  excluding  from  his 
ontology those composite objects which Merricks includes, that is, living things. 
Dorr seeks to make this plausible with a ‗fictionalism‘ about everyday objects102.  
 
Dorr‘s  fictionalism  depends  upon  a  version  of  the  O-arranging  manoeuvre 
whereby it is held to be the case that there is an O-wise arrangement iff it is ‗true 
in the fiction‘ where there are composite objects that there is an O. The idea is 
that  there  is  a  distinction  to  be  drawn  between  the  conditions  under  which 
statements about everyday objects are correct, where this comes to something 
like ‗acceptable assertions given the linguistic standards of the language speaking 
community‘ and the conditions under which such statements are ‗true‘. To make 
sense of this we can say that ‗correct‘ statements about everyday objects are true 
‗in the fiction‘ that there are composite objects. 
 
As  we  shall  see,  the  details  of  Dorr‘s  and  Merricks‘  arguments  are  slightly 
different. What they have in common is that they take it i) that the properties of 
macroscopic objects are overdetermined by microscopica; ii) that if this is the 
case, then objects are epiphenomena; and iii) that if macroscopic objects are 
epiphenomena then this provides sufficient reason to conclude that there are no 
macroscopic objects.  
 
 
 
 
                                              
102 For a more recent development of his position, see (Dorr, 2005).    191 
Merricks argument is as follows:  
 
1.  ‗Object O—if O exists—is causally irrelevant to whether its parts  
P 1 . . . P n , acting in concert, cause effect E.  
2.  P 1 . . . P n cause E.  
3.  E is not overdetermined.  
Therefore,  
4.  If O exists, O does not cause E‘  ((Merricks 2001) pp. 79–80) 
 
We will see below that causal exclusion arguments such as this are generally 
filled out in terms of two distinct causes being sufficient to cause the same 
effect. In this case, Merricks is trying to use the notion of ‗causal irrelevance‘ to 
do  the  work  that  causal  sufficiency  does  for  others103.  This  use  of  ‗causal 
irrelevance‘ will be discussed below. 
 
This  then  is  Merricks  argument  to  the  conclusion  that  everyday  objects  are 
epiphenomena. If the parts of an object cause an effect, and the object itself is 
not relevant to their so doing, then the object is an epiphenomenon. He takes 
this  to  be  sufficient  reason  (given  the  O-arranging  manoeuvre)  for  us  to 
conclude that there are no non-living objects. To reach this conclusion one has 
to suppose that overdetermination is a problem; that if objects and their parts 
overdetermine  their  macroscopic  effects  that  this  means  that  we  should 
eliminate one or other of them from our ontology.  
 
Dorr also argues that objects and their parts over-determine their effects. His 
argument, by contrast with Merricks‘, does not make explicit use of any sort of 
notion of ‗causal irrelevance‘. It runs as follows104: 
 
                                              
103  The  causal  exclusion  argument  in  the  philosophy  mind  is  usually  premised  on  the 
completeness of physics. The point being that if physical causes are sufficient explanations 
for all events, then mental causes appear superfluous. For discussions of this see, e.g. 
(Papineau 1990), (Crane 1995).  
104 I have changed th e way that simples are referred to, to bring them in line with van 
Inwagen’s terminology and that of the rest of this thesis, otherwise this is a quote from (Dorr 
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‗P1   If the xs had been arranged as they actually are but 
composed nothing, all the microphysical facts would 
have been just as they actually are. 
P2   If  all  the  microphysical  facts  had  been  just  as  they 
actually  are,  and  the  xs  had  been  arranged  as  they 
actually  are  but  composed  nothing,  then  everything 
else would have been just the same. 
C1   So, if the xs had been arranged as they actually are but 
composed nothing, everything else would have been 
just the same. 
P3   If  C1  is  true,  then  the  thing  the  xs  compose  is  an 
epiphenomenon. 
C2   So the thing the xs compose is an epiphenomenon.‘  
((Dorr 2002) pp. 42–43) 
 
The idea here is that as the world would be causally just the same even if there 
were no objects, objects must be superfluous. 
 
The  arguments,  while  differing  in  detail,  nonetheless  have  a  good  deal  in 
common. They both rely on the idea that whatever causal effects we attribute to 
objects could really be attributed to the collective action of their parts. Merricks 
and Dorr go on to argue that this sort of overdetermination would be sufficient 
reason to conclude that there are no objects.  
 
It  is  worth  considering  then,  whether  or  not  it  is  in  fact  the  case  that 
‗overdetermination‘ would be problematic for everyday objects, and if it would, 
whether there is anything that someone who wished to defend everyday objects 
could say in response to people deploying causal exclusion arguments. 
 
Sider (Sider 2003) argues that we should grant that over-determination takes  
place, and then question what is wrong with this sort of overdetermination. He 
canvasses  and  rejects  three  reasons  for  supposing  over-determination  to  be 
objectionable,  which  he  terms  the  ‗metaphysical  objection‘,  the  ‗coincidence 
objection‘ and the ‗epistemic objection‘. Of these, only the ‗epistemic‘ objection 
seems to be a contender for being the source of the Eliminativists‘ worries.  
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The ‗coincidence‘ objection is that if epiphenomenal-objects‘ effects are over-
determined by the effects of their parts, it would be a striking coincidence that 
the epiphenomenal-objects went everywhere their parts went and did everything 
that their parts did. If anyone has argued this in the case of everyday objects, 
then Sider is right to say that this is a bad argument. The ‗coincidence objection‘ 
is  not  a  good  reason  to  reject  epiphenomenalism.  The  problem  with 
epiphenomenalism is not that it makes it ‗coincidental‘ that objects do the same 
things  as  their  parts.  Even  positing  the  sorts  of  causally  inert  objects  that 
Merricks and Dorr seem to be suggesting that we are committed to if we believe 
in everyday objects, it would not be a coincidence that they do the same things 
as their parts. As Sider remarks:  
 
‗It is no coincidence that baseballs and their parts, or mental 
and physical events, are correlated, given the necessary truths 
governing these correlations‘ (Sider 2003) 
 
This  though,  is  not  the  basis  of  either  Dorr‘s  or  Merricks‘  objection  to 
overdetermination. 
 
The  ‗metaphysical  objection‘  is  supposed  to  be  that  there  is  something 
metaphysically  incoherent  in  thinking  that  there  are  epiphenomenal  objects. 
Sider argues that it is not ‗metaphysically incoherent‘ to suppose that objects and 
their  parts  both  cause  the  same  effects.  He  suggests  that  this  ‗metaphysical 
objection‘ depends upon an unsatisfactory metaphor for causation that treats it 
as a kind of fluid that can be ‗used up‘. As he notes, we can treat either objects 
or  their  parts  as  the  causal  relata  in  any  of  the  contemporary  accounts  of 
causation105. As Sider notes ((Sider 2003) p. 3), we can fit either a ball, or its 
parts equally well into any of the contemporary theories of causation . In terms 
of fitting them into a counterfactual analysis106, for instance, there seems little to 
choose between the claim: 
                                              
105  It  is  natural  given  the  view  of  properties  assumed  in  this  thesis  to  take  property 
instances or tropes as the causal relata. See, for instance (Whittle 2003).  
106 See (Lewis 1973) for a defence of the counterfactual theory of causation.   194 
 ‗The window would not have broken had it not been hit by the ball‘  
And the claim: 
‗The window would not have broken had it not been hit by the atoms 
arranged ball-wise‘. 
This objection too though appears to be something of a straw-man.  
 
What Sider refers to as the ‗epistemic objection‘ is the claim that ‗we have no 
reason to believe in overdetermining entities‘. The idea behind this objection is 
that unless objects are independently causally effective, there is no reason to 
posit them. We can, therefore, apply Ockham‘s razor in order to eliminate them. 
Sider concedes that this is not in itself an unreasonable argument, but suggests 
that it only counts as a response to the argument that we should posit everyday 
objects because they are causal relata; that they are needed as the causal ground 
of our experiences. It is not, according to Sider, in itself a reason to reject the 
existence of objects. From Sider‘s theoretical position this is no doubt true107; he 
defends a Universalism with respect to objects and offers theoretical arguments 
in support of it (see (Sider 2001)). If such is your theoretical starting position, 
then you already believe that any collection of simples will compose something 
and it will seem obvious that whether or not t hey are causally effective will be 
irrelevant to this (though it is not obvious that every day objects are what they 
compose108).  Nonetheless,  the over -determination argument  does  present  a 
challenge for the position argued for in the current thesis.   In the remainder of 
this  chapter  we  will  examine  what  is  wrong  with  the  over -determination 
argument for the non-existence of objects. 
 
Ockham‘s razor tells us not to posit entities beyond those necessary. What the 
over-determination  argument  does  is  give  a  criterion  for  determining  what 
                                              
107 Though see (Merricks 2003) for his response to this argument. 
108 Unger can be read as arguing that there are physical objects, but that none of them are 
suitable for satisfying ou r object concepts (see  (Unger 1979) and (Unger 1980)), this is 
noted in (van Inwagen 1990) p. 73.   195 
things  are  ‗necessary‘  and  what  things  are  not  necessary109.  What  Merricks 
argues for is the application of Ockham‘s razor to the question of everyday 
objects, and as he notes, these are the sorts of things that we would expect to be 
causally effective. His target here is not the Universalist, who has already given 
up  ‗folk  mereology‘  and  holds  counterintuitive  views  about  objects,  but 
someone who has something like a pre-philosophical conception of objects. The 
argument rests in part on a sort of constrained principle of sufficient causes 
((Kim 1989) makes a similar point): 
 
Principle of sufficient cause:   If A is sufficient to cause E, then B (such 
that A≠B) is not necessary to cause E 
 
Since objects are the sorts of things that would be causally efficacious if they 
existed, this principle, if correct, would be a plausible way to give content to the 
‗beyond  necessity‘  part  of  Ockham‘s  razor.  If  it  is  correct  then  it  would  be 
appropriate to eliminate everyday objects from our ontology if there were other 
entities in existence which were sufficient to cause everything that they cause.  
 
The principle of sufficient cause, however, is clearly not correct. The condition 
that B is not identical to A is far too unrestrictive. Consider for instance a 
cricket ball causing a window to break. Suppose A to be the ball, and B to be a 
segment of the ball that takes in three quarters of the mass of the ball. A is not 
identical to B, but it may well be that B is none the less necessary in order for 
the window to break. To make the principle of sufficient cause plausible we 
would need to strengthen it with a notion of independence:  
 
Strong Principle of sufficient cause:   If A is sufficient to cause E, then B 
(such  that  A  and  B  are  causally 
independent)  is  not  necessary  to 
cause E 
                                              
109 See (Kim 1989)    196 
 
Now however, we have a notion of causal independence built into our principle 
of sufficient causation. As we shall see shortly, this notion of ‗independence‘ is 
the key to evaluating arguments from over-determination110.  
 
Both Merricks‘ argument and Dorr‘s take their inspiration from the sort of over-
determination  arguments  that  philosophers  of  mind  (see  (Kim  1989)  and 
discussions in (Papineau 1990) and (Crane 1995)) use against overdetermination 
of  the  mental.  The  original  idea  there,  as  developed  in  (Kim  1989)  is 
metaphysical and applies to the apparently systematic way that behaviour can be 
ascribed  both  mental  and  physical  causes.  It  is  that  two  separate  causal 
explanations of the same explanandum, where one (or both) of the explanations 
is  by  itself  sufficient  to  account  for  the  explanandum,  must  tend  either  to 
collapse into each other or to be mutually exclusive. One way for explanations 
to collapse into each other would be for it to turn out that the things referred to 
in each of the explanations were not really independent of each other; that what 
were taken to be separate causes were really the same cause.  
 
In  the  mental  case  we  can  illustrate  (slightly  simplistically)  how  such  an 
argument  might  go.  Suppose  that  there  is  some  piece  of  behaviour  B  that 
requires  explanation.  There  might  be  an  explanation  of  B  in  terms  of 
neurological  states  N,  and  another  explanation  of  B  in  terms  of  the 
propositional attitudes P that we normally ascribe to people. The suggestion is 
that if the behaviour can be explained wholly in terms of the neuralogical states, 
then there is no work for the explanation in terms of beliefs to do. It might be, 
however,  that  there  is  an  explanation  which  unifies  both  of  these  available 
explanations, by, for instance, showing how the propositional attitude states are 
related intimately to neurological states. In that situation, we would have one 
explanation rather than two.  
                                              
110  See  (Bennett  2003),  for  a  discussion  of  the  exclusion  problem  concerning  mental 
causation which reaches a similar conclusion.    197 
 
Dorr‘s and Merricks‘ claim is that there cannot be two causes for the same 
effect, and that if there were objects as well as their parts then there would be 
two causes for almost any effect we cared to name. As in the case of explanatory 
exclusion, however, we must hold that any principle of causal exclusion must 
include some notion of independence; that two causes being attributed to an 
effect only over-determine it if they are in fact independent.  
 
Both Merricks‘ and Dorr‘s arguments then must be consistent with and depend 
upon  the  following  plausible  principle  or  risk  turning  out  straightforwardly 
invalid: 
 
No-overdetermination:    It  is  never  the  case  that  one  effect  has  two 
independent causes 
 
They have to depend on this principle because a version of the principle of 
sufficient  cause  that  does  not  build  in  the  ‗independence‘  clause  is  simply 
implausible given the sorts of things that we are talking about. Certainly, we can 
think of events of a kind that have two or more interrelated causes111 (though 
clearly much will depend here on what we mean by ‗independent‘). Just to be 
clear, the point here is not that Merricks and Dorr do in fact appeal to such a 
principle, but rather that without it their position is not plausible.  
 
As we shall see below, Dorr needs no-overdetermination in order to make his 
premise  P3,  plausible.  Without  it  there  is  no  reason  to  think  that  the  thing 
composed by ‗the xs‘ would be epiphenomenal; both the composite object and 
the parts could be responsible for the way things are. Merricks seems to accept 
the need for some sort of independence requirement. It is this that Merricks‘ 
                                              
111  To  use  a  sporting  example,  we  might  suppose  that  a  particular  try  in  rugby  has  a 
number of related causes, including the speed of the winger who caused it and the fact that 
a dummy runner, knowing about the speed of the winger and seeing what was happening 
caused the defenders to go the wrong way…   198 
notion  of  ‗causal  irrelevance‘  is  supposed  to  be  capturing.  He  offers  us  the 
following as sufficient conditions for an object O‘s being causally irrelevant to 
whether some simples (‗the xs‘) cause an effect E: 
 
‗O is not one of the xs,  
O is not a partial cause of E alongside the xs,  
none of the xs cause O to cause E, and 
O does not cause any of the xs to cause E‘  
(Merricks 2001) p. 58 
 
While these conditions would be sufficient to rule out the of a ¾ ball over-
determining an effect ascribed to a whole ball, in what follows it will be argued 
that these conditions are not sufficient for causal independence and that under 
any  plausibly  relevant  notion  of  causal  independence,  objects  are  not 
independent of their parts.  
 
So what is involved in being causally independent? I argued above that in order 
for a claim that some event is over-determined (and therefore that one of the 
causes is epiphenomenal) to be reasonable, we have to be able to show that the 
two causes do not, under scrutiny, turn out to be either identical or so closely 
related as to be not really distinct. In addition we have to show that they are not 
in fact ‗partial causes‘ of the same effect.  
 
Merricks‘ (p. 57) notion of ‗causal irrelevance‘ seems to be required to do similar 
work.  Otherwise,  we  might  ask  what  it  is  doing  in  his  argument.  Why,  for 
instance, would he not just argue as follows: 
 
M1.  P1 . . . P n cause E.  
M2.  E is not overdetermined.  
M3.  If P  1 . . . P  n cause E and E is not overdetermined, then If O 
exists, O does not cause E  
Therefore,  
M4.  If O exists, O does not cause E    199 
 
Premise M3 (like Dorr‘s premise P3) would require an assumption of what we 
above  termed  ‗no-overdetermination‘  in  order  to  make  it  plausible.  We  can 
charitably see the introduction of the notion of causal irrelevance as an attempt 
to make this assumption explicit. If this is the case however, it fails. It fails 
because it is question begging.  
 
Merricks fits his conditions for causal irrelevance into the causal principle that 
underwrites his version of the argument from over-determination:  
 
‘Causal Principle. Suppose: O is an object. The xs are objects. 
O is causally irrelevant to whether the xs, acting in concert, 
cause a certain effect E (i.e. O is not one of the xs, O is not a 
partial cause of E alongside the xs, none of the xs cause O to 
cause E, and O does not cause any of the xs to cause E). The 
xs,  acting  in  concert,  do  cause  E.  And  E  is  not 
overdetermined. It follows from all this that O does not cause 
E.‘ ((Merricks 2001) p. 58) 
 
The problem is that upon reflection no one who supposes that macroscopic 
objects cause things to happen is likely to accept these conditions as sufficient 
for causal irrelevance. They are unlikely to accept them precisely because they 
do not, in fact, capture the sort of independence we think is necessary for two 
causes to overdetermine an effect. To see this, compare Merricks‘ list, with the 
following one:  
 
  O is causally irrelevant to whether the xs cause E iff:  
    O is not one of the xs,  
O is not a partial cause of E alongside the xs,  
none of the xs cause O to cause E,  
O does not cause any of the xs to cause E, and 
It is not the case that the actions of the xs give rise to the object-
form of O112 
                                              
112 See Chapter Two for a definition of ‘object form’.   200 
 
This last condition  seems like a perfectly plausible addition to  the  sufficient 
conditions  for  causal  irrelevance.  The  least  that  can  be  said  is  that  the 
relationship  between  the  matter  that  gives  rise  to  objects  and  the  objects 
themselves is intimate enough to throw the plausibility of an ‗independence‘ 
claim in to question. We might go further, and suggest that it is always going to 
be implausible to suppose that an object and its parts (if you go in for that sort 
of thing) or an object and the matter that it is causally dependent upon could be 
regarded as two separate causes of a particular event.  
 
Thomasson ((Thomasson 2007) pp. 17–20) puts some effort into responding to 
Merricks‘  charge  of  over-determination.  She  too  targets  Merricks‘  notion  of 
‗causal irrelevance‘. 
 
Thomasson argues that the independence condition fails in the case of everyday 
objects, and that this is an instance of a more general phenomenon. Her claim is 
that an object‘s causing some effect E analytically entails its parts causing E and 
vice versa.  
 
She introduces the notion of an analytic entailment as follows: 
 
‗I  use  the  expression  ‗analytically  entail‘  to  mean  ‗entail  in 
virtue of the meanings of the expressions involved and rules 
of  inference‘,  so  that  a  sentence  (or  set  of  sentences)  φ 
analytically entails a sentence ψ just in case, given only logical 
principles and the meanings of the terms involved, the truth 
of φ guarantees the truth of ψ.‘ (Thomasson 2007) p. 16 
 
Thomasson‘s  book  features  an  extended  defence  of  this  notion  of  analytic 
entailment. Analyticity here is clearly being thought about in terms of ‗truth 
grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact‘ (Quine, 1951), as was 
famously  criticized  by  Quine.  Thomasson  expends  a  significant  number  of 
words responding to the Quinean critique. It is worth noticing that the account 
Thomasson gives does not require that we understand sentences or groups of   201 
sentences that analytically entail each other to be synonymous, or to be defined 
in terms of each other. Rather it relies on the meanings that the words actually 
have in natural language.  
 
In the case of objects and their parts over-determining some event, the claim 
that there is an analytical entailment of some kind along these lines is at least 
plausible. Take the sentences:  
   
  A: The cricket ball broke the window 
And 
B: The parts of the cricket ball, acting together in the way that parts of 
cricket balls are wont to, broke the window. 
 
Clearly these sentences are not synonymous, or even necessarily an analysis of 
each other. We might nonetheless suppose that if A is true that we can infer the 
truth of B. Similarly, we can infer on the basis of the truth of B that A is true. 
These are plausible claims, and Thomasson points out why ((Thomasson 2007) 
p. 16). As she puts it A ‗requires no more of the world‘ than B does. The same 
causal process needs to take place for either sentence to be true113.  
 
Thomasson‘s  position  has  much  to  recommend  it  and  is  in  broad  terms 
consistent with the  position adopted in  this  thesis.  One  might suppose that 
treating statements about objects as analytically entailing statements about their 
parts might conflict somewhat with the line taken in Chapter One of this thesis 
to the effect that parthood is not what matters in ontology. The argument there 
however was not that we have no sensible notion of parthood, but rather that i) 
if we have to make a choice we would do better to revise our account of what 
things have parts than to conclude that there are no everyday objects and ii) that 
the notion of parthood appealed to by Organicists (and other compositional 
                                              
113  Which,  we  might  recall  from  Chapter  Four  is  something  that  van  Inwagen  at  least, 
seems constrained to agree with.    202 
ontologists) gives no reason to reject the idea that objects are simple. These 
claims are compatible with our accepting that non-living everyday objects do in 
fact have parts.  
 
The theory of objects presented in this thesis though offers sufficient resources 
to  challenge  the  claim  that  objects  are  epiphenomenal.  We  do  not  need  to 
appeal to analytic entailment in order to accept the general point that objects are 
not (on any reasonable account of independence) independent of the matter 
which  constitutes  them.  All  we  need  is  the  plausible  supposition  that 
overdetermination is only a problem if what is posited are two independent 
causes. What we need is a notion of dependence that makes objects and the 
simples  which  constitute  them  less  than  causally  independent.  Thomasson‘s 
notion  of  analytic  entailment  does  this,  but  so  does  the  account  of  objects 
presented in Chapters Two and Chapter Three of this thesis.  
 
The account of objects presented here was as follows: our object concepts are 
satisfied  by  object  forms  which  are  the  causal  result  of  the  structures  that 
organize  the  simples  in  arrangement-formations.  Since  the  object  and  its 
constituent matter are intimately related, it seems very difficult to suppose that 
under any plausible principle of causal independence they would come out as 
causally independent. Strictly speaking the position that has been advanced here 
does not require that we treat the matter in an arrangement-formation that gives 
rise to an object-form as thereby composing an object; we need not accept that 
those bits of matter are ‗parts‘ of the object. We could treat the object form as a 
simple whole, constituted by the properties that are the result of the relations 
between  the  simples  that  participate  in  the  arrangement-formation.  This  is 
sufficient to license the conclusion that the bits of matter causally implicated in 
the effects of an object are not causally independent of that object under any 
non-question begging account of independence.  
 
Assuming that we take E to be the breaking of a window by O, a cricket ball, 
none of the parts, p1 to pn, of O are individually sufficient to cause E. The ‗parts‘   203 
are only able to cause E because of the relations in which they stand to each 
other.  Because  of  these  relations  they  generate  the  coordinated  macroscopic 
properties that ground our object concepts. There is no more to the object than 
this. Under any reasonable understanding of what goes on when you chuck a 
cricket ball at a window, we need not suppose that the ‗ball‘ is some entity in 
addition to the object form. If you accept the functionalist intuition presented in 
Chapter Two, the fact that the arrangement-formation exhibits the properties of 
a cricket ball is sufficient for the existence of the cricket ball. The object on this 
account is not causally independent of the arrangement-formation which is its 
causal base.  
 
We have then, plenty of reason to reject the argument from overdetermination. 
In  the  next  chapter,  we  will  discuss  briefly  how  we  ought  to  respond  to 
Organicists‘  claims  about  the  puzzles  concerning  everyday  objects  given  the 
claims made so far in this thesis. Before moving on to that chapter though, we 
will  return  to  Dorr‘s  argument.  It  is  worth  making  explicit  how  the 
aforementioned considerations affect Dorr‘s argument. In what follows, Dorr‘s 
argument  will  be  reconstructed  in  order  to  show  how  it  depends  on  an 
assumption of No-Overdetermination. It will then be noted that if we add the 
premise that there are everyday objects to the first part of Dorr‘s argument we 
are in a position to offer another argument to the conclusion that composition 
is not what matters in ontology.  
 
We  laid  out  Dorr‘s  argument  earlier  (see  page  192).  Here  are  the  first  two 
premises again, along with Dorr‘s first conclusion: 
 
‗P1   If the xs had been arranged as they actually are but composed 
nothing, all the microphysical facts would have been just as they 
actually are. 
P2   If  all  the  microphysical  facts  had  been  just  as  they 
actually  are,  and  the  xs  had  been  arranged  as  they 
actually  are  but  composed  nothing,  then  everything 
else would have been just the same.   204 
C1   So, if the xs had been arranged as they actually are but 
composed nothing, everything else would have been 
just the same.‘ 
 
In the original version of the argument Dorr then argues as follows: 
 
‗P3   If  C1  is  true,  then  the  thing  the  xs  compose  is  an 
epiphenomenon. 
C2   So the thing the xs compose is an epiphenomenon.‘ 
 
However, in the foregoing we argued that P3 is only plausible if we take it to be 
modified  by  something  like  the  principle  of  no-overdetermination.  We  then 
argued  that  the reasons we have for  supposing that objects are not causally 
independent of their parts apply here as well.  
 
The claim then, is that in order to get from ‗if the xs had been arranged as they 
actually are but composed nothing, everything else would have been just the 
same‘ to ‗the thing the xs compose is an epiphenomenon‘ we need an additional 
argument which allows us to assume the principle of no-overdetermination. To 
this end then, we add no-overdetermination as an assumption: 
 
Assumption (No-overdetermination): It is never the case that one effect has 
two independent causes 
 
In the light of this, we need to include a premise in Dorr‘s argument to make 
this assumption explicit. That is, we need to include a premise to the effect that 
the xs and the thing they compose are causally independent. We then get the 
following argument: 
1)  The thing(s) that the xs compose is causally independent of the xs 
2)  (C1)  ‗if  the  xs  had  been  arranged  as  they  actually  are  but  composed 
nothing, everything else would have been just the same‘ 
3)  If C1 and the thing that the xs compose is causally independent of the 
xs, then the thing that the xs compose is an epiphenomenon 
4)  The thing that the xs compose is an epiphenomenon   205 
This  then,  is  what  Dorr‘s  argument  would  look  like  if  the  independence 
assumption were made explicit. However, clearly given the earlier discussion we 
should conclude that this argument fails to go through because 1) is false. Both 
Merricks‘ and Dorr‘s arguments fail for the same reason.  
 
We have seen that both Merricks‘ and Dorr‘s arguments fail for similar reasons. 
They fail, because they are only plausible if objects and their parts are taken to 
be causally independent, and objects are clearly not causally independent of their 
parts.  
 
To close off this chapter, however, an argument will be suggested that is based 
on Dorr‘s  argument (P1 to C1 are directly quoted). The argument is for the 
conclusion that composition is irrelevant to whether or not there are everyday 
objects.  Consider  Dorr‘s  argument  as  laid  out  above,  but  add  an  additional 
premise to the effect that there are everyday objects:  
 
  P0  There are everyday objects 
P1   If the xs had been arranged as they actually are but 
composed nothing, all the microphysical facts would 
have been just as they actually are. 
P2   If  all  the  microphysical  facts  had  been  just  as  they 
actually  are,  and  the  xs  had  been  arranged  as  they 
actually  are  but  composed  nothing,  then  everything 
else would have been just the same. 
C1   So, if the xs had been arranged as they actually are but 
composed nothing, everything else would have been 
just the same. 
 
Then,  rather  than  argue  as  Dorr  does  to  the  conclusion  that  objects  are 
epiphenomenalism, we can argue as follows: 
 
P3*  If  P0  and  C1,  then  whether  the  xs  compose  something  is 
irrelevant to whether there are objects. 
C2*  Whether the xs compose something is irrelevant to whether there 
are objects.   206 
  
Given the foregoing, P3* seems fairly reasonable, and therefore C2* follows. 
Thus, we have an argument to the conclusion that composition is not what 
matters in determining whether there are everyday objects. While we should not 
put too much weight on this argument, it does serve to illustrate how the No-
Difference  claim  encountered  previously  (the  claim  that  a  world  without 
composite objects would be no different from one in which there are composite 
objects) could be viewed as a double edged sword. If rather than taking No-
Difference as a reason to reject the existence of everyday objects we hold on 
tight to the existence of everyday objects, then what the No-Difference claim 
gives us is a reason to worry about the notion of ‗composition‘ that is being 
appealed  to.  If  ‗composition‘  really  makes  no  empirical  difference,  then  we 
should be dubious about drawing sweeping conclusions about ontology on the 
basis of a priori reasoning about it. 
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One  thing  that  Organicists  claim  weighs  in  favour  of  their  position  is  its 
purported ability to do better than other positions with respect to the traditional 
puzzles about everyday objects; puzzles such as the sorites paradox, the problem 
of the many, and the Ship of Theseus. The basis of this purported advantage is 
simple: If there are no everyday objects than these puzzles do not arise.  
 
The  status  of  this  claim  to  theoretical  superiority  is  slightly  different  for 
Merricks and van Inwagen. For Merricks, the ability to deal with these puzzles is 
a useful supporting argument to the argument from overdetermination. For van 
Inwagen, it is (as becomes clear towards the end of Material Beings) in fact the 
central argument for his position. Van Inwagen‘s dialectic in Material Beings is as 
follows:  In  order  to  find  out  about  what  there  is  we  need  to  know  about 
composition,  as  the  General  Compositional  Question  is  unanswerable  we 
should focus on the Special Compositional Question, Organicism is the best 
answer  to  the  Special  Compositional  Question  because  it  gives  the  best 
systematic account of everyday objects. One of the reasons that it is the best 
systematic account of everyday objects is that it does the best job at dealing with 
the puzzles.  
 
The strategy of this thesis has not been to challenge the efficacy of Organicism 
in treating the philosophical puzzles about everyday objects. Rather, it has been 
to question the theoretical basis for asking the Special Compositional Question 
in the first place and for thinking that answers to it have the sort of significance 
for  ontology  that  Organicists  suppose  it  to  have.  We  have  argued  that  the 
method  for  finding  out  what  sorts  of  objects  there  are  must  involve  some   208 
element of empirical investigation (beyond finding out whether or not some 
lump of matter is alive or not). The point of this thesis has been that by the time 
you  enter  the  Organicist  position  onto  the  theoretical  scales  against  other 
positions you have already conceded something to the Organicists.  
 
Given  this,  this  chapter  will  be  shorter  than  might  otherwise  have  been 
expected. The purpose of this chapter is not to address the puzzles, or even to 
argue that the Organicist cannot deal with them. Rather, the aim is to examine 
two puzzles as exemplars, and clarify where the burdens of proof lie for the 
Organicist. All that is claimed is that even if we granted an Organicist ontology, 
dealing with the puzzles is not so simple as saying that since everyday objects do 
not exist the puzzles do not arise114.  
 
In this chapter we will briefly discuss two puzzles, the sorites and the Ship of 
Theseus. The Ship of Theseus is one of the puzzles which van Inwagen makes 
the strongest case for being able to deal with, and the sorites is appealed to by 
Merricks‘ as giving supporting evidence for the Organicist position. 
 
7.1  The sorites paradox 
The sorites paradox as applied to objects can be developed as follows: 
 
1)  A chair, C is composed of at least some atoms, but not an infinite 
number of atoms.  
2)  For  any  chair,  if  one  atom  were  removed,  the  chair  would  still 
exist115. 
 
                                              
114 For an alternative way of arguing to the same conclusion see (McGrath 2005). McGrath 
gives an account of what it would be for sentences to express factual contents  that are 
neutral between Eliminativist paraphrases and the original sentences, and then argues that 
if the van Inwagen style paraphrases are interpreted as expressing factual statements that 
puzzles about composition remain puzzles.  
115 This way of formulating the paradox can be found in (Unger 1979)   209 
Through repeated iterations of the second premise, the number, n, of atoms 
composing  the  chair  is  reduced,  one  at  a  time.  Entailing,  eventually,  the 
following two conclusions: 
 
3)  C would still exist even though only one atom remained. 
4)  If that atom was removed, then C would still exist. 
 
One solution for this paradox is to simply reject premise 1). Organicists have a 
principled reason for doing this as they do not suppose chairs to exist. Since 
they accept that there are no chairs they are justified in supposing that the claim 
that chairs are composed of a finite number of atoms is false.  
 
There are a number of points that we can usefully make with respect to the 
Organicists position with respect to the sorites:  
 
Firstly, this is what Schiffer terms a ‗happy face‘ solution to the sorites paradox: 
it dissolves the paradox by rejecting one of its key elements116. But we might 
think that in doing so it merely moves the troublesomeness of the paradox 
elsewhere. We can imagine an interlocutor accepting that there are no everyday 
objects, but still worrying about when some simples are arranged chairwise and 
when they are not. To be sure, when we discuss chair -wise arrangements it is 
clear that the question is linguistic —it  is  about  the  application  of  our  chair 
concepts, but since van Inwagen argues that he must allow vague existence in 
any case (see (van Inwagen 1990) Section 19) it is not clear that there is much 
gain here.  
 
Secondly, it should be clear that in at least one respect Organicists do not do as 
well as a pure nihilist such as Cian Dorr with respect to this argument. It is quite 
                                              
116  See  (Schiffer,  2003)  p.  68.  In  Schiffer’s  parlance  a  paradox  is  a  set  of  mutually 
inconsistent  propositions  such  that  we  have  good  reasons  to  believe  each  of  them 
individually. A happy face solution to a paradox shows either that the propositions are not 
really inconsistent and explains why, or shows that one or more of the propositions is false 
and explains why we thought them true.    210 
clear that if one were to apply the sorites argument to a gerbil it would go 
through just as well for the hapless gerbil as it does for a chair. Almost any 
problem  that  we  can  pose  for  everyday  objects  can  be  adapted  to  hold  for 
organisms.  Van  Inwagen  acknowledges  this  and  the  second  half  of  Material 
Beings  shows how van  Inwagen thinks  the nature of Organicism helps solve 
puzzles. Merricks accepts that the sorites argument applies to people, but argues 
that while it gives a reason to eliminate statues it does not give a reason to 
eliminate persons (see (Merricks 2001) p. 125). The issue here is whether or not 
the Organicist position furnishes its proponents with resources for approaching 
this  problem  that  their  opponents  cannot  access,  and  whether  these  extra 
resources really do a better job at dealing with the sorites paradox. If they do, 
then this will be because of the account that Organicists can provide of what is 
involved in something‘s being a life. That is, it will depend on the details of their 
positive ontological claim. The way that they do this will not be discussed here, 
but it is worth noting that this is an argumentative burden that they must bear. 
 
Finally, we can note that the sorites paradox as applied to objects is in fact an 
instance of a wider problem. The problem is that of vagueness, and it arises in 
many areas. It arises, for instance, in the case of colour continua117. Take this 
colour continuum for instance:  
 
 
 
If we take a thin strip of colour on the left hand side of the continuum, and 
term it C, then we can construct a sorites style case that is similar in structure to 
that presented above concerning objects:  
 
 
 
                                              
117 Though there are features of continuum cases which might distinguish them from other 
sorites type problems. See for instance (Graff 2001) for a discussion of colour continua 
cases.  
Figure 1: a colour continuum   211 
1)  A colour patch, C, is black (but is a finite number of imperceptible 
colour brightenings from being white).  
2)  For  any  black  colour  patch,  if  it  were  made  brighter,  but 
imperceptibly brighter, it would still be black. 
 
Through repeated iterations of the second premise, the brightness of the patch 
is increased, one imperceptible increment at a time. Entailing, eventually, the 
following two conclusions: 
 
3)  C is black even though it  is  one imperceptible colour brightening 
away from being white. 
4)  If C were made imperceptibly brighter, then C would be white and C 
would be black 
 
In fact, sorites style paradoxes are, at least somewhat, ubiquitous. We can create 
similar style problems with classic vague predicates such as ‗bald‘ but also many 
predicates that can be applied in different degrees, such as ‗shiny‘, or ‗hard‘. 
 
The fact that sorites style reasoning can be applied to so many cases in addition 
to  the  sorites  of  everyday  objects  introduced  above  is  problematic  for 
Organicists  for  two  reasons.  Firstly,  it  means  that  the  theoretical  benefit  of 
solving the problem for everyday objects is limited— in simply accepting the 
sorites as a reductio ad absurdum on the existence of everyday objects, they have 
not offered us a general solution to vagueness. If such a solution were to be 
found it might be thought that it would solve the sorites as applied to everyday 
objects too. Secondly, the parallel argument developed above for the continuum 
case suggests that merely accepting the paradox as a reductio ad absurdum on the 
existence of objects will only be a viable strategy if one can also show why 
parallel reasoning should not be applied to other sorites style cases.  
 
To be sure, Merricks argues that the sorites as applied to everyday objects is in 
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example,  that  Epistemicists118  (who  hold  that  there  are  sharp  boundaries 
demarking the application of vague predicates but that these are unknowable) 
should worry more about the sorites applied to objects than, for insta nce, a 
sorites concerning when someone is bald. The argument appears to be as 
follows: Either the vagueness involved in the sorites of everyday objects is 
metaphysical, which we should reject 119, or it has a linguistic basis. Merricks 
takes Epistemicists to hold that vagueness has a linguistic basis and advances the 
following  argument  against  all  ‗linguistic‘  accounts  of  vagueness.  (His  initial 
presentation  of  the  sorites  puzzle  is  in  terms  of  a  statue,  ‗David‘,  which  is 
subjected to atom by atom dismantling at the hands of god): 
 
‗I  believe  that  every  plausible  linguistic  account  of 
vagueness—and  thus  epistemic  versions  thereof—requires 
there to be, in some sense, equally good candidates either for 
what a vague predicate might mean or for what a vague name 
might refer to. For example, if the vagueness of baldness is 
rooted in ‗bald‘, then there are many properties that are, in 
some sense, equally good candidates for being expressed by 
‗bald‘. 
 
But if David exists, then—given the assumption noted above 
and  to  be  defended  in  the  next  section—there  are  not 
multiple  equally  good  candidates  for  being  referred  to  by 
‗David‘.  So  linguistic  accounts  of  David's  vague  persistence 
cannot find a foothold. ‘ 
 (Merricks 2001), p. 34 
 
Should we accept that the sorites applied to everyday objects is a special case120? 
If we are to accept that, then we will need a better argument then this.  
 
The assumption mentioned in the quote is the assumption that objects are not 
collocated. Merricks‘ idea seems to be that by removing atoms one at a time 
from a statue we have a series of arrangements each a bit smaller, and that in 
                                              
118 See (Sorensen 1988; Williamson 1994). 
119 He references (Evans 1978). 
120 Van Inwagen does not: he is quite explicit that vagueness applies to organisms. He 
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order for a linguistic response to vagueness work, these would each have to 
constitute individual entities that could be the referent of the term ‗David‘ and 
that are initially co-located. This is clearly not a plausible requirement on an 
Epistemicist position.  Why should an  Epistemicist accept  the claim that  she 
needs equally good candidates for a name to refer to? All she needs to be able to 
do is to give an argument for why it is that we do not know when the name 
‗David‘  stops  referring  to  the  thing  in  front  of  us.  The  essence  of  the 
Epistemicist position is not linguistic it is epistemic. Epistemicists respond to 
the sorites paradox as laid out above by denying the second premise. According 
to the Epistemicist there is a last atom the removal of which will destroy the 
chair and there is a last ‗black‘ colour patch. The point is just that we cannot 
know  which  atom,  or  which  colour  patch  that  would  be.  There  is  no 
requirement  in  the  position  for  different  candidate  things  to  be  potential 
referents of the term ‗black‘ or ‗chair‘.  The Epistemicist claim can be filled out 
in linguistic terms as the claim that our predicates have sharp boundaries but 
that we are unable to know them, but there is no reason why they should accept 
the existence of distinct entities that are possible referents of our object terms. 
 
Merricks‘  objection  might  hold  better  against  a  supervaluationist  account  of 
vagueness. The supervaluationist account is more clearly linguistic in that it is an 
account of the truth values of sentences. The account suggests that any ‗vague‘ 
sentence can be made precise in a number of different ways. That is, that we can 
give a number (if necessary a large number) of stipulative precisifications of the 
sentence. Thus, on some precisifications of ‗tall‘ someone who is 5‘8‘‘ would be 
‗tall‘, and on some he would not. Having allowed that there are various ways of 
precisifying a sentence, the supervaluationist is then able to define ‗super-truth‘. 
A sentence is held to be ‗super-true‘ iff it is true on all precifications and ‗super-
false‘ iff it is false on all precisifications. The supervaluationist claim is then that 
a sentence is true if and only if it is ‗super-true‘, and neither true nor false if it is 
true on some precisifications but not on others. The purported advantage of the 
position is that it provides the basis of a logic for vague sentences which is 
consistent with classical logic (see (Fine 1975) for a technical development of   214 
the position121). This account then, does require that there are different ways of 
making  a  sentence  precise,  or,  as  Merricks  puts  it,  ‗multiple  equally  good 
candidates‘ for being the extension of a predicate or the referent of a term. Even 
here,  however,  it  is  not  clear  that  the  position  requires  one  to  posit  many 
collocated entities to be the target extensions of the name ‗David‘. It seems 
quite clear that we can entertain the possibility that some selection of the sub-
formations of simples within David could be ‗determinately‘ David, and others 
could be neither determinately David nor determinately non-David. We do not, 
however, have to hold that each of these is itself an entity collocated with the 
others. We need only hold that it would still be David were the relevant atoms 
removed so that it was all that was left.  
 
We should conclude then that the sorites is less important than might initially be 
thought for the question of whether or not there are everyday objects. To the 
extent that it is problematic it should be thought of as a paradox and not as an 
argument to the conclusion that there are no everyday objects. Sorites problems 
applied to everyday objects are of a kind with other problem cases that invoke 
vagueness and should be treated together with them. Even were the Organicist 
better able to cope with such a paradox than other positions, we should count 
this as only a limited theoretical benefit gained at the expense of their ontology. 
What  is  more  we  should  note  that  sorites  of  everyday  objects  occur  for 
Organicists as well, if only in application to organisms. 
 
For what it is worth, we could note that the theory of objects presented in 
Chapter  Two of  this  thesis lends itself to an ‗unhappy‘ face  solution to  the 
sorites paradox as applied to everyday objects. An ‗unhappy face‘ solution in 
Schiffer‘s terms is one which does not solve the paradox but is illuminating 
about why it is insoluble.  
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The account of objects given in Chapters Two and Three suggested that objects 
are  constituted  by  those  collections  of  regularities  in  our  environment  that 
satisfy our object concepts. It was suggested that in the vast majority of cases 
there  will  be  arrangement-formations  that  are  causally  responsible  for  these 
regularities. On such a view, something stops being, say, a table, when it fails to 
satisfy the concept ‗table‘. However, if one were to engage in a sorites-style 
deconstruction of a particular table an atom at a time, it would not be at all clear 
when one had reached a point where our table concept was no longer satisfied. 
The  reasons  for  this  are  fairly  obvious.  As  was  noted  in  Chapter  Two,  any 
structure that gives rise to some arrangement-form will in fact encompass an 
indefinitely  large  number  of  efficacious  substructures.  We,  operating  at  the 
macro  level,  are  simply  unable  to  determine  at  what  point  each  of  these 
becomes inefficacious as they degrade, or how that will effect the macroscopic 
properties of  the object. It is clear that  this  degradation of those properties 
which enable an object-form to satisfy an object concept will happen gradually, 
and  we  will  be  unable  to  say  at  which  point  those  concepts  are  no  longer 
satisfied. This will be partly because we are not aware of the extent to which the 
efficacious structures within an object-formation have broken down and partly 
because our object concepts, while allowing that some things determinately are 
things of a certain sort, do not necessarily do very well at adjudicating borderline 
cases. Here then, we have a metaphysical account of the makeup of objects 
which allows in a moderately clear way for the failure of our object concepts in 
the face of a sorites-style deconstruction of everyday objects. 
 
7.2  The Ship of Theseus 
The  Ship  of  Theseus  is  perhaps  one  of  the  more  challenging  philosophical 
puzzles about everyday objects. It is one that sortalists have struggled with122. It 
is also a puzzle which van Inwagen claims his theory of everyday objects  gives 
the best account of. The Ship of Theseus problem differs from the sorites in 
                                              
122 See, for instance, (Wiggins 2001), pp. 93-104 for a survey of the issues for sortalists in 
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being a particular problem for everyday objects rather then an instance of a 
more general problem. There are a number of points to be made about this 
problem and the Organicists‘ response to it.  
 
The puzzle, it will be recalled, stems from a story such as the following: 
 
1.  A Ship, S1, is constructed at time t1 out of a finite number n of parts P1 
to Pn.  
2.  As the ship sails around, over some reasonably extended period of time 
all the parts of S1, P1 to Pn are replaced, one by one, with newer parts, 
NP1 to NPn.  
3.  At  time  t2,  once  all  the  parts  have  been  replaced  a  new  ship,  S2,  is 
created from the original parts P1 to Pn.  
 
The situation then is as follows: At the start of the story we have one ship, S1, 
composed of P1 to Pn. At the end of the story we have two ships, S2, which is 
also composed of P1 to Pn. And another, which in order to avoid begging any 
questions, we will call S3. S3 is the ship made of parts NP1 to NPn, and exhibits 
what van Inwagen ((van Inwagen 1990) p.132) terms a ‗history of maintenance‘ 
that links it to S1. The question raised by the ship of Theseus puzzle is just this: 
Which of the ships at t2 is identical to S1? Is it S2, which has all the same parts, 
or S2 which has a history that can be traced back to S1?  
 
There is a substantial literature on the ship of Theseus problem123. The aim of 
this section is not to solve the puzzle, but rather to examine the claim that the 
Organicist position offers more resources for the resolution of the puzzle then 
competing positions. Merricks does not discuss the Ship of Theseus in any 
                                              
123 Wiggins takes the problem from Hobbes (ref)  De Corpore, II, H, and cites Hobbes’s 
source as Plutarch’s The Life of Theseus. See also, (Carter 1983), (Rea 1995), (Barnett 
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depth124, but van Inwagen clearly thinks that one of the advantages of his 
position is that it offers a solution to the Ship of Theseus, which he terms ‗The 
greatest  and  most  profound  of  the  classical  problems  about  the  identity  of 
artefacts‘ ((van Inwagen 1990) p. 128). 
 
The Organicists‘ purported solution to the Ship of Theseus puzzle is as simple 
as their solution to the sorites paradox: Since there is no ship S1, and nor are 
there ships S2 or S3, none of them are identical to each other. So S1 is not the 
same ship as either S2 or S3. Or as van Inwagen succinctly puts it:  
 
‗…if there are no artefacts, then there are no philosophical problems 
about artefacts‘ ((van Inwagen 1990) p. 128). 
 
To be fair, van Inwagen has more to say on the matter than this (see Material 
Beings pp. 128–129). The Organicist can give an account of the arrangement of 
some objects into an arrangement that is shipwise, how over time these are 
rearranged into non-shipwise arrangements, and other simples are arranged in 
the same way as the original parts were originally arranged, and finally how the 
first lot of simples are then rearranged. The purported benefit of their position 
is that they have a principled reason for saying that this account of how ‗parts‘ 
get moved around is the whole story; that there is no more to say than this. 
Somewhat similarly, Merricks argues that the best way to respond to the Ship of 
Theseus is to treat the matter as a purely pragmatic decision: since none of the 
ships exist, it is up to us which we decide to treat as the same as the other. 
 
The first point to make is that, like the sorites, the problem recurs at the level of 
organisms.  Perhaps  the  strongest  thing  that  can  be  said  in  favour  of  the 
Organicist position is that it is easier to give an account of the persistence (or 
                                              
124 He mentions it on page 184 of Objects and Persons (Merricks 2001), where he suggests 
that the non-existence of ships means that we can treat the best answer to the Ship of 
Theseus as a matter of pragmatics, and contrasts this to what would be the case for a life 
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not) of living things then it is to give such an account of inanimate objects. 
Aristotle takes organisms as paradigm cases of substances for a similar reason. 
Organisms are self-organising, and this makes it tempting to suppose that they 
are  in  some  way  special.  None  the  less,  organisms  have  parts  that  can  be 
removed (or not), and if this is the case then, in theory at least, those parts could 
be reassembled in order to create a new organism.  
 
Van Inwagen in fact offers a variety of interesting arguments about how to deal 
problems about how organisms persist. In dealing with problems of vagueness, 
for  instance,  he  commits  himself  to  ‗metaphysical  vagueness‘  and  vagueness 
about identity (see chapters 18 and 19 of Material Beings) and develops a segment 
of a three valued logic (see chapter 17).  
 
What is notable in both van Inwagen‘s and Merricks responses to the Ship of 
Theseus puzzle is that they do not suppose it to apply to organisms. Whatever is 
the case with the other puzzles, this is one where they take their position to be 
clearly superior to others. Thus Merricks: 
 
‗We ought to decide whether ‗this ship belongs to Theseus‘ is 
‗true  for  practical  purposes‘.  Moreover,  I  would  add,  our 
decision here—if it is both reasonable and we are apprised of 
all the other relevant facts—somehow constitutes what the 
‗truth for practical purposes‘ is. We cannot get it wrong. 
 
All  this  seems  plausible  with  respect  to  ships  and,  indeed, 
artifacts  generally.  But  the  conventionality  of  ‗truth  for 
practical purposes‘ is not plausible when it comes to matters 
of personal identity. This asymmetry, I argued, evidenced an 
advantage, with respect to practice, of my ontology over that 
of the folk.‘ (Merricks 2001) p. 185 
 
Merricks sees here two potential advantages to his view. One is that he can 
allow that all decisions about how far objects persist or not are in some sense a 
matter of convention, and that this in fact matches our intuitions about the Ship 
of Theseus case. The other is that he can simply dodge the question by resorting 
to what he takes to be the ‗strict‘ truth which is that there are no ships.    219 
 
This in fact exposes an oddity of Merricks position. Presented with S2 and S3, 
Merricks must say that the strict and literal truth of the matter is that there are in 
front  of  him  two  collections  of  simples,  and  both  collections  are  arranged 
shipwise. Asked which is identical to S1, he should really say the following: S1 
was not ‗strictly speaking‘ a ship, it was some simples arranged ship-wise. Now 
S3 is, in fact, the very same collection of simples as were involved in S1, standing 
in the very same relations. Merricks cannot say that they are the same arrangement 
(as he does not admit to there being arrangements), but he must surely say that 
the simples arranged S3-wise stand in a peculiarly close relation to the simples 
arranged S1-wise. If one were not so committed as he to the non-existence of 
arrangements, however, one might go so far as to claim that S3 is the same 
arrangement of simples as S1. Seen in this way, his position begins to look less 
attractive: Strictly speaking, on Merricks‘ view there is reason to adjudicate one 
way rather than the other (because the simples in S1 have nothing in common 
with those in S3), yet he holds that what we should say should be determined on 
purely pragmatic grounds.  
 
Like Merricks, van Inwagen sees the Ship of Theseus puzzle as unproblematic 
for organisms. He writes, for instance, in discussing the Ship of Theseus puzzle:  
 
‗Note that there is no tendency to identify a ―reassembled‖ 
organism with the ―original‖. If God were to ―reassemble‖ the 
atoms  that  composed  me  ten  years  ago,  the  resulting 
organism would certainly not be me.‘ (van Inwagen 1990) p. 
140.  
 
Arguably,  this  confidence  that  Ship  of  Theseus  problems  would  be 
unconvincing in the case of organisms is unfounded. It is clear that with the 
help of an omnipotent demon and/or a malicious scientist we can come up with 
an analogue for the Ship of Theseus case for persons or, if it is more plausible, 
for trees:  
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1.  Jones (J1) is fully grown at time t1 and is composed of a finite number n 
of parts P1 to Pn.  
2.  Over the course of year a malicious demon causes the parts of J1, P1 to 
Pn, to be replaced, one by one, with newer parts, NP1 to NPn. The old 
parts are kept somewhere by an evil scientist. 
3.  At time t2, once all the parts have been replaced, a new version of Jones, 
J2, is created from the original parts P1 to Pn put back together (and 
quickened with a convenient lightening bolt).  
 
The situation then is this: at time t2 we have two versions of Jones. J2, which is 
made of all the original parts of Jones (P1 to Pn) arranged precisely as they were 
at t1125. We also have J3, J3 is linked to J1 by a history of maintenance but is 
made of NP1 to NPn and has no parts that J1 has. Which version of Jones, J2 
or J3, is identical to J1? Let‘s call this the Body of Jones problem.  
 
If Merricks and van Inwagen are correct in saying that an analogous problem to 
the Ship of Theseus does not arise for organisms then there must be one or 
several relevant asymmetries between the Ship of Theseus puzzle and Body of 
Jones problem. What are they supposed to be? 
 
One clue can be found in the quote from van Inwagen just above. Clearly, J3 
will have no doubt who ‗me‘ is. This seems like a less conclusive argument then 
van Inwagen supposes, however. In the first place if we suppose that ‗Jones‘ to 
be  the  name  of  a  tree  rather  than  a  person,  then  such  considerations  are 
irrelevant. More interestingly, supposing that J2 was put together as J1 was (to 
the very atom) at t1, we may suppose that he has all the same mental states as 
J1. Phenomenologically, it will seem to him that he has just jumped a year into 
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the future. Neither J2 nor J3 will have any doubt that the other is not ‗me‘.  
Both, in fact, will have a claim to being psychologically continuous with J1.  
 
Another clue might be found in what has to go on in order for there to be a 
history of maintenance in the two cases. Van Inwagen introduces the notion of 
a ‗history of maintenance‘ not in relation to the Ship of Theseus problem, but in 
relation  to  a  problem  that  we  will  broach  shortly,  the  problem  of  how 
Organicists are going to manage diachronic reference to the same object.  
 
In order for a ship to be maintained some things other than the ship need to 
undertake activities; the ships‘ ongoing maintenance depends upon what things 
other than the ship do. The activities that maintain Jones, by contrast, are self 
directed. This seems to van Inwagen a fundamental difference. On this basis he 
explicitly rejects the notion that his answer to the Special Composition Question 
should  be  modified  to  allow  artefacts  that  are  the  subject  of  a  ‗history  of 
maintenance‘ to be counted as composite as well. He says for instance:  
   
‗This  answer  goes  against  all  my  deepest  instincts.  The 
question whether certain things constitute a life is a question 
about  the  relations  they  bear  to  one  another  and  about 
nothing else. The question whether certain things are current 
objects of a history of maintenance, however, is a question 
about those things and other things as well.‘ 
 
   
And later on the same page: 
  
‗My deepest instincts tell me that composition is an internal 
relation and that, therefore, a proper answer to the Special 
Composition  Question  must  take  the  form  of  a  statement 
that asserts a necessary extensional equivalence between the 
relation expressed by ‗the xs compose something‘ and some 
internal multigrade relation‘. (van Inwagen 1990) p. 138.  
 
We can respect van Inwagen‘s metaphysical instincts, but they are unlikely to 
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there being kinds that any identity statement must be understood in terms of.  
But some sortalists will also accept that what determines which kind of thing 
they are dealing with may be affected by factors that are external to the thing in 
question. That the Mona Lisa is a work of art, for instance, is down not just to 
her physical make up but also her current social context and the context in 
which she was created. Sortalists of this stripe may accept that composition is an 
‗internal‘ relation, but they should pause before accepting that whether there is 
an object before them must depend entirely upon relations between the simples 
before  them  (which  is  another  reason  for  them  to  reject  the  notion  that 
composition is what matters in ontology).  
 
It is worth noting that in Section 15 of Material Beings (van Inwagen 1990) van 
Inwagen defends an account of personal continuity in terms of brain continuity, 
and in fact in Section 16 he discusses a case of splitting. It is difficult, however, 
to see how these discussions offer additional resources for solving the Body of 
Jones problem. We could think of the Body of Jones problem as a case of 
duplication;  duplication  cases  give  rise  to  well  known  problems  of  personal 
identity126. But even if we allow this, it is difficult to see w hy the Organicists‘ 
distinctive ontology would allow them to do better in dealing with duplication 
problems  than  anyone  else.  The  fact  that  van  Inwagen  gives  an  account  of 
personal continuity in terms of brain continuity does not seem to help either; 
the Body of Jones problem is also the Brain of Jones problem.  
 
The splitting case that van Inwagen discusses (the case is introduced in (van 
Inwagen 1990) pp. 202-203) is an idealisation involving a being named ‗neo-
cerberus‘ who has two brains. Van Inwagen imagines an interlocutor arguing 
that on splitting the being in half there would be two new conscious beings; the 
challenge  for  van  Inwagen  is  that  since  the  two  brains  existed  (and  were 
conscious) before the split, two, rather than one, entity inhabited the body of 
neo-Cerberus,  and  so  neither  of  them  could  have  been  identical  with  the 
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organism that was neo-Cerberus. Van Inwagen‘s reply is that (see, e.g. pp. 205-
206) there is no continues consciousness throughout the split (as in order for 
there to have been continued consciousness an organism would have had to 
have survived the split). This though offers no help with the question of the 
Body of Jones. It seems implausible to suppose that at some point between t1 
and  t2  Jones  was  suddenly  destroyed,  given  the  incremental  nature  of  the 
replacement  of  his  parts.  Even  if  we  accepted  such  a  conclusion,  it  hardly 
constitutes an advance in dealing with the puzzle.  
 
There is then, no obvious non-question begging reason to distinguish the Ship 
of Theseus problem from the Body of Jones problem. If the Organicists have a 
positive answer to give to the Body of Jones problem it will have to come from 
the details of their positive ontological claim. It will have to come from their 
account  of  what  a  life  is.  Even  once  they  have  allayed  our  worries  about 
composition, they will still need to show that the resources offered them by 
restricting  existence  to  living  things  and  simples  are  actually  helpful  in  this 
respect.  
 
Again, the point here is not to suggest that there is no way for Organicists to 
broach the problems of everyday objects. The point is simply that they do have 
to bear the burden of doing so, and it is not at all obvious why we should 
suppose that their ontology puts them in a better position to do so than anyone 
else.  
 
Finally,  we  might  note  that  the  Ship  of  Theseus  itself  highlights  a  further 
semantic issue for Organicists to deal with. Quine (Quine 1951b) noted that 
there is often a need to pay for ontological economy with increases in ‗ideology‘, 
and it seems that here we have an analogous issue. It is not  just that Organicists 
need a greater stock of predicates and names in order to make their position 
reasonable, but as was argued in Chapter Five, that they need an alternative 
account of the appropriate application conditions of object terms.  
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The problem of the Ship of Theseus is, for most, a problem about the identity 
of everyday objects. The question to be answered is ‗Which ship is the Ship of 
Theseus?‘. As Organicists deny the existence of everyday objects the problem 
resolves itself into an issue about when to treat diachronic applications of the 
term ‗Ship of Theseus‘ as true (for van Inwagen) or nearly-as-good-as-true (for 
Merricks).  
 
The Ship of Theseus is a particularly complex case, but in fact this is something 
that Organicists need to be able to give a general account of. As was noted in 
Chapter Two (following Thomasson see (Thomasson 2007) p. 40) our object 
concepts and terms need both ‗application conditions‘ and what Thomasson 
terms ‗co-application conditions‘. The co-application conditions for an object 
term are the conditions that determine when it applies to the same object on 
different occasions.  
 
If we think about an object picked out by a description such as ‗the chair that 
the queen was crowned on‘ or a named object such as ‗the Golden Hind‘, it is 
clear that we can ask and give an answer to questions such as: is the object in 
front of me the same chair that the queen was crowned on, and is the ship in 
front of me the same one in which Drake circumnavigated the globe? 
 
We saw in Chapter Five how Organicists attempt to account for our everyday 
object language in ways that do not commit them to the existence of everyday 
objects. Van Inwagen, it will be recalled, paraphrases sentences about objects in 
terms of supposedly equivalent sentences about simples arranged object-wise. 
As  we  saw,  Merricks  treats  our  everyday  speech  about  objects  as  strictly 
speaking false, but ‗nearly as good as true‘ where there are simples arranged 
object-wise about which the same claims could be made.  
 
The importance for the Organicist of the theory of plural reference has perhaps 
not been highlighted here as much as it could have been. The point of plural 
reference is that it allows for the predication of non-distributive properties over   225 
collections of individuals. This is what the claim that simples are arranged in the 
manner  of  some  object  amounts  to:  the  attribution  of  the  non-distributive 
property  of  being  arranged  object-wise  to  some  simples.  (We  have  been 
allowing Organicists the assumption that we are in fact able to make reference 
to microscopic simples in this way).  
 
Here  we  will  simply  point  out  that  simples  arranged  object-wise  are  not 
susceptible to re-identification. To attribute the property of being arranged in a 
certain  way  to  some  simples  is  not,  according  to  Organicists,  to  identify  an 
arrangement. Thus one cannot say that ‗this‘ is the same arrangement as ‗that‘.  
In  this  thesis  I  have  suggested  that  the  very  property  of  being  object-wise 
arranged is something that can be tracked and that grounds our object concepts. 
Organicists cannot say this.  
 
One could, presumably, try and make the claim ‗these are the same simples that 
Drake sailed around the world in, and they are arranged in the same way now as 
they were then‘. Of course, that would be very unlikely to be true. Even if one 
could  track  arrangements  of  simples  one  could  not  do  so  for  very  long. 
Arrangements of atoms are extremely fragile; knock a couple of atoms off and 
you no longer have the very same simples arranged boat-wise. Everyday objects, 
if they exist, are a good deal more robust than arrangements. If we are to make 
sense of the co-application conditions of our object concepts in terms of atoms 
arranged object-wise then we will need more to go on.  
 
This is where van Inwagen‘s notion of a history of maintenance comes in. For 
instance, he thinks we can paraphrase ‗the very same house that stands here now 
has stood here for three hundred years‘ like this:  
 
‗There are bricks (or, more generally, objects) arranged 
housewise here now, and these bricks are the current 
objects of a history of maintenance that began three 
hundred years ago: and at no time in the period were 
the  then-current  objects  of  that  history  arranged   226 
housewise anywhere but here.‘ (van Inwagen 1990) p. 
133 
 
He acknowledges that there are problems with such a paraphrase but thinks it is 
‗on the right track‘ (p. 134).  
 
One issue that stands out is that this notion of a ‗history of maintenance‘ only 
applies to artefacts. If one were to go and climb Mount Everest today, one 
would be climbing the same mountain that Hillary first climbed. How is van 
Inwagen to make sense of a sentence saying as much? And mountains are not 
the only non-artificial objects we might want to so keep track of. The sun might 
be another, as might our planet, or the Atlantic Ocean. He gives a clue about 
how he might respond in the following:  
 
‗Statements  that  are  apparently  about  the  persistence  of 
artifacts  make  covert  reference  to  the  dispositions  of 
intelligent beings to maintain certain arrangements of matter. 
We might compare statements of this sort with statements 
apparently  about  the  persistence  of  constellations  (―the 
heavens  change  slowly;  the  constellations  of  today  are  the 
constellations  the  Greeks  named‖),  which  make  covert 
reference to the perspectives of actual or possible observers 
of the heavens‘. (van Inwagen 1990) p. 134.  
 
Now  then,  we  have  built  into  everyday  persistence  or  identity  claims  about 
almost anything some sort of tacit reference to whomever else did or could have 
conceptualised that object. Implausible as this is as a general account of object 
terms, it clearly is not sufficient as an account of how we now refer to non-
artefacts  that  others  encountered  earlier.  Hillary  did  not  climb  the  same 
mountain-wise  arrangement  of  simples  that  is  in  Nepal  now  and  is  called 
Everest. Bits will have fallen off Everest since then, and other bits may have 
been added. So what is it that van Inwagen requires to have been maintained? 
We can make reference to the perspective of Hillary, but his perspective was a 
relation to a different collection of simples to that which we would see if we 
went to Everest.    227 
 
We can paraphrase that quote that we gave above :  
 
There are simples arranged mountainwise here now, and these simples 
are  the  current  objects  of  a  history  of  maintenance  that  began  when 
people first reached this place: and at no time in the period were the 
then-current objects of that history arranged mountainwise anywhere but 
here. 
 
It is just not clear how to make sense of this.  
 
Merricks offers a more promising alternative. He suggests that we can solve the 
issue  of  when  one  object-wise  arrangement  is  the  same  as  another  by 
introducing the idea of simples being arranged ‗same-object wise‘. The idea here 
then, is that it would be ‗nearly as good as true‘ that this is the same mountain as 
the one that Hillary is famous for climbing if and only if, the simples in front of 
us  are  arranged  ‗same  mountainwise‘  as  the  arrangement  of  simples  that  he 
climbed. He gives a condition for some simples being arranged ‗same statue-
wise‘ as follows (as before this is supposed to generalise): 
 
   
‗Atoms at t are arranged same-statuewise as atoms at t* if and 
only if (i) the atoms at t are arranged statuewise; (ii) the atoms 
at t* are arranged statuewise; and (iii) if there were persisting 
statues,  then  the  atoms  arranged  statuewise  at  t  would 
compose the same statue as the atoms arranged statuewise at 
t*.‘  (Merricks 2001) pp. 176-177 
 
 
Here then we see Merricks using the same rhetorical strategy as he used when 
introducing object-wise arrangements, an appeal to what we in fact do believe 
about everyday objects. This is ingenious, and Merricks argues that it is in fact a 
better account of our everyday object speech then the account that takes it to be 
about objects. The basis of this claim to utility is that the account purportedly   228 
allows  for  those  cases  where  we  want  to  allow  that  whether  some  artefact 
persists over time is to some degree a matter of stipulation. As was mentioned 
above, the Ship of Theseus is one of these. Merricks suggests that we could 
imagine a court case about whether some statue I own is the same one as was 
owned in the past by the royal family and that we would accept this sort of 
legislation. His suggestion is that by removing artefacts from our ontology we 
can  replace  talk  of  them  with  some  sort  of  conventionalism  about  object 
identity. 
 
We have already noted that Merricks‘ feeling that problems such as the Ship of 
Theseus do not arise for organisms is overly optimistic. We might here express 
scepticism about whether Merricks‘ account can allow for this sort of legislation 
and whether it is a benefit for his account if it does.  
 
The reason we might doubt that the notion of same-objectwise arrangement 
allows for a conventionalism about when some object is the same as another is 
its reliance on (what Merricks takes to be) the contra-possible identity of one 
object  with  another.  We  have  already  noted  (see  Section  4.1  above)  that 
Merricks‘ appeal to contra-possibles is at best slightly odd. But if he is truly to 
appeal to them he cannot suppose that we legislate how they are any more than 
someone who thinks that there really are statues can.  
 
Someone like Dorr, who argues that the correct assertability conditions of our 
object talk come away from the truth conditions, might hold something like this, 
but  such a position  cannot then rely upon  the contra-possible behaviour of 
objects to establish what the assertability conditions of our object speech are. 
To rely on such objects is not conventionalism in the sense that Merricks thinks 
would be helpful. 
 
We can all agree that in the court case example the answer arrived at is driven by 
pragmatics. However, one cannot just ‗decide‘ that a statue in your possession 
has survived from the 17th century or what not. It is just not clear that the   229 
Eliminativist  gives  a  better  account  of  this  than  someone  who  believes  in 
objects. Consider, for example, someone who created an atom for atom replica 
of  Michael  Angelo‘s  David.  Would  this  replica  be  Michael  Angelo‘s  David? 
Certainly not. It would not be even if some court were to legislate that it was the 
original Michael Angelo‘s David.     
 
The account of objects sketched in Chapter Two of this thesis allows that at 
times the application and co-application conditions for our object concepts may 
be unclear, and it is consistent with there being a need to occasionally adjust 
concepts in the light of new discoveries. What it relies on, however, is that they 
track what is actually going on in our environment. Merricks‘ account is wrong 
because i) it is not clear that it does allow for the sort of conventionalism he 
thinks would be useful, and ii) even if it did, object identity is not a matter of 
convention, so making ‗same-objectwise-arrangement‘ a matter of convention 
would mean it is not able to adequately account for our actual practice. 
 
What Merricks is suggesting could be termed a piggy-back semantics: it borrows 
the  semantic  discipline  of  our  actual  everyday  object  talk  while  rejecting  its 
ontological  commitments.  Merricks  is  piggybacking  an  alternative  semantics 
onto  the  semantics  of  our  actual  everyday  object  talk  in  a  somewhat  ad  hoc 
manner in order to provide a semantics consistent with his metaphysics that 
would allow us to function in the world. The conclusion we should draw, is not 
that the Organicist position copes especially well with the problem of the Ship 
of Theseus, but rather that it has the same problems with all objects that other 
positions only have with problem cases.  
 
It has been argued in this chapter that the Organicist position incurs two sets of 
argumentative burdens in relation to the puzzles about everyday objects. One 
set  of  burdens  arises  from  the  application  of  those  puzzles  to  the  everyday 
objects which they do think exist: living objects. The challenge of these puzzles 
is one that they bear along with anyone else who believes that there are some 
composite objects.    230 
 
The other set of argumentative burdens is incurred by their claim that they do 
better with the puzzles as applied  to non-living everyday  objects  than other 
positions do. They need to show that the costs that their position gives rise to 
by virtue of eliminating objects are compensated in terms of utility in dealing 
with the puzzles. In the last part of this section we have examined some of the 
costs incurred in terms of the complexity of the semantics given to our everyday 
talk of persisting objects.  
 
We should draw the following conclusion from the two puzzles discussed in this 
chapter:  the  Organicist  position,  like  any  other  philosophical  position  has 
strengths and weaknesses. This chapter suggests that any benefits Organicism 
might offer in dealing with the puzzles are either not as significant as might 
initially  have  been  thought  (as  in  the  case  of  the  sorites)  or  correspond  to 
challenges for the position elsewhere (as in the case of the Ship of Theseus).  
 
The purpose of this thesis has been to argue that Organicists‘ emphasis on the 
notion of composition is misguided. If one thought that the Organicist position 
did  a  good  enough  job  in  relation  to  the  puzzles,  however,  one  might  be 
tempted  to  attempt  to  rehabilitate  it  even  in  the  face  of  this  critique  of 
compositional ontology. In order to warrant this, however, Organicism would 
have to do very well with the puzzles. It would have to be clearly better than the 
alternatives. What has been suggested in this chapter is just that Organicism is 
not  a  ‗quick  fix‘  for  the  puzzles  about  everyday  objects.  It  may  be  that 
Organicism has some advantages over other positions in relation to the puzzles 
that stem from its positive ontological claim; but if so these advantages are not 
self-evident and have yet to be shown to be sufficient to outweigh the costs of 
the position.  
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has presented a number of challenges to the Organicist position. 
Organicism is founded upon two key ideas. One founding idea is that we can 
establish what things there are by determining when composition occurs. When, 
that is, mereological simples compose other things. The other founding idea is 
the  O-arranging  manoeuvre;  the  idea  that  we  do  not  need  objects  in  our 
ontology because anything that objects can do, simples arranged object-wise can 
do just as well. 
 
The idea that composition is what matters in ontology was challenged on two 
scores. It was noted that the concept of ‗composition‘ that Organicists appeal to 
is not one that they can offer any real analysis of; the best they can manage is a 
very contentious claim about the extension of the concept. Firstly, it was argued 
that this means that there is a difficulty in making sense of the notion of a 
mereological simple. Secondly  and  more importantly, it was argued that  this 
means there is no principled reason to reject the notion that everyday objects 
are functional simples. Even if we were to accept the Organicists‘ claim that the 
only  composite  objects  are  organisims,  the  claim  that  the  only  objects  are 
organisms would not follow because we have been given no principled reason 
to reject the idea that (in the slightly mysterious sense of composition that is at 
issue in this debate) everyday objects are non-composites or simples. 
 
In the last part of this thesis some consequences of the O-arranging manoeuvre 
have  been  drawn  out.  It  was  noted  that  one  purpose  of  the  O-arranging 
manoeuvre was to allow the ‗no-difference‘ claim; the claim, that is, that things 
would appear just as they actually do even if there were no objects. We noted 
that  one  consequence  of  this  is  that  while  denying  that  there  are  everyday 
objects, the Organicist accepts that the world is in other ways very similar to the 
way we normally take it to be. Most importantly, they must allow that those 
macroscopic sparse properties that we take to be distributed through the world   232 
are distributed in more or less the way we suppose them to be. In Chapter Five, 
we saw the key role that the O-arranging manoeuvre must play for Organicists 
in making sense of speech and thoughts about objects.  
 
This then fits nicely with the theory of objects presented in Chapter Two. The 
theory presented there takes objects to be those regularities in our environment 
which satisfy our object concepts. In Chapter Three, we saw that this need not 
be taken as a new or radical theory, but rather as an extension of one of the 
original lines of thought of British empiricism.  
 
It was then argued that by utilising the O-arranging manoeuvre the Organicists 
have committed themselves both to the existence of the sorts of regularities that 
the theory of properties in Chapter Two requires for there to be objects, and to 
there  being  object  concepts  which  these  regularities  satisfy.  The  second 
challenge that this thesis presents to Organicists then, is to say why we should 
not accept on this basis that there are everyday objects. The reasons they have 
presented to date have focused upon composition, but if they are to rely on this, 
they must give us a better account of what composition is. 
 
The conclusion I have drawn then, is that the Organicists‘ negative ontological 
claim is false. We have seen that we have reasons to reject their reasons for 
holding it, and further, that we have reasons to suppose that there are everyday 
objects.  
 
At the beginning of Chapter One, an approach to questions about the existence 
of everyday objects was outlined that I termed ‗compositional ontology‘. The 
basis of this approach is that one can establish what there is by establishing what 
mereological simples there are, and then establishing under what conditions they 
will compose further things. By establishing, that is, rules of composition. It was 
noted  that  there  are  three  available  options  that  one  can  take  concerning 
composition,  and  that  these  give  rise  to  cognate  positions  with  respect  to 
ontology. Nihilism, for instance, is the thesis that there are no everyday objects,   233 
and  it  is  supposed  to  follow  from  the  thesis  that  there  is  no  composition. 
Universalism is the view that for any two objects there is a third object that they 
compose  and  is  supposed  to  follow  fairly  immediately  from  the  thesis  of 
Unrestricted  Composition.  The  thesis  that  is,  that  any  two  entities  always 
compose a third. Organicism is supposed to follow from a particular version of 
restricted composition: the thesis that sometimes simples compose an object, 
and sometimes they do not. The particular version of restricted composition 
that the Organicist appeals to says that objects compose another when they 
(jointly) constitute a life. 
 
This thesis has offered arguments against Organicism. In doing so, it has also 
raised a challenge for the compositional approach to ontology in general. If, as is 
argued in Chapter One, it would be better to conclude that everyday objects are 
simple then to conclude that there are no such objects, then we  need no longer 
treat ‗what there is‘ as hostage to composition. Given this, we can argue that if 
we are interested in composition the order of discovery should be reversed. 
Rather than finding out what things are composite, and using this to work out 
what exists, we should first find out what there is and then work out what things 
are composite.  
 
It  has  been  shown  here  how  this  sort  of  consideration  is  telling  against 
Organicists.  Nihilist  share  with  Organicists  the  negative  ontological  claim 
(lacking only the positive ontological claim that there are living things). To the 
extent that they support their claim in similar ways, parallel arguments will apply. 
We  saw  in  Chapter  Six,  for  instance,  that  Dorr‘s  argument  from  over-
determination  faces  similar  challenges  to  Merricks‘  argument  from  over-
determination. At least one prominent Nihilist, Peter Unger, does not make use 
of the O-arranging manoeuvre to support his position. Without the O-arranging 
manoeuvre though, nihilists face a greater challenge, for they must assuage the 
implausibility of denying the existence of everyday objects in some other way.  
We  can  tentatively,  then,  suggest  that  a  similar  case  may  be  made  against 
nihilism as has here been made against Organicism. It will be noted, however,   234 
that the Nihilist is in a stronger position than Organicists are with respect to the 
account they can give of composition. They can say that there is none. The 
point remains, however, that there is no immediate inference from this to there 
being no everyday objects. 
 
In  the  First  Chapter  we  saw  that  compositional  ontology  has  its  roots  in 
mereological  approaches  to  composition.  Little  has  been  said  here  that  will 
challenge  someone  who  adopts  a  Universalist  ontology  on  the  basis  of 
endorsing unrestricted composition.  We have shown that we do not need to 
endorse such an ontology in order to maintain the existence of everyday objects, 
but there are other reasons for holding such an ontology. Sider, for instance 
argues that there are theoretical benefits in dealing with issues about persistence 
through time (Sider 2001).  This thesis has given reasons to think that the best 
approach to ontology is not, in general, a compositional one. If, however, one is 
still inclined to adopt a compositional ontology, Universalism is the version least 
affected by this thesis and it is the version one should chose.   
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